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Abstract			This	 thesis	 studies	 how	 strategic	 communication	 is	 introduced	 by	 the	 EU	 as	 an	 approach	 to	managing	“disinformation”	in	Russian	media.			Through	a	problematization	of	the	Russian	media	system,	the	EU	legitimizes	its	emerging	use	of	strategic	communication	as	a	foreign	policy	practice	towards	Russia.	In	this	way	”disinformation”	in	Russian	media	is	both	perceived	as	a	threat	to	EU	governance,	and	as	a	possibility	to	extend	EU	governance	within	its	Eastern	neighbor	regions	and	within	the	Union	itself.			The	 analysis	 draws	 on	 a	 governmentality	 analytical	 framework.	 It	 aims	 at	 studying	 strategic	communication	 as	 a	 unifying	 practice,	 which	 encourages	 the	 formation	 of	 strategically	communicating	 diplomats	 with	 greater	 abilities	 to	 bridge	 the	 gaps	 between	 national	 and	 EU	foreign	policy.	The	study	 is	based	on	EU	policy	papers	and	empirical	material,	primarily	about	the	 EU’s	 East	 StratCom,	 and	 interviews	 with	 EU	 practitioners	 working	 with	 strategic	communication	in	Russia	(diplomats	from	the	EU	delegation	and	national	EU	embassies).							 												
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1 	 Introduction		
1.1 Motivation	
1.1.1 Europe	in	an	information	war?		Ever	since	the	outbreak	of	the	Ukraine	crisis	in	the	fall	of	2013,	dialogue	between	the	EU	and	Russia	has	been	tense.	In	the	public	debates	opinion	makers	in	both	Russian	 and	 EU	 based	media	 have	 even	 labeled	 the	 situation	 an	 “information	war”	 (BBC	16.09.15,	RT	01.10.15).	Leaders	and	opinion	makers	 in	 the	EU	have	claimed	that	Russian	journalists	do	not	report	‘objective’	and	trustworthy	news,	but	 are	 being	 used	 to	 disseminate	 the	 Russian	 government’s	 political	propaganda	 –	 or	 as	 the	 EU	 officially	 says:	 “Russia’s	 ongoing	 disinformation	campaigns”	(East	StratCom	1).	This	allegation	is	not	only	presented	as	a	problem	because	 it	 contradicts	 the	 EU’s	 values	 for	 independent	media	 (IFJ	 Declaration	1954),	 but	 as	 a	 prominent	 EU	 diplomat	 in	 Moscow	 states	 also	 because	 it	threatens	the	legitimacy	of	the	EU	itself:					
“We	have	seen	a	continually	more	intense	campaign,	which	has	also	distorted	and	
misrepresented	what	the	EU	has	done”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		One	 of	 many	 noticeable	 examples	 he	 gives	 is	 a	 news	 story	 that	 flourished	 in	several	Russian	news	sites	and	bigger	media,	informing	that	the	EU	was	funding	concentration	 camps	 for	 Russian	 separatists	 in	 Eastern	 Ukraine.	 The	 pictures	that	accompanied	the	story	portrayed	EU	funded	buildings	in	Ukraine.	In	reality,	however,	they	showed	a	construction	site	of	an	EU-funded	project	for	temporary	housing	of	 illegal	 immigrants	 (Stopfake	26.04.15;	 Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		The	perceived	increase	in	discrediting	stories	about	the	EU	in	Russian	media	has	urged	 the	EU	 to	 act.	On	19-20	March	2015,	 the	European	Council	 invited	High	
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Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy	and	Vice	President	of	the	Commission	 (HRVP),	 Federica	 Mogherini,	 to	 develop	 a	 strategy	 on	 how	 to	minimize	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 so-called	 “disinformation”	 stemming	 from	 the	Russian	media.	The	answer	 to	 the	perceived	 threat	of	 “disinformation”	became	strategic	 communication	 (stratcom),	which	 can	 theoretically	be	defined	as	 “the	
purposeful	 use	 of	 communication	 by	 an	 organization	 to	 fulfill	 its	 mission”	(Hallahan	et.	al	2007:	3).	Supporting	this,	the	EU	presents	it	as	“an	important	tool	
in	 furthering	 the	 EU's	 overall	 policy	 objectives”,	 especially	 through	 the	communication	of	the	EU’s	values	and	successes	in	order	to	change	the	negative	picture	 of	 the	 EU	 often	 promoted	 in	 the	 Russian	media	 (East	 StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).			
1.1.2 The	EU’s	problematization	of	Russia’s	“media	campaign”		The	East	Stratcom	Team	implementing	the	strategy	works	through	three	overall	objectives:	1)	To	enhance	 information	about	 the	EU’s	policies	and	values,	2)	 to	produce	 and	 spread	 factual	 information	 against	 disinformation,	 and	 3)	 to	support	the	development	of	independent	Russian	language	media	in	post-Soviet	countries.	 Although	 its	 work	 especially	 addresses	 the	 Russian	 speaking	minorities	 in	 the	 EU	 Eastern	 Partnership	 countries	 (Armenia,	 Azerbaijan,	Belarus,	Georgia,	the	Republic	of	Moldova	and	Ukraine),	the	Russian	population	and	 Russian	 speakers	 in	 EU	 member	 states	 are	 also	 defined	 as	 target	 groups	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan;	Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).			Studies	have	shown	that	most	Russian	speakers,	no	matter	where	they	live,	use	Russian	 state	 controlled	media	 as	 their	 primary	 source	 of	 information	 (Gallup	2014),	 which	 makes	 Russian	 state	 controlled	 media	 very	 influential	 among	Russian	 speakers	 globally.	 Furthermore,	 this	 influence	 is	 strengthened	 by	 the	fact	 that	pro-Kremlin	(Russian	government	 friendly)	editors	have	 taken	seat	 in	many	 smaller	media	 outlets	 within	 the	 last	 years	 (Vartanova	 2012).	 The	 high	degree	of	state	intervention	and	elite	interests	in	the	Russian	media	is	presented	as	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	spread	of	“disinformation”	by	diplomats	from	
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the	 EU	 and	 EU	member	 states	 working	 in	 Russia	 (Diplomat	 interviews	 2015-2016).	State	 control	over	Russian	media	has	caused	a	 relatively	high	degree	of	media	 distrust	 among	 Russian	 populations	 (Vartanova	 2012,	 Gehlbach	 2010).	The	 distrust	 is	 not	 just	 confined	 to	 the	 Russian	 media,	 but	 also	 brings	 into	question	the	independence	of	EU	based	media,	which	some	Russian	based	media	accuse	 of	 being	 Western	 propagandists	 trying	 to	 “persuade	 everyone	 to	 hate	
Russia	and	 its	policies”	 (SputnikNews	 14.08.15).	 Similarly,	 Russian	 State	media	has	 framed	 the	East	StratCom	Team	as	being	 founded	as	part	of	upscaling	“the	
information	war	against	Russia”	(TV	Rossiya	30.03.16).		This	critical	narrative	against	‘the	West’,	including	EU	member	states,	is	not	just	strong	 inside	 Russia,	 but	 also	 in	 Russian	 state	 media	 broadcasting	 outside	 of	Russia.	 The	 Russian	 state	 has	 recently	 up-scaled	 the	 support	 for	 these	 global	news	services,	and	other	national	state	media	have	received	substantial	budget	increases	 as	 well.	 This	 has	 raised	 the	 budget	 for	 Russian	 state	 media	 to	approximately	 1.3	 billion	 USD	 in	 2016	 (Moscow	 Times	 11.10.15;	 ibtimes	10.12.15).	In	the	EU,	these	huge	investments	in	media	productions	are	perceived	as	a	part	of	 the	Russian	 “disinformation	campaign”	against	 the	West.	The	most	skeptical	voices	within	the	EU	have	been	expressing	the	concern	that	the	Russian	president	 Vladimir	 Putin	 can	 utilize	 the	 media	 to	 legitimize	 future	 military	actions	 that	 violate	 international	 law	 -	 as	 was	 the	 case	 with	 the	 Russian	annexation	of	Crimea	in	March	2014,	which	gained	huge	public	support	among	Russian	speakers	(EUobserver	23.06.15,	Gallup	2014).		
1.1.3 Strategic	communication	–	A	resolution	to	challenged	governance?		The	media’s	 ability	 to	 set	 agendas	 and	 frame	political	 issues	 has	 given	 them	a	distinguished	position	to	influence	foreign	policy	(Gilboa	2005,	Robinson	2001).	In	 this	 way,	 critical	 narratives	 about	 the	 EU	 in	 Russia	 and	 the	 Eastern	Partnership	 countries	 is	 feared	 to	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 EU’s	cooperation	 with	 these	 countries,	 including	 on	 high-priority	 issues	 such	 as	border	and	conflict	management	and	democracy	promotion	(Barbé	&	Johansson-
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Nogué	 2008).	 Also	 within	 the	 EU	 itself	 negative	 media	 coverage	 can	 have	 a	substantial	 influence,	 “since	 ordinary	 citizens	 usually	 do	 not	 have	 ‘first-	 hand’	
experience	 of	 the	 EU,	 but	 depend	 on	 mass	 media	 coverage	 for	 information”	(Maier&Rittberger	2008:	245,	Koopmans&Statham	2010).			Within	 the	 EU,	 free	media	 and	 journalism	 are	 stressed	 as	 being	 “an	 important	
gauge	 of	 democracy”,	 since	 the	 media	 play	 a	 “leading	 role”	 for	 the	 European	integration	process	(EU	Parliament	1).	Therefore,	critical	media	narratives	that	contradict	the	EU’s	fundamental	values	and	own	narrative	of	the	EU	as	“a	force	for	good”	might	constitute	a	threat	to	EU	governance	itself	(Barbé	&	Johansson-Nogué	 2008).	 Correspondingly,	 the	 EU	 sees	 disinformation	 and	 state	 control	over	media	 content	 as	opposing	and	 threatening	 the	dissemination	of	 the	EU’s	fundamental	 values.	 The	 “disinformation”	 spread	 through	 Russian	 media	 –	especially	the	stories	related	to	the	EU	–	is	therefore	something	the	Union	finds	important	 to	 be	 “prepared	 to	anticipate	and	 respond	 to”	 (East	 StratCom	Action	Plan	 2015).	 In	 order	 to	 deal	 with	 “disinformation”	 the	 EU	 has	 introduced	strategic	 communication	as	 a	 legitimate	way	 to	 counter	 the	Russian	narratives	spread	through	the	media.		This	thesis	argues	that	the	implementation	of	strategic	communication	practice	in	 the	 EU’s	 foreign	 policy	 towards	 Russia	 is	 not	 only	 a	 matter	 of	 concrete	“disinformation”-management,	it	is	also	an	act	of	legitimizing	and	conducting	EU	governance	in	itself.	In	order	to	study	these	processes	of	governance	in	the	EU’s	foreign	policy,	and	the	role	of	media	and	strategic	communication	in	this	process,	the	 thesis	 takes	 its	point	of	departure	 in	governmentality	 theory	developed	by	Michel	 Foucault	 and	 elaborated	 by	Mitchel	 Dean.	Within	 this	 poststructuralist	framework,	 human	 conduct	 is	 something	 that	 can	 be	 regulated	 and	 created	through	 governance	 processes,	 and	 the	 form	 of	 identities	 they	 animate	 (Dean	2009:	18ff).	The	production	of	knowledge	that	for	example	takes	place	through	the	media	must	then	be	seen	as	a	part	of	governance,	since	“To	govern	(…)	is	to	
structure	 the	 possible	 field	 of	 action	 of	 others”	 (Foucault	 2003	 [1982]:	 128	 in	Torfing&Sørensen	2005:	115ff).	In	line	with	this,	strategic	communication	can	be	studied	 as	 a	 governance	 practice	 underpinned	 by	 different	 rationalities	 and	
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technologies	 involved	 in	 the	 processes	 of	 shaping	 perceptions	 and	 actions	 of	populations	into	a	governable	entity	(Dean	2009).		
1.2 Research	question	
The	 outset	 for	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 study	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU’s	 East	StratCom-strategy	 in	Russia,	 and	 outline	 how	 critical	 allegations	 by	 prominent	EU	politicians	and	other	influential	EU	opinion	makers	against	the	Russian	media	was	actually	turned	into	concrete	foreign	policy	initiatives	and	implemented	into	a	 Russian	 context.	 But	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 EU	 actors	 articulate	 and	legitimize	the	application	of	strategic	communication	as	a	foreign	policy	practice	towards	Russia,	governmentality	theory	was	chosen	as	a	theoretical	framework,	through	which	the	interconnectedness	of	the	concepts	of	foreign	policy	practice,	media	systems,	press	norms,	disinformation,	and	strategic	communication	could	be	investigated.		The	central	aim	of	 the	 thesis	 is	 to	study	how	discourses	on	“disinformation”	 in	the	Russian	media	are	used	to	 legitimize	EU	governance	through	foreign	policy	practices,	 specifically	 through	 strategic	 communication	 related	 to	 Russian	“disinformation”.	 This	 study	 of	 EU	 foreign	 policy	 thus	 places	 itself	 in	 the	interplay	 between	 the	 role	 of	 the	media	 as	 a	 crucial	 structure	 for	 the	 opinion	formation	process	 among	 the	populations,	 and	 strategic	 communication	 as	 the	EU’s	way	to	influence	this	process	and	legitimize	EU	governance.			The	 above	 considerations	 and	 areas	 of	 interest	 have	 led	 me	 to	 the	 following	research	question,	which	guides	this	study:								
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RESEARCH	QUESTION	
	How	does	the	EU	govern	through	strategic	communication	with	the	aim	to	diminish	the	effects	of	perceived	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media?					
1.2.1 Sub-questions	 		 1. How	do	utopian	assumptions	and	a	problematization	of	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	construct	a	field	for	legitimate	EU	governance?		 2. How	is	strategic	communication	practice	 implemented	among	diplomats	in	 Russia,	 and	 how	 does	 it	 enable	 governance	 through	 The	 StratCom	Regime?	
	
1.2.2 Clarification	of	concepts		In	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 research	 question	 three	 central	concepts	 will	 be	 presented	 briefly,	 before	 they	 are	 applied	 and	 elaborated	throughout	the	thesis:	“Disinformation”,	the	Russian	media	system,	and	strategic	communication.		Disinformation:		
	The	 official	 strategy	 documents	 from	 the	 EU’s	 East	 StratCom	 use	“disinformation”	as	a	broad	term	to	describe	the	information	spread	by	Russian	media,	politicians	or	officials	etc.,	which	 it	 finds	misleading,	nonfactual,	 and/or	discrediting	 the	 EU	 on	 a	 false	 premise	 (EU	 Actions	 Plan;	 East	 StratCom	Q&A).	
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Disinformation	as	a	concept	will	be	further	elaborated	in	chapter	3.	For	now,	the	term	 “disinformation”	will	 be	defined	 as	 forms	of	 journalistic	 productions	 that	differ	 from	 the	 press	 norms	 and	media	 ethics	 promoted	 by	 e.g.	 the	 European	Federation	of	Journalists	(IFJ	Declaration	1954).			This	 thesis	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 evaluate	 or	 judge	 if	 or	 to	 what	 extend	 there	 is	disinformation	 in	 the	 Russian	 media.	 Thus,	 the	 term	 “disinformation”	 is	presented	 in	 double	 quotation	 marks	 in	 order	 to	 stress	 that	 this	 refers	 to	 a	discursive	concept,	which	is	used	to	legitimize	certain	policy	practices.			Strategic	communication:	
	Within	 recent	 studies,	 strategic	 communication	 is	 concerned	with	 the	ways	 in	which	 an	 organization	 communicates	 purposefully	 to	 advance	 its	 mission	(Hallahan	 et	 al.	 2007:	 4).	 But	 within	 the	 thesis’	 governmentality	 framework,	strategic	communication	will	not	just	be	studied	as	a	‘neutral’	policy	tool.	Instead	the	 thesis	will	 examine	how	 the	concept	 is	 composed	of	powerful	 rationalities,	tools,	 and	 practices,	 which	 underpin	 the	 EU’s	 introduction	 of	 strategic	communication	 as	 a	 legitimate	 foreign	 policy	 practice	 towards	 Russian	“disinformation”.	The	StratCom	Regime:	Within	 this	 thesis	 governance	will	 be	 understood	within	 the	 governmentality-framework	presented	in	chapter	2.	In	line	with	Mitchell	Dean’s	study	of	‘regimes	of	 practices’	 this	 thesis	 sets	 of	 to	 construct	 and	 study	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	regime	 of	 practices	 that	 has	 emerged	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EU’s	 problematization	 of	“disinformation”	within	the	Russian	media.	The	full	name	of	this	regime	is	“The	Regime	of	Diplomatic	Strategic	Communication	towards	“Disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	”	with	from	now	on	will	be	referred	to	as	The	StratCom	Regime.	This	 regime	 is	 constituted	 by	 diplomatic	 practices	 and	 actors	 targeting	“dinsinformation”	 in	 the	 Russian	 media.	 As	 described	 in	 the	 introduction	 the	Russian	media	 are	 also	 influential	 in	 especially	 Eastern	 Partnership	 countries,	and	 in	 this	way	 this	 study	 could	 also	 have	 included	 diplomats	 in	 e.g.	 Ukraine,	
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Moldova,	Georgia	etc.	But	since	Russia	in	the	case	for	this	thesis	the	diplomats	in	Russia	will	provide	the	empirical	basis	for	this	thesis.	Throughout	the	thesis	East	StratCom	will	be	referring	to	the	EU’s	East	StratCom-strategy	as	it	is	formulated	through	the	Action	Plan	describing	the	strategy	implementation.	When	I	refer	to	the	East	StratCom	Team	(comprised	by	9	staff	within	the	EEAS	in	Brussels)	this	will	we	states	explicitly.	Throughout	 the	 thesis	quotations	of	other	sources,	will	be	presented	 in	double	quotations	marks.	New	concepts	will	be	presented	in	single	quotations	marks	in	order	 to	state	 that	 they	represent	 terms	 that	have	a	conceptual	 function	 in	 the	text	or	words	that	can	only	be	understood	according	to	subjective	 judgment	as	‘right’,	‘wrong’	or	‘the	truth’.		Chapter	3	will	elaborate	on	the	hegemonic	understandings	of	the	EU	as	a	foreign	policy	 actor.	 Here	 two	 dominant	 definitions	 of	 EU’s	 foreign	 policy	 identity	 is	introduced:	 EU	 as	 a	 supranational	 vs.	 EU	 as	 an	 intergovernmental	 actor	(Jørgensen	2004:	12).	Throughout	the	thesis	‘EU	actors’	will	be	used	to	describe	all	actors	taking	direct	part	of	the	constitutions	of	the	EU	in	its	broadest	sense,	which	both	includes	EU	institutions,	member	states,	and	 individuals	working	 for	 the	EU	or	EU	member	states.	 ‘EU	 practitioners’	 refers	 to	 individuals	 specifically	 engaged	 in	 policy	formulation	and	execution	within	 the	EU	 institutions.	The	 label	 ‘diplomats’	will	be	referring	to	diplomats	from	both	the	EU	Delegation	in	Moscow	and	diplomats	from	 embassies	 of	 individual	 member	 states	 in	 Moscow	 working	 with	 the	implementation	 and	 development	 of	 strategic	 communication	 in	 Russia.	 If	nothing	else	is	specified,	‘the	EU’	within	this	study	will	be	referring	to	the	sum	of	EU	institutions	and	member	states	engaged	in	EU	affairs	or	policy.	
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1.3 The	scope	of	the	thesis	
	
1.3.1 	Structure	of	the	thesis		The	 following	 section	 provides	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 thesis.	While	Table	1	contains	a	very	stylized	overview	of	the	structure,	a	more	detailed	project	design	is	available	in	the	end	of	this	chapter.				
Table	1.	Structure	of	the	thesis	
	
												Chapter	1:	 Introduction	 to	 the	 field	of	 research,	 the	 research	question,	 and	 the	central	concepts	of	the	thesis.		
	Chapter	 2:	 Presentation	 of	 the	 analytical	 and	 methodological	 framework	departing	 in	 poststructuralism	 and	 governmentality	 theory.	 The	 analytical	dimensions	of	Dean’s	regime	of	practice	analysis,	episteme,	visibility,	techne,	and	
identity	 formation	 are	 presented	 among	 other	 theoretical	 concepts	 guiding	 the	analysis.	Moreover,	the	empirical	material	used	for	this	thesis	is	presented	along	
Chapter	1	 Introduction	Chapter	2	 Analytical	framework		&	Research	methods	Chapter	3	 Analysis	1	Chapter	4	 Analysis	1	Chapter	5	 Analysis	2	Chapter	6	 Analysis	2	Chapter	7	 Reflections	Chapter	8	 Conclusion	
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with	some	central	analytical	considerations	regarding	this	thesis’	construction	of	The	StratCom	Regime.		Chapter	3:	Chapter	 three	constitutes	 the	 first	part	of	Analysis	1,	which	aims	 to	answer	sub-question	1.	This	 is	done	 through	 the	analysis	of	 the	 first	analytical	dimension,	 episteme.	 This	 chapter	 outlines	 the	 underlying	 forms	 of	 knowledge	and	values	underpinning	EU	practitioners’	strategic	communication	practice	and	their	problematizations	of	the	Russian	media	system.		Chapter	4:	This	chapter	provides	the	second	part	of	Analysis	1	through	a	study	of	the	 dimension	 visibility.	 It	 studies	 how	 “disinformation”	 in	 the	 Russian	 media	system	has	become	problematized	by	 the	EU	after	 the	outbreak	of	 the	Ukraine	crisis,	and	how	this	has	enabled	the	construction	of	the	Russian	media	system	as	a	target	for	EU	foreign	policy.			Chapter	5:	By	studying	how	strategic	communication	has	been	 introduced	as	a	legitimate	 foreign	 policy	 response	 to	 “disinformation”,	 and	 by	 outlining	 the	central	 rationalities	 and	 practices	 which	 underpin	 this	 response,	 this	 chapter	contains	the	first	part	of	the	answer	to	sub-question	2.	This	include	the	study	of	the	analytical	dimension	techne	(Analysis	2).		
	Chapter	 6:	 Through	 a	 study	 of	 the	 identity	 formation	 dimension,	 this	 chapter	constitutes	 the	 second	 part	 of	 Analysis	 2.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 processes	 of	legitimizing	strategic	communication	as	a	foreign	policy	practice	is	studied	based	on	 the	 way	 diplomats	 in	 Moscow	 adapt	 to	 the	 role	 as	 ‘the	 strategically	communicating	diplomat’.		Chapter	 7:	 This	 chapter	 presents	 some	 reflections	 on	 what	 consequences	 the	institutionalization	 of	 strategic	 communication	 into	 the	 EU	 foreign	 policy	 can	have	for	diplomatic	work.		Chapter	8:	The	 last	chapter	provides	the	overall	conclusion,	which	answers	the	research	 question.	Here	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 four	 dimensions	 of	 The	 StratCom	
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Regime	are	placed	within	the	scope	of	the	governmentality	framework,	in	order	to	 see	 how	 the	 EU’s	 initiation	 of	 strategic	 communication	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	response	to	Russian	“disinformation”	is	enabling	hidden	EU	governance.		 	
1.3.2 Delimitation		The	current	diplomatic	relations	between	EU	countries	and	Russia	is	the	point	of	the	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 studying	 the	 interrelatedness	 of	 foreign	 policy	 and	strategic	communication.	Due	to	the	limitations	of	the	thesis	format,	the	study	is	limited	 to	 the	 EU-Russia	 relations	 of	 greatest	 relevance	 for	 the	 discourse	 on	“disinformation”	 within	 Russian	 media.	 Other	 policy	 areas	 relevant	 for	 the	general	 relations	 and	 perceptions	 of	 each	 other	 (“the	 other”),	 will	 only	 be	included	to	the	extent	they	take	direct	part	in	the	discourse,	practice	and	identity	creation	among	EU	actors.	The	 inclusion	and	exclusion	of	concepts,	knowledge,	and	 practices	 are	 results	 of	 the	 analytical	 “guidelines”	 provided	 by	 the	governmentality-framework	 and	 my	 own	 points	 of	 view	 as	 researcher,	 which	have	 affected	 the	 selection	 of	 central	 elements	 of	 the	 analysis.	 Similarly,	important	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 elements	 for	 the	 development	 of	 foreign	policy	 perceptions	 and	 discourses	 about	 Russia	 as	 “the	 other”	 have	 been	excluded	 due	 to	 their	 limited	 influence	 on	 strategic	 communication	 practice.	These	 areas	 include	 the	 trade	 relation	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 Russia	 and	 the	current	 impact	 of	 economic	 sanctions	 (Bagheri	 &	 Akbarpour	 2016;	 Shirov	 &	Yantovskii	 2015),	 the	 energy	 dependency	 on	 Russia	 among	 EU	 countries,	Ukraine	and	other	post-Soviet	states	(Tsakiris	2015),	or	the	incipient	military	re-escalations	between	NATO	and	Russia	(Hooker	2015;	Zadra	2014;	Diesen	2016;	Sakwa	2014).		Departing	 in	 poststructuralist	 science	 the	 thesis	 does	 not	 dwell	 much	 on	institutional	functionalists’	accounts	of	the	procedures	behind	EU	foreign	policy	and	the	East	StratCom	concerning	legislature,	economic	and	material	resources,	policy	decision	procedures	etc.	The	focus	of	my	governmentality	study	does	not	include	 scrutinizing	 the	 concrete	 implementation	 of	 the	 East	 StratCom	 Action	
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Plan.	Instead	the	strategy	is	studied	as	a	part	of	the	formation	and	legitimization	of	foreign	policy	practice.			An	important	goal	of	the	thesis	is	to	study	how	the	EU	problematizes	the	Russian	media	system.	As	described	by	Bacchi	2012	(p.6)	the	study	of	problematization	across	 different	 cultures,	 geopolitical	 spaces,	 and	 time	 enable	 us	 to	 do	comparative	 studies	 on	 “how	 an	 issue	 looks	 quite	 different	 in	 different	 locales”.	Due	to	the	limitations	of	the	thesis’	focus	will	be	on	the	EU’s	perceptions	of	and	discourses	about	Russian	“disinformation”.	However	interesting	a	comparison	of	the	respective	perceptions	might	be,	the	thesis	will	not	study	these	same	aspects	from	a	Russian	perspective.	For	detailed	observations	on	the	Russian	narratives	and	perspectives,	reference	is	made	to	a	range	of	other	studies,	which	focus	on	how	 Russia	 constructs	 its	 identity	 and	 foreign	 policy	 vis-à-vis	 the	 EU	 as	 “the	other”;	Prozorov	2007;	Wilson	&	Popescu	2009;	Averre	2009;	Sakwa	2011	etc.	Even	 though	 the	 ‘conduct	 of	 populations’	 (Dean	 2009)	 is	 a	 central	 part	 of	 a	traditional	 governmentality	 study,	 this	 thesis	 delimits	 itself	 from	 studying	 the	direct	 target	 groups	 for	 strategic	 communication.	 Within	 the	 field	 of	 the	 East	StratCom	these	are	defined	as	the	Russian	speaking	populations	in	and	outside	of	Russia.	This	exclusion	has	been	made	due	to	limited	resources,	and	not	least	due	to	 language	barriers.	 Instead	 the	Russian	 targets	groups	will	be	 included	when	they	 influence	on	how	the	EU	practitioners	 form	their	strategic	communication	practices.								
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1.3.3 Research	design	
	
	
RESEARCH	QUESTION	How	does	the	EU	govern	through	strategic	communication	with	the	aim	to	diminish	the	effects	of	perceived	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media?	
	
Sub-question	1		How	do	utopian	assumptions	and	a	problematization	of	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	construct	a	field	for	legitimate	EU	governance?		 Chapter	3	
EPISTEME	
Chapter	4	
VISIBILITY	
Realization	goals	-	How	is	the	EU	constructed	as	a	foreign	policy	actor?	-	How	is	the	EU	using	‘utopias’	to	legitimize	its	foreign	policy,	and	which	utopis	are	underpinning	the	East	StratCom?	-	How	does	the	exclusion	of	the	term	propaganda	in	the	EU	East	StratCom	seek	to	bridge	a	‘gap’	within	the	field	of	episteme?	
Realization	goals	-	How	has	the	conflict	narrative	on	Russia	as	a	‘revisionist’	state	been	strengthen	within	the	EU	since	the	outbreak	of	the	Ukraine	crisis?	-	How	does	the	EU	construct	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	as	a	part	of	a	staterun	“disinformation	campaign”?	-	How	are	the	diplomats	articulating	strategic	communication	as	a	legitimate	response	towards	“disinformation”?	
Analytical	approach	-	Analyze	central	elements	in	the	field	of	
episteme	
Analytical	approach	-	Analyze	central	elements	in	the	field	of	visibility	
Findings	
The	utopias	underpinning	the	EU	help	bridging	
the	contradictions	in	the	EU’s	foreign	policy	
identity.	The	utopias	of	press	norms	and	
independent	media	is	central	for	the	
legitimization	of	the	East	StratCom.	The	term	
propaganda	is	excluded	from	the	East	StratCom	
as	an	attempt	to	strengthen	the	EU’s	ability	to	act	
as	a	unified	policy	actor	through	the	East	
StratCom.	
	
Findings	
Through	the	conflict	narrative	of	Russia	as	a	
‘revisionist’	state	the	EU	is	problematizing	
“disinformation”	within	the	Russia	media	as	being	a	
part	of	“disinformation	campaign”	by	the	Russian	
state	targeting	the	EU.	
Through	a	problematization	of	Russia’s	‘neo-
authoritarian	media	system’	the	EU	has	introduced	
the	East	StratCom	as	a	legitimate	defensive	response	
to	“Russia’s	campaign”.	
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Sub-question	2	How	is	strategic	communication	practice	implemented	among	diplomats	in	Russia,	and	how	does	it	enable	governance	through	The	StratCom	Regime?		Chapter	5	
TECHNE	
Chapter	6	
IDENTITY	FORMATION	
Realization	goals	-	Which	main	rationalities	are	underpinning	strategic	communication?	-	Which	diplomatic	practices	are	underpinning	strategic	communication	as	diplomatic?	-	How	does	the	EU	govern	through	network	creation?	
Realization	goals	-	How	is	‘conduct	of	conduct’	working	through	the	formation	of	a	new	diplomat	role?		-	How	is	this	identity	enabling	the	diplomats	to	enhance	correspondence	between	the	national	and	the	EU	foreign	policy	level?	
Analytical	approach	-	Analyze	the	central	elements	of	the	field	of	
techne	
Analytical	approach	-	Analyze	the	dimension	identity	formation		
Findings	
The	rationalities	of	“strategic	aims”	are	enabling	
strategic	communication	to	emerge	as	a	
diplomatic	practice	subjecting	other	diplomatic	
practices	into	a	unified	practice.	This	qualifies	the	
member	states’	diplomats	to	contribute	to	the	
East	StratCom	without	giving	a	lower	priority	to	
the	“mission”	of	their	member	states.	The	EU	
encourages	this	through	‘fit’	creation	between	the	
strategic	communication	of	the	EU	and	member	
states,	which	enhance	the	EU’s	ability	to	act	as	a	
unified	supranational	actor.	By	obtaining	a	
central	position	within	The	StratCom	Regime	the	
EU	promotes	strategic	communication	as	an	
emerging	diplomatic	practice	through	which	the	
EU	extends	the	realm	of	governance.	
Findings	
Through	adaption	to	the	role	as	‘strategically	
communicating	diplomats’	the	diplomats	are	
increasing	synergy	and	correspondence	between	the	
foreign	policy	communication	done	by	the	EU	and	
their	national	representations.	Through	‘conduct	of	
conduct’	the	EU	is	manifesting	The	StratCom	Regime	
as	not	only	a	way	to	manage	the	effects	of	
“disinformation”	within	Russia,	but	more	importantly	
the	EU	is	enhancing	its	own	governance	capabilities	
towards	the	member	states.	The	‘strategically	
communicating	diplomats’	are	generally	adapting	
management-strategies,	which	encourage	their	
likeliness	to	implement	political	communication	in	
the	communication	practices.		
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2 Analytical	 framework	 and	 research	
methods	
	At	first	glance,	when	studying	strategic	communication,	e.g.	as	expressed	in	the	East	 StratCom	Action	Plan,	 strategic	 communication	might	 look	 like	merely	 an	expression	 of	 deliberate	 strategic	 planning,	 which	 can	 be	 connected	 to	 the	concrete	 descriptive	 actions	 of	 ”setting	 objectives	 and	 goals,	 developing	 targets	
and	performance	indicators,	and	allocating	resources”	(Ansoff	1991).	But	through	the	 analysis	 of	 diplomatic	 strategic	 communication	 from	 a	 governmentality	analytical	 perspective	 (Dean	 2009),	 the	 deeper	 dynamics	 of	 the	 power	 and	meaning	 which	 guide	 the	 practices	 and	 roles	 of	 the	 diplomats	 involved	 in	strategic	communications	can	be	scrutinized.			In	this	chapter,	I	present	my	analytical	and	methodological	point	of	departure	in	governmentality	theory.	I	will	primarily	draw	on	Mitchell	Dean’s	contributions	to	governmentality	 studies	 through	 his	 analysis	 of	 ‘regimes	 of	 practices’.	 I	 will	include	Michel	Foucault	 through	 the	work	of	other	scholars,	and	 furthermore	 I	will	include	the	concept	of	‘problematizations’	as	elaborated	by	Carol	Bacchi.		This	chapter	will	also	elaborate	on	the	methods	and	analytical	choices	and	their	implications.		
2.1 Governmentality	Analysis	
In	 its	 broadest	 definition	 governmentality	 can	be	described	 as	 a	 framework	 to	analyze	 governance	 dynamics	 (Kangas	 2015).	 More	 specifically,	 Foucault	developed	 his	 governmentality	 theory	 as	 a	 framework	 for	 studying	 the	emergence	 of	 neoliberal	 governance	 technologies	 and	 rationalities	 in	Western	welfare	 states.	 This	 enabled	 him	 to	 study	 how	 governance	 forms	were	 tightly	connected	 with	 the	 bureaucratic	 control	 of	 populations	 and	 the	 logic	 and	rationalities	 of	 the	 market	 (Joseph	 2012:	 262).	 The	 emergence	 of	
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governmentality	is	historically	connected	with	the	economic	crises	of	the	1970s	and	 the	 market	 restructurings	 that	 caused	 them.	 In	 this	 way	 governmentality	indicates	both	a	way	to	understand	government	as	a	tendency	for	governance	to	play	 out	 in	 certain	 ways,	 and	 as	 a	 historical	 process	 of	 the	 rise	 of	characteristically	neoliberal	forms	of	government	in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century	 (Foucault	 2008	 in	 Kangas	 2015:	 483;	 Dean	 2009).	 Within	 this	perspective,	governmentality	is	concerned	with	the	‘mentalities’	of	‘government’:		“Thus	 to	 analyse	 mentalities	 of	 government	 is	 to	 analyse	 thought	 made	 practical	 and	
technical”	(Dean	2009:	24f;	27)		In	this	way	a	Foucauldian	understanding	of	governance	should	not	be	seen	as	a	top	 down	 process	 of	 applying	 legislation	 and	 exercising	 vertical	 power	 over	populations,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 collective	 process	 of	 governance	 formation	 (Dean	2009:	24;	Fahnøe	2006:	15).			Instead,	 the	 governmentality	 perspective	 sees	 governance	 as	 a	 special	 form	 of	conduct	working	through	decentralized	processes	and	mentalities,	which	shape	populations’	 self-perception	 and	 the	 way	 they	 act	 in	 society.	 This	 takes	 place	through	 the	 processes	 of	 making	 individuals	 and	 populations	 conduct	themselves	according	to	a	greater	common	goal	(Torfing&Sørensen	2005:	115ff).		
2.1.1 Governing	through	the	‘conduct	of	conduct’	
	In	 the	sense	 that	conduct	can	be	understood	as	a	 regulation	of	 the	behavior	of	oneself,	governmentality	is	particularly	working	through	processes	of	‘conduct	of	conduct’.	This	describes	the	kind	of	conduct	 that	seeks	to	make	others	conduct	themselves	in	certain	directions.	This	conduct	of	conduct	is	enabled	through	the	creation	 of	 common	 perceptions	 of	 ‘right’	 or	 ‘wrong’	 ways	 of	 behavior,	 taking	point	of	departure	 in	certain	norms,	 forms	of	knowledge,	desires,	 interests	and	beliefs	(Dean	2006:	43).	Following	this,	governance	is	not	merely	a	vertical	act	of	power	 stemming	 from	 a	 sovereign	 body,	 as	 the	 state.	 Indeed,	 governmentality	
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conduct	describes	much	more	sophisticated	forms	of	power:	“To	govern	(…)	is	to	
structure	the	possible	field	of	action	of	others”	(Foucault	2003	[1982]:	128).			While	‘domination	power’	describes	the	asymmetrical	institutionalized	forms	of	power	 that	 makes	 individuals	 act	 in	 certain	 ways	 by	 imposing	 power	technologies	 as	 legislation	 and	 punishment	 measures	 (Merlingen	 2006:	 191),	governmentality	 inversely	 work	 upon	 individuals	 who	 are	 free	 to	 act	 as	 they	please.	 The	 conduct	 of	 conduct	 can	 be	 described	 as	 a	 hidden	 form	 of	 power	working	through	the	attempt	to	make	individuals	use	their	freedom	of	action	in	a	specific,	desired	way.	From	this	point	of	view,	governance	constantly	takes	place	among	a	multitude	of	actors	who	apply	governance	techniques	and	rationalities	on	populations	or	target	groups	for	specific	policies,	but	also	upon	themselves:	
	
“Government	 is	 any	more	 or	 less	 calculated	 and	 rational	 activity,	 undertaken	 by	 a	
multiplicity	of	authorities	and	agencies,	employing	a	variety	of	techniques	and	forms	
of	 knowledge,	 that	 seeks	 to	 shape	 conduct	 by	 working	 through	 the	 desires,	
aspirations,	 interests	and	beliefs	of	various	actors,	 for	definite	but	shifting	ends	and	
with	 a	 diverse	 set	 of	 relatively	 unpredictable	 consequences,	 effects	 and	 outcomes.”	(Dean	2009:	21)		Drawing	 upon	 the	 governmentality	 framework	 this	 thesis	 studies	 the	rationalities,	 techniques,	 and	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 which	 make	 EU	 diplomats	engage	in	certain	ways	of	self-conduct	and	conduct	of	others,	which	make	them	legitimize	certain	practices	and	adopt	certain	identities	rather	than	others.		
2.1.2 Discourse,	knowledge	and	power		Since	a	big	part	of	the	perceptions	of	what	populations	see	as	 ‘right’	or	 ‘wrong’	are	formed	through	articulations,	 the	concept	of	 ‘discourse’	plays	a	central	role	for	 the	 conditions	 in	 which	 governance	 can	 play	 out.	 Within	 Foucault’s	understanding	of	 the	 concept,	discourse	 can	be	 studied	as	ways	of	 structuring,	presenting,	and	not	least	making	sense	of	information	about	a	particular	topic	in	a	particular	historical	moment	(Mayr	2008:	8).	Accordingly,	discourse	cannot	be	
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reduced	 to	mere	articulations	 through	 text	and	speech,	but	must	be	studied	as	
“practices	 that	 systematically	 form	 the	 objects	 of	 which	 they	 speak”	 (Foucault	1972:	49	 in	Mayr	2008:	8)	–	a	process	containing	and	 forming	conduct.	 In	 this	way	a	discourse	“constructs	the	topic”,	and	can	thus	be	described	as	a	“language	above	the	clause”,	which	guides	the	individuals’	interpretations	of	certain	words,	concepts,	frames	etc.:		
“[Discourse]	governs	 the	way	 that	a	 topic	can	be	meaningfully	 talked	about.	 It	also	
influences	how	ideas	are	put	into	practice	and	used	to	regulate	the	conduct	of	others.	
This	 in	turn	means	that	discourse	(or	discourses	 in	the	social	theoretical	sense)	can	
limit	 and	 restrict	 other	ways	 of	 talking	 and	 producing	 knowledge	 about	 it.”	 (Mayr	2008:	8)		In	this	way	the	formation	of	discourses	becomes	integrated	in	the	mentalities	of	governance.	 Since	 these	 mentalities	 are	 “not	 readily	 amenable	 to	 be	
comprehended	 from	 within	 its	 own	 perspective”	 (Dean	 2009:	 25)	 the	 study	 of	discourse	becomes	a	way	to	study	the	underlying	discursive	formations	forming	what	we	 see	 as	 the	 ‘reality’	 and	 through	which	we	 engage	 in	 certain	 forms	 of	practice	 and	 knowledge	 production.	 This	 understanding	 of	 discourse	 becomes	central	for	the	study	of	how	unwritten	‘rules’	get	to	guide	and	regulate	what	EU	diplomats	can	say	about	strategic	communication	and	Russian	“disinformation”,	how	 they	 can	 say	 it	 meaningfully,	 who	 can	 speak,	 and	 who	 has	 the	 power	 to	decide	 what	 can	 be	 talked	 about	 (Howarth&Torfing	 2004:	 7).	 The	 creation	 of	meaning	 will	 constantly	 be	 redefined	 by	 hegemonic	 powers	 through	 the	processes	 of	 construction	 of	 contemporary	 ‘truths’	 through	 inclusion	 and	exclusion	of	knowledge	and	narratives.	Here	‘information’	is	understood	as	raw	data	 used	 as	 parts	 of	 as	 discourse	 construction,	 while	 ‘knowledge’	 is	 the	
“interpretation	 of	 information	 by	 the	 knower”	 (Bicchi	 2013:	 241).	 In	 this	 way	knowledge	and	power	are	mutually	constitutive,	since	“there	is	no	power	relation	
without	 the	 correlative	 constitution	 of	 a	 field	 of	 knowledge,	 nor	 any	 knowledge	that	 does	 not	 presuppose	 and	 constitute	 at	 the	 same	 time	 power	 relations”	(Foucault,	1977:	27	in	Mayr	2008:	15).			
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In	relation	to	 this	 thesis	discourses	are	studied	as	a	part	of	 the	ways	EU	policy	practitioners	 define	 and	 redefine	 policy	 areas	 and	 construct	 legitimate	 policy	responses	to	them.	This	implies	that	choices	made	by	e.g.	EU	diplomats	might	be	presented	as	“rational”	and	“strategic”,	but	only	within	the	dominant	discourses	which	effect	the	diplomats	and	their	institutions,	and	into	which	they	”routinely	
embed	their	own	self-understanding”	(Knights	&	Morgans	1991:	254).	In	this	way	the	study	of	powerful	discourses	becomes	central	for	studying	how	the	EU	actors	legitimize	the	use	of	strategic	communication	and	actions	which	seek	to	manage	the	perceived	“disinformation”	stemming	from	the	Russian	media.		
2.1.3 Problematizations		The	outset	 for	 studying	governmentality	within	 the	EU	was	encouraged	by	 the	observation	of	how	criticism	of	the	Russian	media	within	and	by	the	EU	after	the	outbreak	of	 the	Ukraine	crisis	 led	the	EU	to	 introduce	strategic	communication	as	 a	 policy	 response.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 strategic	 communication	emerged	as	a	policy	practice,	it	is	important	to	understand	how	certain	elements	are	constructed	as	‘problems’,	which	EU	actors	can	–	and	should	-	act	upon.	This	aligns	this	study	with	a	Foucauldian	inspired	approach	which	puts	the	processes	of	how	certain	things	become	articulated	as	problems	as	the	central	elements	of	study	(Bacchi	2012:	1).			In	 order	 to	 study	 public	 policies	 from	 a	 critical	 approach,	 Carol	 Bacchi	 (2012)	introduced	 her	 ‘What’s	 the	 problem	 represented	 to	 be?’-approach	 (WPR-approach).	 In	 this	 approach	 a	 public	 policy,	 as	 for	 example	 the	 East	 StratCom,	always	takes	point	of	departure	in	a	‘problematization’	of	something	that	needs	to	 be	 changed.	 In	 this	 way	 ”policies	 and	 policy	 proposals	 contain	 implicit	representations	 of	 what	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 ‘problem’	 (‘problem	representations’)”	(Bacchi,	a	2012:	21).	This	approach	is	useful	 for	the	study	of	how	EU	governance	is	taking	place	through	particular	problematizations	(Bacchi	2012:	5):		
“In	this	view	the	‘public’,	of	which	we	are	members,	is	governed,	not	through	policies,	
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but	 through	 problematisations—how	 ‘problems’	 are	 constituted.”	 (Bacchi,	 a	 2012:	22).	In	order	to	scrutinize	problem	representations,	Bacchi	sets	up	a	list	of	questions	encouraging	 investigationS	 of	 how	 a	 specific	 identification	 of	 a	 problem	 has	occurred,	 what	 effects	 it	 produces,	 what	 presuppositions	 or	 assumptions	 are	underpinning	 this	 representation	 of	 the	 problem,	 and	 which	 aspects	 are	 not	included	in	the	problematization	(Bacchi,	a	2012:	21).		According	 to	Dean,	a	starting	point	 for	 the	analytics	of	government	 is	 similarly	“the	 identification	 and	 examination	 of	 specific	 situations	 in	which	 the	 activity	 of	
governing	comes	to	be	called	 into	question”	 (Dean	2009:	38).	 Similarly,	 the	way	EU	 governance	 becomes	 problematized	 through	 “disinformation”	 in	 Russian	media	 becomes	 this	 thesis’	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 studying	 EU	 governance.	 In	this	 way	 both	 the	 problematization	 of	 EU	 governance	 constructed	 through	Russian	media,	and	subsequently	the	EU’s	problematization	of	the	Russian	media	system	becomes	my	point	of	departure	 for	 studying	EU	governance,	because	 it	allows	me	“to	examine	the	different	and	particular	contexts	in	which	governing	is	
called	into	question,	in	which	actors	and	agents	of	all	sorts	must	pose	the	question	
of	how	to	govern.”	(Dean	2009:	38)		
2.1.4 Regimes	of	practices			I	order	to	be	able	to	study	how	the	concepts	and	processes	of	conduct	of	conduct,	discourse	 formation	and	problematizations	are	 interlinked	and	co-constructing	the	conditions	for	governmentality	among	a	“plurality	of	governing	agencies	and	
authorities”,	 Mitchel	 Dean	 has	 introduced	 the	 study	 of	 ‘regimes	 of	 practices’	(Dean	2009:	8):	
	
“Regimes	of	practices	can	be	identified	whenever	there	exists	a	relatively	stable	field	
of	 correlation	 of	 visibilities,	 mentalities,	 technologies	 and	 agencies,	 such	 that	 they	
constitute	 a	 kind	 of	 taken-for-granted	 point	 of	 reference	 for	 any	 form	 of	
problematization.”	(Dean	2009:	37)		
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In	this	way,	regimes	of	practices	can	be	studied	as	“institutional	practices”	in	the	sense	of	being	practices	 and	ways	of	 thinking	which	have	been	 routinized	and	ritualized	within	“certain	places	and	at	certain	times”	(Dean	2009:	31)	Due	to	the	non-subjective	 character	 of	 governmentality,	 these	 interconnected	 ways	 of	thinking	 and	 acting	 are	 more	 than	 just	 expressions	 of	 actors’	 intentions	 and	interests,	and	according	to	this,	a	regime	of	practices	constitutes	a	field	of	its	own	logics	and	rationalities	on	which	a	wide	range	of	actors	are	both	co-constructing	and	 become	 constructed.	 In	 this	 way,	 regimes	 of	 practices	 are	 the	 organized	practices	through	which	people	are	governed	and	through	which	people	govern	themselves	 (Dean	2009:	 28).	Here,	 the	 analysis	 of	 certain	 regimes	 of	 practices	becomes	 pivotal	 for	 the	 study	 of	 governmentality	 by	 scrutinizing	 different	governmental	 techniques,	 practices,	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 rationalities,	 in	order	 to	 expose	 and	 reveal	 the	 processes	 of	 conduct	 and	 self-conduct	 forming	states	and	societies	(Dean	2009:	40;	Torfing&Sørensen	2005:	115ff):	
	In	 accordance	 with	 Dean’s	 characterization,	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 study	 the	emergence	 of	 The	 StratCom	 Regime.	 This	 is	 done	 by	 studying	 the	 central	processes	that	have	been	decisive	for	what	has	been	included	and	excluded	into	practices	and	identities	of	the	diplomats	working	with	strategic	communication	in	 Russia.	 A	 central	 part	 is	 also	 to	 show,	 which	 kinds	 of	 knowledge	 and	rationalities	 have	 been	 institutionalized	 into	 the	 EU,	 and	 which	 have	 become	decisive	for	the	way	EU	diplomats	engage	in	strategic	communication	practices	and	ascribe	meaning	to	and	legitimize	them.	Thus,	this	analytical	framework	will	provide	the	basic	theoretical	categorizations	structuring	the	analysis	within	the	thesis.		
	In	order	to	examine	the	practices	of	conduct	within	a	regime,	Dean	sets	up	four	independent	but	overlapping	analytical	dimensions,	which	constitute	the	core	of	the	analysis	of	regimes	of	practices	In	the	following,	these	are	presented	shortly	together	with	a	presentation	of	how	they	are	applied	in	the	analyzes	throughout	the	thesis.	
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2.1.4.1 The	episteme	of	government	
	The	 dimension	 of	 the	 episteme	 of	 government	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 forms	 of	knowledge	that	arise	from	and	form	the	activity	of	governance	(Dean	2009:	42).	This	episteme	constitutes	 the	underlying	assumptions	and	 forms	of	knowledge	that	 the	 governing	 practitioners	 legitimize	 their	 governance	 practices	 and	problematizations	 through.	 This	 generally	 consists	 of	 knowledge	 and	 implicit	assumptions	underlying	certain	practices,	and	thus	the	analytical	interest	within	this	dimension	 is	 “to	discover	 the	 logic	of	 such	practices”	 of	 governance	 (Dean	2009:	41).	Concluding,	the	analysis	of	episteme	thus	raises	the	question	of	what	kind	of	knowledge	and	strategies	policy	practitioners	are	employing	in	practices	of	governing,	and	how	these	are	used	to	legitimize	governance	(Dean	2009:	42).		Chapter	 3	 of	 this	 thesis	 studies	 the	 fundamental	 assumptions,	 forms	 of	knowledge,	 and	 “utopias”	 (Dean	2009:	44f)	 that	underpin	 the	EU’s	 governance	through	foreign	policy	practices	 in	general	and	the	East	StratCom	in	particular.	Here,	especially	underlying	assumptions	about	the	democratic	role	of	journalism,	the	 media,	 and	 public	 sphere	 will	 be	 revealed	 to	 guide	 the	 EU	 diplomats’	legitimation	 of	 strategic	 communication	 activities	 in	 Russia.	 In	 this	 way	 this	dimension	 enables	 me	 to	 study	 the	 fundamental	 assumptions	 and	 values	 that	guide	the	policy	formulation	and	conduct	within	the	EU,	and	which,	by	doing	this,	become	 central	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 e.g.	 the	 diplomats’	 discourses	 on	 what	 is	‘good’/’bad’	and	‘right’/’wrong’	etc.			
	
2.1.4.2 Fields	of	visibilities	for	government		While	 the	 dimension	 of	 episteme	 constitutes	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	 and	forms	 of	 knowledge	 on	 which	 the	 governing	 practitioners	 legitimize	 their	governance	 practices	 and	 problematizations,	 the	 dimension	 of	 visibility	 shows	what	 fields	 are	 becoming	 objects	 of	 governance.	 Within	 this	 dimension	 the	
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that	 illuminates	 and	 defines	 different	 objects,	 while	 letting	 others	 hide	 in	 the	dark	 (Dean	2009:	41).	Described	 in	other	words	 the	detection	of	 this	 ‘field	 for	government’	 is	 concerned	with	what	 is	 becoming	 the	 “target”	 of	 conduct;	who	and	what	is	to	be	governed	and	why	(Dean	2009:	87).	In	this	way,	this	dimension	is	 tightly	 connected	with	 the	 process	 of	 problematization,	which	 in	 this	 thesis	means	the	problematization	of	Russian	media,	thereby	constructing	this	field	as	a	 legitimate	 target	 for	 EU	 foreign	 policy.	 According	 to	 Dean,	 this	 field	 should	encourage	the	study	of,	“how	different	locales	and	agents	are	to	be	connected	with	
one	another,	what	problems	are	to	be	solved	and	what	objectives	are	to	be	sought”	(Dean	2009:	41).			Chapter	4	of	the	thesis	explores,	how	the	recent	historical	developments	within	the	 Russian	 media	 system,	 and	 the	 increased	 political	 tension	 following	 the	Ukraine	crisis	have	been	determining	for	the	problematization	of	Russian	media	within	the	EU.	Correspondingly,	the	study	of	the	field	of	visibility	reveals	how	the	problematization	 of	 Russian	 media	 mutually	 challenges	 and	 enables	 EU	governance.		
2.1.4.3 The	techne	of	government	
	In	order	to	study	how	certain	 forms	of	knowledge	and	rationalities	are	applied	on	 a	 certain	 field	 of	 visibility,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 study	 the	 actual	 techniques,	mechanisms,	 vocabularies,	 and	 technologies	 through	which	 actors	 in	 a	 certain	regime	is	operating	and	realizing	goals	(Dean	2009:	31;	42).		
“The	analysis	of	government	is	concerned	with	thought	as	it	becomes	linked	to	and	is	
embedded	 in	 technical	 means	 for	 the	 shaping	 and	 reshaping	 of	 conduct	 and	 in	
practices	and	institutions”	(Dean	2009:	27)		In	 this	way,	government’s	 field	of	techne	 is	 studying	how	exercising	authorities	draw	 upon	 certain	 forms	 of	 “expertise,	 vocabulary,	 theories,	 ideas,	 philosophies	
and	other	forms	of	knowledge”	in	the	processes	of	governance	(Dean	2009:	25).		
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In	 order	 to	 study	 how	 the	 EU	 governs	 through	 the	 The	 StratCom	 Regime,	strategic	 communication	will	be	presented	as	a	diplomatic	practice	 comprising	certain	 rationalities,	 tools	 and	 activities,	 and	 building	 upon	 other	institutionalized	 diplomatic	 practices	 and	 discourses.	 Through	 this	 dimension	the	 analysis	 scrutinizes	 how	 the	 processes	 of	 governance	 promotes	 the	realization	of	certain	values	though	technical	means,	which	in	this	way	becomes	a	means	of	conduct	and	a	part	of	constituting	the	condition	of	governance	itself	(Dean	 2009:	 42).	 In	 line	 with	 this,	 chapter	 5	 analyzes	 which	 rationalities	 and	practices	 are	 underpinning	 strategic	 communication	 as	 foreign	 policy	 practice	and	 hereby	 enabling	 governance	 to	 take	 place	 through	 the	 implantation	 of	strategic	communication	in	the	Russian	context.			
2.1.4.4 Formation	of	identities		The	 last	 dimension	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 forms	 of	 individual	 and	 collective	identity	which	 specific	practices	and	programs	of	 government	 try	 to	 form,	 and	through	 which	 governing	 operates	 (Dean	 2009:	 43).	 Through	 the	 ‘conduct	 of	conduct’	 the	 self-perception	 of	 the	 governed	 and	 governing	 are	 formed.	 This	happens	 as	 part	 of	 the	 processes	 where	 subjects	 internalize	 certain	 truths,	interests,	 and	 wishes	 above	 other,	 which	 guide	 the	 ways	 we	 as	 subjects	 see	ourselves	and	others,	and	how	we	conduct	ourselves	(Torfing	&	Sørensen	2005:	115ff;	Dean	2009:	27).	According	to	this,	the	dimension	of	formation	of	identities	focuses	on	governance	 through	 the	processes	of	 ‘self-government’	(Dean	2009:	26).		Within	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 this	 imply	 the	 study	 of	 how	 governance	 takes	place	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 roles,	 responsibilities,	 and	 self-perceptions	 of	diplomats	within	 the	EU.	Chapter	6	will	detect	how	 the	emergence	of	 strategic	communication	 as	 governance	 practice	 conducts	 the	 diplomats	 to	 adapt	 their	identities	 accordingly.	 In	 this	 thesis	 the	 identities	 of	 “those	 who	 are	 to	 be	
governed”	 (Dean	 2009:	 43)	 are	 indirectly	 included	 through	 the	 policy	practitioners’	 definitions	 of	 target	 groups.	 In	 this	 way	 we	 can	 see,	 how	 the	
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processes	of	 identity	creation	help	 the	EU	 to	divide	people	 into	categories	 that	can	be	governed.			
2.1.5 Governmentality	in	EU	studies		Following	 the	 above	presentation,	 the	 framework	of	 governmentality	has	been	developed	 to	 reveal	 the	 complex	 governance	 techniques	 used	 to	 manage	populations	and	regulate	social	conduct	in	neoliberal	welfare	societies	(Lindgren	2007:	 341,	 Joseph	 2012:	 3).	 The	 supranational	 character	 of	 the	 EU	 enforces	 a	level	of	conduct	above	the	states,	a	form	of	international	governance,	which	can	aim	 at	 not	 just	 the	 conduct	 of	 conduct	 of	 populations,	 but	 also	 the	 conduct	 of	conduct	of	decision	makers	in	other	governmental	bodies,	like	the	politicians	and	the	 officials	 of	 nation	 states	 (Joseph	 2012:	 19).	 Thus	 governmentality	 in	 an	international	 context	 is	 still	 a	 governance	 rationality	 that	 seeks	 “to	govern	at	a	
distance	 through	 the	 mobilization	 and	 regulation	 of	 self-regulating	 individuals,	
organizations	 and	 networks”	 (Torfing	 &	 Sørensen	 2006:	 39f),	 but	 while	producing	 “governance	 of	 spaces	 above,	 beyond,	 between	 and	 across	 states”	
(Larner	&	Walters	in	Dean	2009:	229).		Especially	within	recent	years,	a	growing	number	of	scholars	have	studied	how	governmentality	 has	 taken	 form	 in	 the	 global	 or	 international	 sphere,	 among	others	at	 the	supranational	EU-level	 (e.g.	Dean	2009,	Münch	2010,	Kurki	2011,	Joseph	 2012,	 Kangas	 2015).	 In	 a	 Foucauldian	 perspective	 the	 EU	 institutions	must	 be	 studied	 as	 operational	 authorities,	 which	 integrate	 and	 reproduce	existing	 discourses	 and	 power	 relations	 (Lindgren	 in	 Andersen	 &	 Kaspersen	2007:	 335,	 Mayr	 2008:	 1)	 and	 form	 certain	 regimes	 of	 practices	 through	 the	creation	 of	 governance	 networks	 and	 institutional	 forms.	 These	 governance	processes	within	the	EU	become	defining	for	“what	can	be	said	and	what	can	be	
done,	 which	 rules	 to	 impose	 and	 which	 reasons	 to	 give	 and	 what	 to	 take	 for	
granted	in	the	interaction	between	a	multiplicity	of	actors”	(Foucault	1991b:	75	in	Torfing&Sørensen	 2006:	 39f).	 Governmentality	 analysis	 on	 the	 EU	 level	 thus	provides	 a	 conceptual	 tool-box	 for	 more	 “practice-oriented,	 fine-grained	 and	
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decentered	 analysis	 of	 relations	 of	 power	 and	 the	 knowledge	 implicated	 in	 them	
than	 is	 found	 in	much	of	 the	IR	and	EU	literatures“	 (Merlingen	2003:	 377,	 192).	This	 enables	me	 to	 engage	 in	 the	more	 complex	 study	 of	 governance	 between	different	levels	and	actors	within	the	EU.		
2.2 Realization	goals	and	analytical	approach	
2.2.1 Poststructuralism	and	the	temporality	of	regimes	of	practices		Governmentality	theory	is	based	on	a	poststructuralist	theory	of	science,	which	this	 thesis	 is	 also	 aligned	 with.	 Poststructuralism	 has	 broken	 with	 the	substantialist	 understanding	 of	 structures	 as	 unconscious,	 but	 logical,	 systems	forming	 the	 observable	 historical	 events	 and	 actions	 (Hastrup	 2007:	 299).	Instead	 of	 understanding	 structures	 as	 closed	 entities	 with	 a	 center,	poststructuralists	 argue,	 that	 structures	 must	 be	 seen	 as	 decentralized	 and	intertwined	 with	 continuous	 and	 ever-changing	 processes	 of	 knowledge	production	and	power	struggles	(Esmark	et	al.	2005:	27).			This	 outset	 has	 fundamental	 influence	 on	 the	 kind	 of	 knowledge	 and	argumentations	put	 forward	 throughout	 this	 thesis.	 For	 example	 it	means	 that	regimes	of	practices	are	not	 considered	as	 fixed	entities	 that	 can	be	 studied	 in	the	same	way	at	different	 times.	 Instead,	 regimes	of	practices	are	seen	as	 fluid	constellations	 between	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge,	 values,	 identities,	problematizations,	and	solutions,	among	a	variety	of	actors	being	contingent	on	the	specific	historical	and	sociocultural	context	in	which	they	occur.	In	line	with	this,	 the	 present	 study	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 reveal	 fixed	 structures	 guiding	 the	behavior	 of	 EU	 policy	 practitioners	 or	 Russian	 media.	 Instead	 the	 scientific	interest	 lies	 in	 social	 and	historical	 discursive	processes,	which	 allow	 strategic	communication	 as	 a	 policy	 practice,	 and	 a	 form	of	 governance	 to	 occur	within	this	 specific	 historical	 period,	 from	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis	 to	 the	present.	Following	this,	 the	The	StratCom	Regime	must	be	seen	as	a	temporary	“snapshot”	–	not	a	description	of	a	closed	unchangeable	structure.		
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2.2.1.1 The	construction	of	The	StratCom	Regime		Through	 this	 thesis	 the	Regime	of	 Strategic	Diplomatic	Communicaiton	 towards	
“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	 is	constructed	and	analyzed.	From	now	in	this	regime	will	be	referred	to	as	The	StratCom	Regime.	The	actors	included	into	the	 regime	 are	 actors	 within	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 member	 states’	 embassies	 in	Moscow.	 This	 regime	 of	 practices	 also	 comprises	 the	 EU	 actors	 working	 with	strategic	 communication	 in	 other	 countries	 targeted	 through	 the	 EU’s	 East	StratCom.	However,	 due	 to	 the	 limitation	of	 this	 thesis,	 the	diplomats	working	with	 strategic	 communication	 in	 Russia	will	 serve	 as	 a	 ‘case’	 by	 providing	 the	empirical	 basis	 for	 the	 study	 of	 strategic	 communication	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	practice.		According	 to	 Dean	 “[i]t	 is	 important	 to	 realize	 that	 regimes	 of	 practices	 exist	
within	 a	milieu	 composed	 of	mentalities	 of	 rule,	 without	 being	 reducible	 to	 that	
milieu”	(Dean	2009:	28).	In	this	regarding,	one	must	understand	that	regimes	of	practices	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 separate	 entities,	 but	 entities	 which	 will	 be	overlapping	 and	 intertwined	 with	 the	 practices	 and	 rationalities	 of	 other	regimes.	 	 As	 an	 example,	 the	 present	 regime	of	 study	 can	 also	 be	 studied	 as	 a	sub-regime	 within	 a	 broader	 regime	 of	 practices,	 which	 is	 also	 targeting	Disinformation	in	Russian	Media,	but	through	a	broader	range	of	practices	than	merely	diplomatic.	The	broader	regime	will	not	be	elaborated	within	the	scope	of	this	 these,	 but	 works	 as	 an	 illustrative	 example	 of	 the	 interconnectedness	between	different	regimes	of	practices.	Figure	1.	provides	a	stylized	illustration	of	these	regimes.						
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Figure	 1.	 The	 Regime	 of	 Strategic	 Diplomatic	 Communication	 towards	
Russian	"Disinformation"		
		Source:	Figure	by	the	author	of	this	thesis			It	is	important	to	make	clear,	that	the	characterization	of	The	StratCom	Regime,	and	 the	EU	actors	 included	herein,	 is	 always	a	product	of	 the	 researchers’	–	 in	this	case	my	–	construction.	The	inclusions/exclusions	could	have	been	different	if	different	empirical	data	and	analytical	concepts	were	included	in	the	study.	For	example,	 I	have	 included	the	concept	of	media	systems	as	a	categorization	tool	for	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 the	 problematization	 of	 the	 Russian	 media.	 Other	categorizations	might	have	highlighted	other	relevant	aspects.		Since	the	EU	diplomats’	point	of	perspective	is	the	focus	of	study,	I	have	favored	their	state-centric	point	of	view,	which	for	example	entails	that	I	have	centered	my	 study	 around	 the	 EU	 actors	 and	 their	 internal	 relations	 and	 narrower	
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network	 formation.	 Hereby	 this	 study	 has	 placed	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 predominating	actor	 in	 the	 regimes	of	practices,	which	havsled	 to	 the	 construction	of	 the	The	StratCom	 Regime.	 Other	 studies	 focusing	 on	 the	 broader	 regime	 of	 practices	could	 for	 example	 emphasize	 the	 role	 of	 non-state	 actors,	 such	 as	 NGO’s,	academia,	journalists	etc.			As	 a	 central	 part	 of	 my	 analyzes	 of	 the	 different	 dimensions	 of	 The	 StratCom	Regime	 a	 range	 of	 concepts	 occurred	 as	 central	 for	 the	 emergence	 and	constitution	of	the	regime.	These	are	presented	in	Appendix	1.			
2.2.1.2 Limited	genealogy		According	 to	Dean,	 one	 of	 the	 aspects	 of	 an	 analytics	 of	 a	 particular	 regime	of	practices	 at	 minimum	 should	 seek	 “to	 identify	 the	 emergence	 of	 that	 regime”	(Dean	 2009:	 31).	 This	 encourages	 the	 study	 of	 how	 regimes	 have	 been	constructed	and	restructured	over	time	by	continuous	processes	of	inclusion	and	exclusion,	which	 is	 in	 line	with	Foucault’s	 ‘genealogy	analyses’	(Foucault	2008	:	
36	 in	 Joseph	 2012:	 256).	 The	 thesis	 will	 not	 engage	 in	 a	 chronological	genealogical	analysis	of	the	emergence	of	the	regime	of	practice.	Instead	it	draws	up	some	historical	lines	and	discursive	categorizations,	which	are	useful	for	the	analysis	of	 the	present	day	regime	as	 I	 study	 it	 through	my	empirical	material.	Here,	 the	 illumination	of	 the	 inclusion	of	 central	 concepts,	 rationalities,	 values,	and	 knowledge	 into	 the	 regime,	 enable	 me	 as	 a	 researcher	 to	 take	 a	 critical	distance	 to	 the	 discursive	 phenomena	 of	 for	 example	 “disinformation”,	“propaganda”,	“strategic	communication”,	“independent	media”	etc.	Similarly	the	developments	 of	 discourses	 on	 strategic	 communication	 is	 traced	 in	 order	 to	detect	 which	 understandings	 of	 strategic	 communication	 form	 the	 diplomats’	understanding	of	the	emerging	foreign	policy	practice	towards	“disinformation”.		Hence,	the	aim	is	not	to	reveal	broader	processes	of	 inclusion/exclusion,	but	to	only	 to	 bring	 in	 historical	 developments	 when	 absolutely	 necessary	 for	 the	analysis	of	the	present	day	regime.		
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2.2.2 Empirical	material	and	analytical	levels		Through	the	analysis	of	how	the	EU	governs	through	strategic	communication	in	its	Russian	foreign	policy,	the	analysis	is	constructed	on	two	main	levels,	which	enable	 me	 to	 draw	 a	 conclusion	 based	 on	 the	 empirical	 material	 from	 the	Russian	context	and	the	broader	EU	institutional	level:		Analytical	level	1:	Strategic	communication	by	EU	diplomats	in	Russia	is	studied	as	 both	 a	 part	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 East	 StratCom	 in	 Russia	 and	 the	broader	 implementation	 of	 strategic	 communication	 as	 foreign	 policy	 practice	towards	“disinformation”.		Analytical	 level	 2:	 Strategic	 communication	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	 practice	 in	 The	StratCom	Regime	is	studied	as	a	case	of	governmentality.		Since	the	empirical	material	is	focusing	on	the	strategic	communication	towards	Russia,	the	thesis	will	not	conclude	on	how	strategic	communication	can	be	seen	as	a	governance	practice	within	the	EU	in	general	–	this	aspect	will	instead	be	left	to	 a	 part	 of	 the	discussion	 encouraging	 further	 studies.	 Instead,	 the	 two	 levels	above	will	provide	the	understanding	of	how	strategic	communication	towards	Russian	“disinformation”	is	implemented	in	Russia	as	a	part	of	strengthening	the	institutionalization	of	strategic	communication	within	the	EU.			In	 order	 to	 conduct	 the	 analysis,	 the	 thesis	 bases	 itself	 on	 different	 empirical	sources.	 Since	 the	 East	 StratCom	 is	 a	 strategy,	 which	 is	 engaging	 many	 other	actors	 in	 its	 implementation	 in	Russia,	 I	needed	 to	draw	on	empirical	material	from	several	actors	in	order	to	study	the	East	StratCom	in	Russia.	Especially	The	East	StratCom	Actions	Plan	and	The	Communication	and	Information	Report	for	2015	and	the	strategy	plan	for	2016	(EU	Delegation	2015)	by	the	EU	Delegation	in	 Moscow	 have	 been	 important	 written	 sources.	 Furthermore,	 the	 internal	newsletter	 by	 the	 East	 StratCom	 Team	 (East	 StratCom	 Weekly	 Digest)	 and	internal	status	emails	about	the	East	StratCom,	the	team’s	weekly	Disinformation	Reviews,	and	a	broad	variety	of	online	sources,	such	as	official	homepages	and	
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different	social	media	accounts	(as	e.g.	Twitter,	Facebook,	Vkontakte	etc.)	 from	both	the	EU	and	EU	members	states,	have	been	studied.	This	empirical	material	comprised	communication	of	official	statements,	cultural	and	public	information,	‘myth	 busting’,	 videos,	 info	 graphics	 on	 political	 issues	 etc.	 Furthermore	 this	empirical	material	has	been	supplemented	with	reports,	articles,	and	analytical	papers	by	several	other	actors	within	the	broader	regime	of	practices.		As	 illustrated	in	Table	2.,	all	 these	sources	have	contributed	to	the	study	of	the	implementation	of	strategic	communication	as	a	diplomatic	practice	in	Russia.		
Table	2.	Empirical	sources	-	Levels	of	strategy	implementation	
		
2.2.2.1 Theory	as	object	of	study		The	empirical	material	comprises	a	large	amount	of	academic	literature	on	EU		foreign	policy,	diplomacy,	press	norms	and	media	theory,	propaganda,	public	diplomacy,	strategic	communication,	EU-Russia	relations	etc.		Since	 academic	work	plays	 a	 central	 role	 for	 the	 constructions	of	 ‘reality’,	 also	theories	 in	 themselves	 play	 a	 role	 in	 this	 construction	 (Bacchi	 2012:	 6).	Accordingly,	this	thesis	also	includes	several	theoretical	concepts	as	a	part	of	the	empirical	material	constituting	the	regime	of	practices.		
Broader	EU	&	EEAS			
!	
East	StratCom	Team	Brussels			
!	
EU	Delegation	Moscow		
!	
EU	member	state	embassies	Moscow	
!	
Like-minded	actors			
!	
Implementation	of	strategic	diplomatic	
communication	in	Russia	
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Many	scholars	working	with	governmentality	theory	argue	that	governmentality	should	rather	be	seen	as	an	analytical	perspective	than	an	actual	theory,	since	it	allows	 us	 to	 challenge	 different	 basic	 ontological	 assumptions	 presented	 as	‘truths’	 by	 different	 theoretical	 schools	 (Kangas	 2015:	 482).	 In	 this	 way	poststructuralism	 does	 not	 fit	within	 the	 categorizations	 of	 the	 big	 theoretical	paradigms,	 since	 it	 can	 be	 perceived	more	 as	 a	 critical	 attitude	 than	 a	 theory.	Instead	 of	making	 a	 distinction	 between	 theory	 and	 practice,	 it	 sees	 theory	as	
practice,	 since	 we	 all	 constantly	 engage	 in	 creating	 the	 interpretations	 of	 ‘the	world’	(Campbell	2010:	214,	216).			The	 distinctions	 between	 governmentality	 as	 an	 analytical	 framework	incorporating	 empirical	 material	 consisting	 of	 both	 theoretical	 concepts,	academic	analysis,	and	reports,	strategies,	statements	etc.	 is	presented	in	Table	3.		
	
Table	3.	Theoretical	and	empirical	levels	
	Theoretical	framework	 Governmentality	Theoretical	and	empirical	concepts	 Strategic	communication,	independent	media,	disinformation,	propaganda,	media	systems	Empirical	data	on	EU	level	 EU	values	and	foreign	policy		East	StratCom	Team’s	strategy/objectives/tools		Empirical	data	on	Russia	level	 Strategic	communication	by	EU	diplomats	in	Russia	
		
2.2.2.2 Qualitative	interviews		An	extensive	part	of	 the	empirical	material	enabling	me	to	analyze	how	the	EU	diplomats	 construct	 the	 Russian	 media	 system	 as	 a	 problem,	 and	 how	 they	
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construct	strategic	communication	as	a	legitimate	policy	resolution,	is	based	on	qualitative	interviews	conducted	with	six	EU	diplomats	in	the	period	November	2015	to	March	2016.	 I	quote	the	 informants	as	 follows	based	on	the	 individual	agreements	with	the	informants:		
" Diplomat	from	EEAS,	East	StratCom	Team,	background	
" Spokesperson	and	head	of	Information	and	Press	Department,	EU	Delegation	Moscow,	quoted	by	title		
" Four	 diplomats	 from	 embassies	 of	 bigger	 EU	 member	 states	 in	 Moscow,	
quoted	anonymously.		The	interviews	took	place	as	dinner	or	coffee	meetings	in	restaurants	or	cafés	in	Moscow,	 which	 is	 how	 diplomats	 often	 arrange	 informal	 and	 non-diplomatic	meetings.	They	generally	 lasted	between	45	minutes	to	2	hours,	which	enabled	them	 to	 cover	 wide	 aspects	 with	 relations	 to	 the	 regime	 of	 practices.	 The	interviews	 have	 been	 conducted	 in	 English,	 while	 the	 interview	 with	 the	Spokesperson	 on	 the	 EU	 Delegation	 was	 conducted	 in	 Danish.	 The	 interviews	have	been	recorded	and	transcribed	according	to	thematic	relevance	(Appendix	4).	 Furthermore	 several	 background	 talks	 and	 interviews	with	 diplomats	 from	other	 EU	 Embassies	 in	 Moscow,	 and	 with	 scholars	 within	 the	 field,	 have	contributed	to	my	ability	to	construct	the	regime	of	practices.		Theory	 on	EU	 foreign	policy	 often	 shows	 that	 big	 EU	member	 states	 generally	have	a	bigger	influence	on	the	EU	foreign	policy	development	than	smaller	ones	(Wood	 2011:	 247;	 Lequesne	 2015:	 256).	My	 study	 of	 the	 empirical	 context	 in	Moscow	 has	 shown	 that	 this	 is	 also	 the	 case	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 developing	strategic	 communication	 as	 foreign	policy	practice.	On	 this	 background,	 I	 have	chosen	the	primary	informants	among	the	big	EU	embassies	(beside	from	the	EU	institutions).	 All	 the	 diplomats	 are	 heads	 of	 their	 embassies’	 press	 and	communication	 departments,	 which	 mean	 that	 they	 are	 both	 in	 charge	 of	following	the	communication	policies	by	their	respective	national	MFA’s,	and	at	the	same	time	constitute	the	direct	partners	for	the	EU	diplomats	working	with	the	implementation	of	East	StratCom	in	Russia.	On	this	basis,	I	argue	that	the	six	
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informants	chosen	for	this	study	are	placed	in	influential	positions	at	the	center	of	the	regime	of	practices,	which	strengthens	the	quality	of	the	findings.		The	interviews	have	all	been	conducted	as	semi-structured	research	interviews	(Kvale	 1997),	 which	 have	 enabled	 me	 to	 guide	 the	 informants	 through	 the	themes	of	the	characteristics	of	the	Russian	media	system,	the	emergence	of	and	tools	 for	 diplomatic	 strategic	 communication,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 media	 for	democratic	 societies,	 and	 their	 engagement	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU’s	East	 StratCom.	 The	 interviews	 have	 been	 conducted	 through	 “open”	 and	 yet	“focused”	questions,	which	have	helped	to	secure	that	all	relevant	themes	were	touched	upon,	while	at	the	same	time	enabling	the	informants	to	contribute	with	new	 aspects	 and	 concepts,	 which	 could	 provide	 new	 insights	 for	 the	 analysis	(Kvale	&	Brinkmann	2009:	131f).		
2.2.2.3 The	researcher	and	the	field	of	study		At	the	time	of	research,	I	was	a	non-active	part	of	the	Danish	diplomatic	corps	in	Moscow	 through	 a	 personal	 relation.	 This	 eased	 the	 facilitation	 of	 interview	agreements	with	 the	 “high-profile”	and	very	busy	diplomats,	 and	 it	might	have	enabled	 me	 to	 obtain	 access	 to	 internal	 newsletters,	 evaluations	 and	 reports,	which	 I	might	not	else	have	been	granted	access	 to.	My	previous	knowledge	of	the	 diplomatic	 community	 in	 Moscow	 increased	 my	 “sensitivity”	 towards	nuances	 in	 the	 informants’	articulations	(Kvale	1997:	44f),	and	made	 it	easy	 to	create	a	natural	atmosphere	around	the	interview	(enhanced	by	the	agreements	of	anonymity).	This	seems	to	have	enhanced	the	informants’	 likeliness	to	speak	freely,	in	a	way	they	would	do	with	colleagues	from	other	EU	embassies.	This,	I	believe,	have	strengthened	the	quality	of	the	interviews	as	material	for	discourse	analyzes	 due	 to	 the	 diplomats	 larger	 tendency	 to	 use	 their	 “normal”	 ways	 of	articulating	themselves,	 than	they	would	have	had,	 if	 they	had	perceived	me	as	someone	 from	 an	 alien	 professional	 field.	 In	 this	 way	 the	 interviews	 both	enabled	me	to	collect	information	about	the	official	policies	and	practices	which	
	 41	
each	diplomat	represents,	and	about	 their	personal	constructions	of	 their	roles	as	strategic	communicating	diplomats.		In	order	to	minimize	the	risk	that	my	personal	relation	to	the	diplomatic	corps	set	my	academic	neutrality	at	risk,	I	have	been	paying	huge	attention	to	keeping	myself	 in	 a	 neutral	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 field	 of	 study.	 Since	 I	 am	 not	working	as	a	diplomat	myself,	I	was	still	able	to	position	myself	as	an	‘outsider’	with	the	opportunity	to	use	interview	techniques	as	“intentional	naivety”	(Kvale	1997:	 43).	 Through	 these	 ‘naive’	 questions,	 I	 sought	 to	 make	 the	 diplomats	elaborate	on	more	 sensitive	 topics,	 as	 for	 example	 the	disagreements	between	member	states,	and	between	member	states	and	the	EU.	The	Danish	Embassy	is	furthermore	 not	 actively	 engaged	 in	 the	 development	 of	 strategic	communication	in	Russia,	which	also	secured	my	outsider-position.			Since	the	field	of	study	is	generally	characterized	by	high	political	sensibility	and	emotions,	 I	was	extra	careful	about	pursuing	a	neutral	position,	e.g.	by	starting	each	 interview	 out	 with	 broad	 ‘who’	 and	 ‘what’-questions.	 This	 enabled	 the	diplomats	 to	 present	 their	 work	 and	 analyses	 using	 their	 own	 terminology,	which	was	 crucial	 for	 the	 validity	 of	my	 analyses	 of	 the	 diplomats’	 discursive	constructions	(Kvale	&	Brinkmann	2009:	131f).	In	order	to	make	the	informants	comment	 on	 the	 terminologies	 and	 practices	 of	 other	 actors,	 I	 have	 always	quoted	these	directly	–	again	in	order	to	minimize	my	own	influence.		
3 Knowledge	underpinning	the	East	
StratCom		This	 chapter	 studies	 The	 StratCom	 Regime’s	 field	 of	 episteme	 in	 order	 to	investigate	the	central	underlying	assumptions,	values,	and	forms	of	knowledge,	which	enable	the	EU	to	problematize	the	“disinformation”	in	Russian	media,	and	further	to	construct	strategic	communication	as	a	legitimate	policy	response.		
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The	 first	 part	 of	 chapter	 3	 investigates	 how	 two	 dominant	 and	 divergent	discourses	construct	EU	as	a	foreign	policy	actor.	In	the	second	part	of	chapter	3	the	 concept	 of	 ‘utopia’	 is	 introduced	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 the	 fundamental	norms	and	values	that	form	the	underlying	assumptions	legitimizing	certain	EU	foreign	 policy	 practices.	 Further,	 the	 specific	 utopian	 ideas	 underpinning	 the	East	StratCom	are	detected.	The	last	part	of	the	chapter	scrutinizes	the	concepts	of	“disinformation”	and	“propaganda”	in	order	to	examine	how	these	terms	are	infused	 with	 meaning	 in	 the	 diplomat’s	 discourses	 and	 the	 East	 StratCom.	Further,	 this	 chapter	 investigates	 how	 the	 concepts	 of	 “disinformation”	 and	“propaganda”	 are	 constructed	 as	 oppositions	 to	 the	 EU’s	 utopias	 and	 how	 the	exclusion	 of	 “propaganda”	 from	 the	 EU	 East	 Stratcom	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘gap’	within	the	field	of	episteme.	
	
3.1 Discourses	of	EU	foreign	policy	actorness:	
Intergovernmental	or	supranational?		After	 the	European	Union	was	established	under	 its	current	name	 in	1993,	 the	
“discursive	 processes	 of	 constructing	 European	 foreign	 policy	 have	 increased	 in	
terms	of	both	scope	and	density”	(Jørgensen	2013:	503).	According	to	Jørgensen’s	studies	more	 and	more	 policy	 areas	 have	 been	 included	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 EU	foreign	 policy,	 but	 still	 the	 character	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	 actor	 is	 a	complicated	 political	 construction	 to	 pin	 down.	 It	 has	 been	 described	 as	everything	from	a	“non	identificable	political	object”,	a	“technocratic	edifice”,	to	a	“Family	of	nations”	(Carta&Morin	2014:	305).			
	
“The	EU	is	famous	for	being	a	complex	political	hybrid,	which	represents	its	member	
states,	but	at	the	same	lies	“above”	the	European	national	states	as	a	multi-layered	
structure	 and	 with	 multiple	 agents,	 but	 with	 the	 same	 fundamental	 goal	 as	 the	
national	 states:	 The	 management	 of	 the	 populations	 living	 within	 its	 territorial	
borders.”	(Larsen	2004:	70f).		
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In	 line	with	 governmentality	 framework,	 this	 thesis	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 judge	 to	what	extend	the	EU	is	political,	technocratic,	bureaucratic	etc.	What	matters	here	is	 how	 the	 different	 actors	 engaging	 in	 the	 discursive	 constructions	 of	 the	 EU	ascribe	meaning	to	the	EU’s	role/identity.	The	different	roles	of	the	EU	become	central	 for	 the	way	 the	 EU	 can	 legitimize	 its	 governance	within	 The	 StratCom	Regime.		In	order	to	understand	how	the	EU	is	constructed	as	an	institution	and	political	body	with	a	mandate	to	operate	on	the	international	level,	my	analysis	sets	out	with	the	investigation	of	two	prominent	existing	discourses,	which	both	seek	to	define	EU	as	a	foreign	policy	actor.			
3.1.1 The	EU	as	a	supranational	unified	foreign	policy	actor		In	the	EU	documents,	which	contain	the	Unions	policy	practices,	it	is	possible	to	detect	 a	 “hegemonic,	 unitary	 discourse	 on	 the	 assertion	 that	 the	 EU	 is	 an	
international	actor	with	its	own	interests	and	policies”	 (Larsen	2004:	69f).	These	policies	are	among	others	aiming	 to	 “spread	the	European	values	all	around	the	
World”	 (EU	 2014:	 3).	 The	 construction	 of	 EU	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	 actor	 can	 be	traced	 back	 to	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Union.	 However,	 this	 understanding	 was	especially	 strengthened	 through	 The	 Maastricht	 Treaty	 from	 1993,	 which	included	 defense	 policy	 in	 its	 provisions,	 and	 thus	 supported	 the	conceptualization	of	the	Union	as	a	“tous	azimuth”	foreign	policy	institution.	This	was	 further	 enabled	 by	 the	 significant	 increase	 in	 European	 decisions-makers’	engagement	 in	 common	 foreign	 policy-making	 during	 the	 1990’s	 (Jørgensen	2004:	10).			The	discourse,	articulating	the	EU	as	a	supranational	unified	foreign	policy	actor,	has	 been	 strong	 within	 the	 EU	 institutions.	 E.g.	 in	 2003	 the	 EU	 launched	 the	European	Security	Strategy,	which	argued	that	the	size	of	the	EU	justifies	that	it	is	perceived	and	acts	as	a	global	actor:			
	 44	
“As	 a	 union	 of	 25	 states	 with	 over	 450	 million	 people	 producing	 a	 quarter	 of	 the	
world's	Gross	National	Product	(GNP),	the	EU	is	inevitably	a	global	player”		(Document	on	European	Security	Strategy	2003).		The	most	prominent	development	of	the	supranational	aspect	of	the	EU	foreign	policy	was	 the	 launch	of	 the	European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS)	 in	2011,	with	the	appointment	of	a	High	Representative	of	the	Union	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	 Security	 Policy	 (HR).	 This	 new	 EU	 Foreign	 Service	 operates	 through	 its	headquarter	in	Brussels	and	through	140	delegations	worldwide	(EEAS	2016/1;	Conceição-Heldt&Meunier	2014:	962).	Through	the	EEAS	the	EU	has	obtained	a	central	 foreign	 policy	 body,	 with	 responsibility	 for	 communicating	 the	 values	and	 policies	 of	 the	 EU	 related	 to	 foreign	 affairs	 by	 continuously	 briefing	 other	European	 institutions	 and	 political	 and	 civil	 society	 actors	 internally	 and	externally	 (Jørgensen	 2013:	 493).	 The	 process	 of	 creating	 the	 EEAS	 as	supranational	organ	representing	the	EU’s	common	foreign	policy	strengthened	the	discourse	shaping	the	EU	a	supranational	unified	foreign	policy	actor.		
3.1.2 The	EU	as	an	arena	for	member	states		Even	 though	 the	 discourse	 on	 supranational	 governance	 can	 be	 argued	 to	 get	“thicker”	as	the	Union	develops	and	expands	(Dean	2009:	228f),	the	EEAS	never	became	a	European	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	designed	to	replace	 the	 foreign	ministries	of	the	member	states.	The	member	states	have	to	a	large	extend	given	the	EU	mandate	to	manage	civilian	aspects	of	foreign	policy	(stability	pacts,	trade	and	 cooperation	 agreements,	 political	 conditionality,	 declaratory	 diplomacy,	etc.),	but	 the	member	states	have	not	been	willing	 to	pass	e.g.	a	direct	military	mandate	to	the	EU’s	foreign	policy	 ‘toolbox’	(Larsen	2004:	75).	Instead	another	discourse	articulating	the	EU	foreign	policy	as	being	the	sum	of	all	independent	member	states’	foreign	policies	remain	strong.	Is	can	for	example	be	detected	in	The	 Lisbon	Treaty’s	Declaration	13	 that	 stressed	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	EEAS	would	not	“affect	the	responsibilities	of	the	Member	States,	as	they	currently	
exist,	for	the	formulation	and	conduct	of	their	foreign	policies	nor	of	their	national	
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representation	 in	 third	 countries	 and	 international	 organizations’”	 (Lequesne	2015:	255f).			This	discourse	stresses	the	intergovernmental	characteristics	of	the	EU	and	does	not	 consider	 the	 EU	 to	 be	 a	 foreign	 policy	 actor,	 since	 “there	 are	 no	 ‘real’	
European	 interests	 to	 represent,	 and	 since	 the	 EU	 has	 only	 obtained	 power	 that	
rightfully	belonged	to	sovereign	nation	states”	(Larsen	2004:	69f).	Following	this	discourse	the	EU	cannot	be	characterized	as	a	unified	foreign	policy	actor,	even	though	it	has	obtained	mandate	to	construct	itself	as	such,	within	certain	policy	areas,	 through	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 the	 supranational	 discourse.	 Instead	this	discourse	constructs	EU	as	a	policy	arena	for	member	states.			As	 outlined	 in	 the	 above	 the	 supranational	 and	 intergovernmental	 discourses	construct	two	divergent	roles	for	the	EU	as	a	foreign	policy	actor.	This	finding	is	in	 line	with	 Jørgensen’s	 (2004)	 suggestion,	 that	 “Sometimes	the	EU	is	the	policy	
arena,	sometimes	it	is	an	actor”	(Jørgensen	2004:	12)			As	the	further	investigations	of	this	thesis	will	support,	none	of	these	discourses	on	the	EU’s	foreign	policy	actorness	have	yet	obtained	hegemony	within	the	field	of	 episteme.	Both	understandings	 coexists,	 and	 the	analysis	 in	 chapter	5	and	6	will	investigate	how	this	two-sided	character	of	the	EU’s	foreign	policy	identity	is	defining	for	how	strategic	communication	is	“thought”	and	“practiced”	among	EU	policy	practitioners.			
3.2 Utopias	-	Legitimization	of	foreign	policy		
In	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 EU	 diplomats	 draw	 upon	 aspects	 of	 the	 field	 of	
episteme	to	legitimize	the	initiation	of	the	East	StratCom,	and	their	general	work	with	 strategic	 communication,	 I	 utilize	 an	 aspect	 of	 Dean’s	 characteristics	 of	governmentality,	 which	 he	 calls	 “the	 Utopian	 element	 of	 government”.	 This	entails	the	belief	that	“every	theory	or	programme	of	government	presupposes	an	
end	of	this	kind:	a	type	of	person,	community,	organization,	society	or	even	world	
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which	is	to	be	achieved.”	Thus,	governmentality	works	through	the	creation	of	a	shared	 belief	 –	 a	 utopia	 –	which	 actors	 believe	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 reach	 through	concrete	 policies	 (Dean	 2009:	 44).	 In	 order	 to	 detect	 the	 central	 utopias	underpinning	 the	 East	 StratCom,	 I	 will	 first	 present	 some	 general	 utopian	elements	of	 the	EU	 foreign	policy,	before	 I	 specify	 the	utopian	elements,	which	are	especially	strong	within	the	East	StratCom	Action	Plan.		
3.2.1 Universal	values	and	the	EU’s	normative	power		In	 the	 founding	documents,	which	 express	 the	 identity	of	 the	European	Union,	the	 values	 regarding	 liberal	 democracy,	 rule	 of	 law,	 good	 governance,	 human	rights,	 and	 order	 and	 justice	 are	 central	 elements	 (Larsen	 2004:	 73;	 Kangas	2015:	485,	Münch	2010:	1).	These	utopian	 concepts	and	values	are	 central	 for	the	 discursive	 legitimization	 of	 the	 performance	 of	 EU	 institutions,	 for	 the	citizens’	transmission	of	decision	competence	to	the	EU	“collectivity”,	and	for	the	value	 and	 identity	 creation	 across	 the	 heterogeneous	 member	 states	(Čmakalová&Rolenc	2012:	264).			In	 this	 thesis,	 legitimacy	will	be	defined	as	“a	shared	expectation	among	actors”	which	make	actors	engaged	 in	governance	processes	(for	example	 the	member	states)	 voluntarily	 accept	 the	 actions	 of	 those	 who	 rule	 (for	 example	 the	 EU	institutions),	 because	 they	 are	 convinced	 that	 the	 actions	 “conform	 to	 pre-
established	norms”	 (Čmakalová&Rolenc	 2012:	 265).	 The	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 EU’s	foreign	policy	 thus	depends	highly	 on	how	populations	 as	well	 as	 opinion	 and	policy	 makers	 in	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 EU	 consider	 the	 character	 of	 the	 EU’s	actorness	 –	 and	 if	 they	 “buy	 in”	 on	 the	 utopic	 discourses	 dominating	 the	 EU’s	foreign	policy	and	EU	in	general.	Similarly,	the	EEAS’	activities	abroad	are	based	on	 several	 of	 these	 utopian	 guiding	 principles	 used	 to	 legitimize	 “The	Union's	
action	on	 the	 international	 scene	 (…)	and	which	 it	 seeks	 to	advance	 in	 the	wider	
world”	(Lisbon	Treaty,	EEAS	2011).		
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Generally,	the	values,	which	are	sustaining	processes	of	legitimizing	EU	policies,	are	 often	 associated	 with	 general	 ‘Western	 values’	 or	 “within	 some	 discourses	
(especially	 within	 the	 West)	 even	 “universal	 values”	 (Pace	 2007:	 1059).	 These	values	play	a	huge	role	for	the	EU’s	interaction	with	other	countries.	In	order	to	be	 perceived	 as	 a	 legitimate	 international	 actor,	 the	 EU	 extensively	 draws	 on	these	“universal	values”,	and	within	the	last	decade	the	EU	has	frequently	been	articulated	and	studied	as	a	 ‘normative	power’	(Čmakalová&Rolenc	2012:	260f,	Pace	2007:	1059,	Conceição-Heldt&Meunier	2014:	972).	This	normative	power	is	 especially	 powerfully	 exerted	 when	 the	 EU	 is	 acting	 as	 a	 regional	 power,	where	 it	 constructs	 itself	 as	 a	 “force	 for	 good”,	 which	 spreads	 the	 “universal”	democratic	 values	 and	 governance	 forms	 to	 its	 less	 developed	 neighboring	regions	(Pace	2007:	1059).	These	“universal	values”	are	a	strong	element	in	The	Copenhagen	Criteria,	which	sets	the	development	goals	for	countries	aspiring	to	EU	 membership	 (European-Lex).	 Also	 within	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood	Policy	 (ENP),	 the	 EU	 develops	 its	 relations	 to	 its	 EU	 Southern	 end	 Eastern	Neighbors	through	these	“common	interests	and	on	values	—	democracy,	the	rule	
of	 law,	 respect	 for	human	rights,	and	 social	 cohesion”	 (EEAS	 ENP).	 Through	 the	partnership	programs,	 the	EU	uses	 its	normative	and	political	attractiveness	as	central	 foreign	 policy	 ‘tools’,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 countries	 in	 the	 neighboring	regions	 adapt	 their	 internal	 developments	 to	 the	 EU’s	 (Zimmermann	 &	 Favell	2011:	 496).	Here,	 the	 normative	 tools	 are	 often	 taking	 place	 through	 different	tools	 of	 rewards	 or	 punishments,	 e.g.	 the	 association	 agreements	 and	partnership	 arrangements	 with	 Eastern	 European	 non-member	 states	 work	through	 international	 recognition,	 financial	assistance,	market	access,	 technical	expertise	or	aid,	and	the	public	praise	for	every	change	in	the	desired	direction	(Pace	2007:	1045).	In	this	way	the	normative	aspects	underpinning	the	EU	as	a	part	of	 the	episteme	of	different	regimes	of	practices	also	become	 influential	 in	the	more	technical	aspects	of	the	EU’s	foreign	relations.					
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3.2.2 Utopias	underpinning	the	East	StratCom		As	part	of	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy,	the	Eastern	Partnership	(EaP)	was	launched	 in	2009.	Under	 the	 slogan	 “Bringing	Eastern	European	partners	closer	
to	 the	EU”	 it	aims	 to	 strengthen	 the	 EU’s	 relations	with	 six	 eastern	 neighbors,	Armenia,	 Azerbaijan,	 Belarus,	 Georgia,	 Moldova	 and	 Ukraine	 (EC	 Eastern	Partnership).	 The	 East	 StratCom	was	 initiated	 as	 a	 part	 of	 furthering	 the	 EU’s	policy	objectives	for	these	countries	in	its	Eastern	neighbourhood	region	(EEAS	ENP).	 In	 line	 with	 the	 overall	 objectives	 of	 the	 EaP	 the	 East	 StratCom	 are	similarly	“building	a	common	area	of	shared	democracy,	prosperity,	stability,	and	
increased	 cooperation”	 and	 thus	 aim	 at	 strengthening	 and	 working	 upon	 the	“universal	values”	as	mentioned	above	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).		But	 since	 the	 East	 StratCom	 is	 specially	 created	 as	 response	 towards	“disinformation”	 in	 the	 Russian	 media,	 the	 more	 specific	 utopias	 regarding	public	sphere,	independent	media,	and	journalistic	press	norms	are	imbuing	the	East	StratCom	Action	Plan.		
3.2.2.1 The	European	public	sphere			A	 central	 part	 of	 the	 EU’s	 democratic	 legitimacy	 is	 related	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	European	 public	 sphere	 (Čmakalová&Rolenc	 2012:	 265f),	 which	 is	 promoting	the	creation	of	a	civil	society,	that	can	“take	on	the	functions	of	the	state”	(or	the	functions	 the	 EU	 encourages	 the	 states	 to	 promote),	 and	which	 can	 provide	 a	space	for	free	and	economically	driven	citizens	to	be	formed	through	conduct	of	conduct	 (Kurki	2011:	362).	Within	 the	East	StratCom	the	central	 target	groups	are	precisely	members	of	“civil	society	”	as	journalists,	young	people,	members	of	academia	or	more	broadly	“local	populations”	or	“the	general	public”	within	the	EaP-countries	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).		Within	the	EU	the	 idea	and	construction	of	a	European	public	sphere	 is	central	for	 securing	 the	 right	 to	 information	and	 freedom	of	 expression,	which	 the	EU	
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constructs	 as	 the	 “heart	of	democracy	 in	Europe”	 and	 as	 a	 human	 right	 for	 the	citizens	 (EU	 communication	 policy	 2006).	 The	 public	 sphere	 works	 as	 an	overarching	 communicative	 space	 that	 fosters	 dialogue	 between	 rule	 makers	and	 populations	 (Zimmermann	 &	 Favell	 2011:	 501f).	 Here	 the	 media	 and	journalists	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 holding	 an	 important	 democratic	 function	 as	‘intermediaries’	 between	 the	 governing	 agencies	 and	 the	 public	(Frandsen&Johansen	2015),	in	that	they	secure	that	the	public	get	the	necessary	information	to	take	on	their	role	as	democratic	citizens.	In	order	to	be	sure	that	the	EaP	citizens	can	 take	on	 their	 ‘democratic	role’	 the	East	StratCom	similarly	work	 “to	secure	that	citizens	have	access	to	alternative	sources	of	 information	 in	
their	local	language”.	As	part	of	this	the	promotion	of	media	literacy	among	the	populations	should	be	promoted	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).			In	 this	 way	 the	 populations	 both	 within	 the	 EU	 and	 in	 EaP-countries	 are	constructed	 as	 conscious	 and	 involved	 citizens,	 who	 can	 be	 governed	 through	conduct	 of	 conduct	 enabled	 through	 the	 spread	 of	 information	 within	 the	European	public	sphere.		Similarly,	the	media	are	constructed	as	central	information-providers	within	the	utopian	 concept	 of	 the	 European	 public	 sphere.	 Today	 the	 “general-audience”	mass	 media	 is	 generally	 considered	 the	 most	 influential	 public	 forum	(Zimmermann	&	 Favell	 2011:	 495;	 501f)	 –	many	 even	 see	 the	mass	media	 as	being	 the	 public	 sphere	 (Metykova	 &	 Preston	 2009:	 61).	 In	 democracies	 the	media	 are	 generally	 constructed	 as	 a	 central	 player	 for	 the	 legitimacy	 of	democracy	in	itself,	through	their	ability	to	encourage	transparency	and	political	accountability	 (Thomas	 2009:	 1),	 and	 the	 EU	 also	 explicitly	 stresses	 that	 “The	
media	 are	 key	 players	 in	 any	 European	 communication	 policy”	 (EU	communication	policy	2006).	Similarly,	the	fundament	for	the	EastStratCom	is	to	strengthen	“the	overall	media	environment”	in	the	Eastern	Neighbourhood		(East	StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).			
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3.2.2.2 Media	independence		In	order	to	secure	the	role	of	the	media	as	‘democratic	intermediaries’,	the	East	StratCom	 strive	 to	 diminish	 the	 effects	 of	 perceived	 “disinformation”	 in	 the	Russian	 media	 through	 their	 work	 to	 “support	 independent	 media”	 and	 the	
“fundamental	 freedom	 of	 the	media	 and	 freedom	 of	 expression”	 (East	 StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).		The	 norms	 of	 media	 independence	 is	 one	 of	 the	 utopian	 values,	 which	 are	generally	underpinning	 the	EU’s	 foreign	policy	within	 the	Eastern	Partnership,	where	for	example	”Political	interference	in	the	media,	economic	concerns	such	as	
media	concentration	and	various	 forms	of	harassment,	 including	violence	against	
journalists”	 is	 stated	 as	 threats	 that	 have	 to	 be	 eliminated	 (EEAS	 ENP).	 The	norms	of	media	 independence	are	also	 institutionalized	within	the	very	core	of	the	 EU,	 where	 press	 freedom	 and	 media	 pluralism	 are	 established	 as	fundamental	rights	in	the	EU	Charter,	which	is	protected	especially	in	Article	10	in	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(Council	of	Europe).	Here	‘media	pluralism’	entails	 the	rights	of	 free	movement	of	media	services	across	 the	EU,	the	independence	of	media	from	private	monopolies,	and	an	ambition	to	ensure	pluralism	 in	 information	 and	 views	 spread	 within	 the	 Union.	 Within	 the	 East	StratCom	 this	 is	 explicitly	 expressed	 through	 the	 objective	 of	 “supporting	
pluralism	in	Russian	language	media	space”	in	the	East	StratCom.	‘Press	freedom’	obligate	 public	 authorities	 to	 guarantee	 the	 freedom	 of	media	 both	 from	 state	monopoly	or	state	intrusion	and	from	un-proportionable	restrictions	by	private	actors	 (European	 Parliament	 2015).	 To	 enhance	 this	 in	 the	 Eastern	Neighbourhood	 the	 EU	 “will	 work	 to	 improve	 cooperation	 between	 national	
regulators”	 and	 “partner	 country	 administrations”	 (East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan	2015).	As	a	part	of	the	East	StratCom	suggestions	about	creating	a	EU	Russian-language	TV	station	has	been	discussed	among	the	member	states.	This	idea	has	so	 far	been	 rejected,	 since	many	member	 states	have	 seen	 this	as	problematic,	specifically	 according	 to	 the	 values	 of	 press	 freedom	 (Q&A	 East	 StratCom).	 As	one	of	the	EU	diplomats	in	Russia	explained	the	discussion	about	a	common	TV	channel	 referring	 to	 the	 utopias:	 “I	 think	 our	 strength	 is	 the	 pluralism,	 that	we	
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don’t	have	one	single	narrative,	and	we	shouldn’t	have	one.	We	had	this	discussion	
if	 we	 should	 counter	 Russia	 Today	 TV	 with	 a	 EU	 TV	 Channel.	 But	 it	 would	 be	
counter	productive.”	(National	Diplomat	3)	
	
3.2.2.3 Press	norms		 	The	 East	 StratCom	 furthermore	 works	 to	 strengthen	 the	 civil	 society	 “media	watchdog“	 that	 can	 “hold	Governments	 to	 account”	 (East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan	2015).	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 general	 democratic	 understandings	 within	 the	 EU,	where	 the	 press	 obtains	 this	 mandate	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 that	 the	 governing	institutions	 and	 people	 do	 not	 abuse	 the	 power	 democratically	 passed	 on	 to	them	 (McQual	 2000).	 	 In	 order	 to	 perform	 this	 role	 the	media	 have	 obtained	special	 rights,	 which	 includes	 that	 obstructions	 to	 journalists’	 information	gathering	are	banned	 (European	Parliament	2012).	 In	order	 to	 legitimize	 their	central	role	as	“watchdogs”	the	medias	correspondingly	have	to	work	according	to	 certain	 norms	 and	 ethics.	 Here	 especially	 the	 concepts	 of	 “objectivity”	 and	“neutrality”	 have	 gained	 prominence	 as	 vital	 journalistic	 professional	 norms	among	 Western	 journalists	 and	 scholars	 (Vartanova	 2012:	 137).	 These	normative	 aspects	 entail	 that	 the	 media	 in	 democratic	 societies	 should	 do	
“objective,	impartial	and	balanced	reporting”	(Metykova	&	Preston	2009:	63).			Among	 journalists	 within	 the	 EU	 this	 more	 specifically	 entails	 professional	journalists	should	seek	the	truth,	get	as	many	sources	as	possible,	check	sources,	cite	 sources	 correctly,	 balance	 information,	 and	 strictly	 separate	 facts	 and	opinion	(Metykova	&	Preston	2009:	64).	These	understandings	are	 in	 line	with	the	 central	 elements	 in	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Principles	 on	 the	 Conduct	 of	Journalists	 adopted	 by	 the	 International	 Federation	 of	 Journalists	 in	 1954	 (IFJ	1954),	which	 is	 also	 referred	 to	as	 the	norms	 for	press	behavior	underpinning	the	EU’s	East	StratCom	(Liborius	2016).	Even	though	the	Western	press	norms	are	not	explicitly	mentioned	 in	 the	East	StratCom	Action	Plan,	 they	still	widely	underpin	 the	 ways	 the	 diplomats	 understand	 the	 media	 institutions	 and	journalists	 that	 they	 wish	 to	 support.	 Here	 the	 press	 norms	 are	 seen	 as	 a	
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guarantee	that	the	media	live	up	to	their	democratic	obligation	as	intermediaries	and	watchdogs:		
“We	believe	that	 the	citizens	need	access	 to	valid	 information,	and	 in	order	 to	secure	
that,	 we	 have	 some	 classical	 and	 well-proven	 and	 well-developed	 journalistic	
standards.	These	should	 just	be	sustained,	 they	should	not	be	developed.	 It	 is	actually	
very	simple.	We	just	have	to	keep	up	to	good	form	and	tradition.”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).			Likewise,	the	diplomats	interviewed	for	this	thesis	refer	to	both	the	press	norms	and	the	utopias	of	independent	media,	when	they	talk	about	the	East	StratCom.	Such	 utopias	 and	 norms	 underpin	 their	 categorizations	 of	 “professional	
journalists”	that	are	“accepting	the	rules”	(National	diplomat	2).	As	investigated	in	the	above	the	StratCom	Regime‘s	pervading	utopias	being	the	democratic	public	sphere,	the	independent	media	and	the	journalistic	press	can	be	 studied	 as	 underpinning	 norms	 and	 values	 that	 the	 East	 StratCom	 is	 based	upon,	and	that	the	diplomats	refer	to	as	indirect	utopian	‘truths’.	Following,	these	norms	 are	 constituting	 an	 underlying	 point	 of	 reference	 for	 EU	 actors’	articulations	of	“disinformation”	as	being	the	antithesis	to	these	norms.		In	 the	 next	 part	 I	 will	 scrutinize	 how	 the	 concepts	 of	 “disinformation”	 and	“propaganda”	are	discursively	constructed	 in	 the	official	 strategy	papers	of	 the	East	StratCom	and	in	the	diplomats’	articulations.	As	a	part	of	this	I	 investigate	how	some	discursive	constructions	 intertwine	 the	meaning	of	 the	 two	words.	 I	further	investigate	how	the	exclusion	of	“propaganda”	is	related	to	the	discursive	construction	of	EU	as	a	unifying	policy	actor.			
3.3 Propaganda	or	disinformation?	
The	 official	 strategy	 documents	 from	 the	 EU’s	 East	 StratCom	 use	“disinformation”	as	a	broad	term	to	describe	the	information	spread	by	Russian	media,	politicians	or	officials	etc.,	which	they	find	misleading,	nonfactual,	and/or	
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discrediting	 the	 EU	 on	 a	 false	 premise	 (EU	 Actions	 Plan;	 East	 StratCom	Q&A).	Within	 the	 East	 StratCom’s	 official	 written	 communication	 (Action	 Plan	 and	online	Q&A)	 “propaganda”	 is	 excluded.	Even	 though	 “disinformation”	has	been	chosen	as	the	official	term	within	the	EU	to	describe	such	misleading	information	spread	 by	 the	 Russian	media	 and	 politicians	 the	 term	 “propaganda”	 is	 widely	used	 to	 describe	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Russian	media	 –	 especially	 in	more	popular	debates	and	analyses	and	news	coverage	like	“EU	campaign	to	counter	Russian	propaganda	asks	MEPs	for	help”	(Euractiv	19.2.16).	Likewise,	several	of	the	 diplomats	 working	 with	 strategic	 communication	 in	 Russia	 and	 the	 2015	report	on	 information	and	communication	 from	the	Delegation	 in	Moscow,	use	the	term	“propaganda”	to	explain	what	they	perceive	as	problematic	content	in	Russian	media:		
“The	main	challenges	to	our	activities	are:	(1)	Increased	anti-Western	/	anti-EU	public	
rhetoric	 from	 key	 state	 opinion	 makers.	 (2)	 Significant	 increased	 state	 media	
operations	against	“the	West”/EU	including	with	covert	“trolling”,	 fake	or	misleading	
propaganda	via	social	media	activities	(…)”	(EU	Delegation	2015)		The	 term	 “propaganda”	has	historical	 roots	 back	 to	 the	big	periods	 of	 internal	conflicts	within	the	20th	century.	Propaganda-like	methods	were	already	used	as	a	 prominent	 tool	 for	 state	 officials	 during	 World	 War	 I,	 where	 e.g.	 the	 U.S.	Committee	 on	 Public	 Information	 organized	 journalists	 in	 order	 to	 create	domestic	 and	 allied	 support.	 Similarly	 the	 term	 propaganda	 is	 popularly	connected	 to	 the	 techniques	 used	 by	 the	 chief	 Nazi-propagandist	 Joseph	Goebbels	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).	But	also	the	leaders	from	nations	like	 Britain	 and	 the	 United	 States	 ‘Western	 nations’	 used	 the	 techniques	mentioned	 above	 to	 attack	 the	 credibility	 of	 enemies,	 and	 to	 gain	 support	 for	their	 own	 military	 actions	 both	 internally	 and	 within	 the	 international	community	during	World	War	II	(Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	2009:	914).	In	recent	times	in	 ‘the	West’	propaganda	has	been	widely	connected	to	the	 information	spread	during	the	Cold	War	by	the	United	States	representing	a	Western	 liberal	world	order,	and	the	Soviet	Union	representing	a	communist	world	order	(Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	2009:	914).	Since	the	utopian	narratives	of	the	‘Western	press	norms’	was	developed	 within	 the	 Western	 countries	 after	 the	 1940’s,	 propaganda	 was	
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widely	 connected	 to	 the	 information	 control	 and	 intervention	 in	 media	productions	 executed	 by	 totalitarian	 states,	 with	 especially	 Nazi	 Germany	 and	the	Soviet	Union	presented	as	the	bugaboos	for	what	power	abuse	and	the	lack	of	 a	 democratic	 public	 sphere	 could	 lead	 to	 (Crossen	 2003).	 The	 connection	between	state	involvement	and	propaganda	can	be	outlined	as	follows:		
“In	 its	 most	 common	 current	 usage,	 propaganda	 refers	 to	 a	 form	 of	 persuasion	
distinguished	 by	 a	 mass	 persuasion	 campaign,	 often	 one	 sided	 and	 fear	 based,	 that	
distorts	 or	 attempts	 to	 hide	 or	 discredit	 relevant	 evidence,	 disguises	 sources,	 and	
discourages	 rational	 thought.	 Often	 considered	 a	 tool	 of	 government	 formation	 and	
policy,	 propaganda	 also	 may	 be	 found	 in	 advertising,	 religion,	 education,	 and	 other	
institutional	settings.”	(Hurn	2016:	1)		In	 line	 with	 these	 enemy	 pictures	 the	 diplomats’	 articulate	 “propaganda”	 as	being	performed	by	an	illegitimate	undemocratic	state,	e.g.:		
“Moscow	is	different.	Moscow	is	the	place	where	we	have	to	face	official	propaganda,	
misinterpretation,	manipulation,	all	kinds	of	hybrid	stuff”	(National	diplomat	3).	
	The	 underlying	 free	 press	 norms	 enable	 the	 diplomats	 to	 frame	 the	 Western	media	as	being	on	the	right	side	of	 the	“democratic	spectrum”	and	the	Russian	media	as	being	‘the	other’	that	is	engaged	in	propaganda:	
	
“It	is	always	difficult	because	our	media	do	not	function	like	the	Russian	do.	We	are	not	
used	to	do	propaganda.	We	never	taught	propaganda”	(National	diplomat	2).			When	taking	a	closer	look	at	the	definition	of	“disinformation”	in	the	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	concept	is	closely	connected	with	the	 hegemonic	 understandings	 of	 propaganda	 as	 presented	 by	 Hurn	 (2016).	Here	 disinformation	 is	 understood	 as	 “false	 information	 that	 is	 intended	 to	
mislead,	 especially	 propaganda	 issued	 by	 a	 government	 organization	 to	 a	 rival	
power	or	the	media.”	 (New	Oxford	American	Dictionary).	This	definition	 is	very	
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much	 in	 line	 with	 one	 of	 the	 diplomats’	 view	 on	 propaganda:	 “Propaganda	 is	
certainly	the	falsification,	which	is	intentionally	done”	(National	diplomat	2).		In	 this	 way	 both	 the	 terms	 “propaganda”	 and	 “disinformation”	 are	 used	 to	describe	 the	 examples	 of	 fake	 news	 stories	 constructed	 through	 the	 Russian	media.	While	some	diplomats	equals	“propaganda”	and	“disinformation”,	others	construct	 “disinformation”	 as	 being	 a	 more	 legitimate,	 less	 confronting,	 and	 a	less	historically	tainted	term:		
”I	 think	 disinformation	 is	 the	 right	word.	 I	 think	 there	 are	 so	many	 version	 of	 the	
truth	out	here,	that	I	think	it	is	difficult	for	audiences	know	what	is	and	isn’t	correct.	I	
dont	know	how	much	trust	there	is	in	Russian	media,	but	I	dont	think	that	necessarily	
there	is	trust	in	what	we	but	out	messaging	wise	either.	”	(National	diplomat	4)	
“I	 understand	 that	 at	 some	 point	 some	 sentences	 specifically,	 some	 headlines,	 of	
course	deserve	the	word	that	“this	is	propaganda”.	But	that	the	Russian	media	as	a	
standard	are	propaganda,	come	on…”	this	diplomat	says,	referring	to	fact	that	the	Russian	 state	 today	 is	 not	 controlling	 the	 media	 in	 the	 way	 they	 have	 done	historically	(National	diplomat	1).		In	this	way	the	term	“propaganda”	is	seen	as	more	problematic	to	some	member	states	and	diplomats,	while	disinformation	 is	more	neutral.	 Since	 the	 initiation	and	 implementation	 of	 the	 East	 StratCom	 is	 contingent	 on	 all	 member	 states’	consent,	 the	 term	 “propaganda”	 has	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 official	 strategy	papers.	But	as	I	will	study	in	the	following	chapter,	it	is	still	central	for	the	EU’s	general	 problematization	 of	 the	Russian	media.	 This	 is	 supported	by	 the	 point	made	 in	 this	 chapter,	 that	 the	 terms	 “disinformation”	 and	 “propaganda”	 easily	become	 intertwined	 since	 the	 both	 refers	 to	 false	 information	 especially	promoted	 by	 a	 government,	 which	 is	 intended	 to	 mislead	 (Hurn	 2016:	 1;	Dictionary).		
3.4 Sum	up:	Episteme	
In	order	to	analyze	“the	forms	of	knowledge	that	arise	from	and	form	the	activity	
of	 governance”	 (Dean	 2009:	 42)	 this	 chapter	 has	 studied	 the	 field	 of	 episteme	
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underpinning	The	StratCom	Regime.	As	being	a	part	of	the	EU’s	foreign	policy	a	central	 element	of	 the	 regime	 is	 formed	by	 the	way	 the	EU	 is	 constructed	as	a	foreign	policy	actor.	Here	the	 first	part	presented	two	contradictory	discourses	on	the	EU,	which	are	respectively	constructing	the	EU	as	a	unified	supranational	foreign	 policy	 actor	 or	 the	 EU	 as	 an	 arena	 for	 member	 states.	 The	 unified	discourse	was	presented	as	most	strong	within	the	EU	institutions	themselves.	This	 two-sided	 character	 of	 the	 EU	 foreign	 policy	 identity	 creates	 specific	conditions	 for	 the	 way	 the	 EU	 can	 exercise	 governance,	 and	more	 specifically	how	the	strategic	communication	is	implemented	in	Russia.		In	order	to	bridge	the	contradiction	within	both	identities,	 the	EU	is	constructs	itself	 upon	 democratic	 utopian	 values,	which	 from	 the	 EU	 perspective	 is	 often	presented	as	“universal	values”	that	are	forming	the	utopias	form	both	member	states	 and	 EU	 institutions.	 Similarly,	 the	 utopias	 are	 also	 underpinning	 the	Eastern	Partnership	programs,	which	the	East	StratCom	is	launched	as	a	part	of.	The	utopias	enables	the	EU	to	construct	itself	as	“a	force	for	good”	through	these	praogams.	The	East	StratCom	 is	especially	dominated	by	 the	utopias	 regarding	public	 sphere,	 independent	 media,	 and	 journalistic	 press	 norms.	 These	 are	widely	 referred	 to	 as	 taken-for-granted	 values	 within	 the	 East	 StratCom	 and	among	the	diplomats	working	with	strategic	communication	in	Russia.	Especially	these	utopias	are	constructed	as	an	antipole	 to	 the	 terms	 “disinformation”	and	“propaganda”,	 which	 enables	 the	 diplomats	 to	 articulate	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 EU	media	 as	 being	 legitimate,	 while	 positioning	 the	 Russian	media	 as	 illegitimate	from	 a	 democratic	 point	 of	 view.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 episteme	 furthermore	showed	 how	 “propaganda”	 as	 a	 term	 has	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 official	 East	StratCom	 policy	 papers	 due	 to	 its	more	 historically	 tainted	 perceptions,	 while	“disinformation”	has	been	 included.	The	term	propaganda	 is	excluded	from	the	East	 StratCom	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 strengthen	 the	 EU’s	 ability	 to	 act	 as	 a	 unified	policy	 actor	 through	 the	East	 StratCom,	 since	 all	member	 states	 can	 adhere	 to	this	 term.	 But	 as	 both	 dictionary	 definitions	 and	 the	 diplomats’	 articulations	show,	 the	 perceptions	 of	 the	 terms	 “disinformation”	 and	 “propaganda”	 are	largely	overlapping	and	both	terms	are	constructed	as	 the	opposite	 to	 the	EU’s	utopias.	
	 57	
4 The	problematization	of	
“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media		This	chapter	analyzes	the	field	of	visibility	of	The	StratCom	Regime	in	order	to	outline	how	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	has	become	constructed	as	an	
“object	for	governance”	(Dean	2009:	41).			Drawing	on	Bacchi	(2012),	the	initiation	of	the	EU’s	East	StratCom	can	be	studied	as	 a	 policy	 response	 that	 takes	 its	 point	 of	 departure	 in	 a	 problematization	 of	“disinformation”	 in	 the	 Russia	 media.	 	 Correspondingly,	 the	 present	 chapter	analyzes	how	this	problematization	can	be	linked	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Ukraine	crisis,	and	how	this	has	enabled	a	new	conflict	narrative	about	Russia	 to	occur	among	 EU	 actors.	 As	 a	 part	 of	 the	 problematization,	 I	 will	 study	 how	 EU	diplomats	working	in	Russia	construct	the	Russian	media	system	as	a	promoter	of	 “disinformation”,	 and	 how	 this	 enables	 them	 to	 articulate	 strategic	communication	 as	 a	 legitimate	 foreign	 policy	 response	 towards	 the	 Russian	“disinformation	campaign”.			
4.1 The	EU’s	construction	of	Russia’s	
“disinformation	campaign”		
	
4.1.1 The	Ukraine	crisis	and	the	narrative	on	‘revisionist	Russia’			The	military	and	political	crisis	in	Ukraine	has	played	a	central	role	for	relations	between	 Russia	 and	 the	 EU	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	 EU’s	 East	StratCom	in	relation	to	Russia.		Russia’s	annexation	of	the	Ukrainian	peninsula	Crimea	in	March	2014	prompted	wide	 condemnation	 within	 the	 EU,	 leading	 the	 Union	 to	 impose	 economic	
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sanctions	 on	 Russia	 due	 to	 the	 “gross	 violation	 of	 international	 law	 and	 of	 the	
territorial	integrity	of	Ukraine”	(EEAS	18/03/2016).	The	 annexation	 of	 Crimea	made	 critical	 voices	 within	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 Eastern	Neighborhood	fear,	that	if	Russia	had	been	willing	to	use	military	in	Ukraine,	the	country	might	as	well	do	it	to	annex	other	former	Soviet	territories	as	well	(The	Washington	 Post	 16.05.15).	 In	 this	 way	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis	 has	 become	constructed	 as	 a	 threat	 towards	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 neighboring	countries’	 borders	 with	 particular	 resonance	 for	 some	 member	 states.	 The	Latvian	vice-president	for	the	European	Commission	presented	the	threat	at	an	official	meeting	in	the	beginning	of	2015:		
"Russia's	 aggression	 against	 Ukraine	 is	 very	 worrying	 for	 Baltic	 states	 (…)	 It	 shows	
that	Russia	is	looking	to	redraw	Europe's	21st	century	borders	by	force,	and	it	must	be	
noted	 that	 Ukraine	 is	 not	 the	 first	 country	 to	 face	 Russia's	 aggression."	 (Reuters	19.02.15)		According	to	Larsen	(2004),	articulations	that	build	up	a	risk	related	to	foreign	nations	can	be	seen	as	an	 important	part	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	EU’s	own	foreign	 policy	 identity	 (Larsen	 2004:	 73).	 For	 example	 the	 conflict	 narrative	enhance	 the	EU’s	 ability	 to	 construct	 itself	 as	 a	 “force	 for	 good”	 in	 the	Eastern	Neighborhood	 by	 increasing	 the	 “enemy”-construction	 of	 Russia.	 Even	 though	the	 official	 statements	 regarding	 the	 EU’s	 condemnations	 of	 Russia’s	 actions	have	been	much	more	subtle,	 the	criticism	of	the	Russia’s	military	 involvement	in	 Ukraine	 has	 nonetheless	 become	 predominant	 within	 the	 EU’s	 official	communication	about	EU-Russia	relations	(EEAS	18/03/2016).	Several	scholars	have	studied	how	the	relationship	between	Russia	and	the	EU	has	generally	been	characterized	 by	 ‘othering’-processes	 created	 through	 inside-outside	distinctions	highlighting	Russia	and	the	EU’s	geographical,	cultural,	political,	and	historical	 differences	 (see	 e.g.	 Prozorov	 2004,	 2006,	 Wilson	 &	 Popescu	 2009,	Haukkala	2008).	The	term	‘othering’	can	be	defined	as	a	the	“construction	of	‘us’	
and	 ‘they’	 identities”	 (Vartanova	2014:	 100),	 and	 in	 this	way	 the	Ukraine	 crisis	can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 event	 that	 is	 clearly	 reviving	 and	 invoking	 the	 ‘othering’	 of	Russia	by	the	EU,	through	articulations	of	Russia	as	a	potential	threat:	
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“A	 number	 of	 European	 countries	 first	 pursued	 a	 policy	 [where	 they]	 thought	 that	
insecurity	and	 instability	was	vanished	 forever.	And	then	someone	 [Russia]	 came	and	
reminded	them,	that	that	wasn’t	how	life	was,	and	that	is	why	you	have	to	turn	some	
policies	back	and	find	good	old-fashioned	deterrence	back	again”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		Within	 the	 official	 Russian	 narrative,	 the	 annexation	 of	 Crimea	 has	 been	presented	 as	 an	 act	 of	 “historical	 justice”,	 since	 Crimea	 was	 a	 part	 of	 Russia	before	 the	 Peninsula	 became	 a	 part	 Ukraine	 when	 the	 country	 got	 its	independence	in	1991	(The	Moscow	Times	2015).	Combined	with	Russia’s	high	level	 of	 engagement	 in	other	post-Soviet	 states,	 e.g.	 its	military	 intervention	 in	Georgia	 in	 2008,	 a	 discourse	 has	 been	 growing	 within	 the	 EU,	 which	characterizes	Russia	as	a	“revisionist	state”.	This	defines	a	state	which	seeks	to	adjust	the	way	present	borders	are	drawn,	through	the	willingness	to	“use	force	
to	alter	the	balance	of	power”	 (Dunne,	Kurki	&	Smith	2010:	79).	The	prominent	EU	articulations	of	a	fear	of	potential	Russian	military	aspirations	in	other	post-Soviet	 states	 support	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 bigger	 conflict	 narrative	 of	 Russia	turning	into	a	“revisionist	state”	following	the	Ukraine	crisis.	This	conflict	narrative	of	“Revisionist	Russia”	has	also	included	the	information	within	 the	Russian	media	 into	 its	 broader	 problematization	 of	 Russian	 foreign	policy	intentions:		
“What	is	happening	within	the	media	field	is	a	precise	parallel	to	what	is	happening	in	
the	security	field”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		The	following	section	will	elaborate	on	how	the	EU	increasingly	sees	the	Russian	media	 as	 ‘problematic’.	 This	 led	 the	 European	 Council	 on	 March	 20	 2015	 to	stress	 “the	 need	 to	 challenge	 Russia’s	 ongoing	 disinformation	 campaign”	 and	 to	the	creation	of	the	East	StratCom	Team	(East	StratCom	1).			
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4.1.2 Media	in	the	center	of	Russia’s	“disinformation	campaign”		EU’s	increased	awareness	of	“disinformation”	in	Russian	media,	is	supported	by	the	perceived	increase	in	‘false’	stories	in	the	Russian	media	since	the	outbreak	if	the	Ukraine	crisis:		
“For	instance,	the	number	of	stories	now	compared	to	half	a	year	ago,	compared	to	a	
year	 ago,	which	altogether	 lack	 basis	 in	 reality,	which	are	 pure	 fiction	 –	 it	 has	 been	
remarkably	increased	(…).	After	all,	it	gives	food	for	thought	that	we	now	on	a	weekly	
basis	can	spot	a	number	of	outright	lies”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016)	
	Especially	 one	 “fake”	 news	 story	 about	 a	 child	who	was	 allegedly	 crucified	 by	Ukrainian	military	 forces	 in	 the	Ukrainian	 city	Slovyansk	on	13	 July	2014,	was	the	 turning	 point	 at	 which	 the	 EU	 truly	 became	 aware	 of	 this	 “campaign”	(Spokesperson,	 EU	 Delegation	 2016).	 This	 story	 was	 produced	 for	 Russian	national	 television,	 Channel	 1,	 and	 the	 EU	 as	 well	 as	 other	 critics	 inside	 and	outside	of	Russia	have	subsequently	claimed,	that	the	story	was	pure	fabrication,	since	no	evidence	or	additional	sources	could	be	found	on	the	alleged	crucifixion	(Moscow	Times	14.07.14).		In	 its	 annual	 communication	 report	 from	 2015,	 the	 EU	 Delegation	 points	 out	
“Significant	 increased	 state	 media	 operations	 against	 “the	 West”/EU”	 as	 an	obstruction	 to	 the	 EU’s	work	 in	 Russia	 (EU	Delegation	 2015).	 In	 line	with	 the	terminology	 “disinformation	 campaign”	 the	 EU	 constructs	 this	 increase	 in	“disinformation”	as	a	deliberate	part	of	the	strategy	by	the	Russian	state.	In	this	way	the	EU’s	criticism	of	the	way	the	Russian	state	“uses”	information	is	in	line	with	Hurn’s	definition	of	“propaganda”	as	a	“mass	persuasion	campaign,	often	one	
sided	and	fear	based	(…)	Often	considered	a	tool	of	government”	(Hurn	2016:	1).	Hurn	(2006)	also	describe	propaganda	as	information	or	actions	“that	distorts	or	
attempts	 to	 hide	 or	 discredit	 relevant	 evidence”.	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 EU’s	accusations	of	Russia’s	 “campaign”	as	using	 “fake	or	misleading	propaganda	via	
social	 media	 activities,	 fake	 academia/think	 tanks	 aiming	 at	 “neutralising”	 EU	
positions“	 (EU	 Delegation	 2015).	 Concluding,	 the	 EU	 constructs	 the	“disinformation”	 in	 the	 Russian	 media	 as	 a	 propaganda	 campaign	 seeking	 to	
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position	the	EU	as	 the	enemy.	Since	 freedom	of	 the	press	constitutes	a	utopian	cornerstone	within	the	EU	(EUparl	1),	this	propagandistic	use	of	the	media	is	not	only	discrediting	the	external	image	of	the	EU,	it	also	poses	a	threat	to	the	values	on	which	the	EU	builds	its	narrative	as	“a	force	for	good”,	which	suggests	that	the	“propaganda”	 and	 “disinformation”,	 also	 reaching	 citizens	 within	 the	 EU,	 is	constructed	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 EU’s	 governance	 itself	 (Barbé	 &	Johansson-Nogué	2008).	In	 this	way,	 the	 increase	 in	 “disinformation”	 and	 “false”	 stories	within	Russian	media,	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 bigger	 conflict	 narrative	 of	 Russia	 as	 a	 “revisionist	state”	 seeking	 to	 achieve	 its	 goals	 through	military	means,	 but	 also	 through	 a	“disinformation	campaign”	which	discredits	the	EU	and	constructs	the	Union	as	an	enemy.			Thus,	 the	 EU	 explains	 the	 differences	 in	 media	 coverage	 and	 framing	 within	Russian	and	EU	based	media	 through	 the	 conflict	narrative,	which	 is	 seen	as	a	part	of	 “Russia’s	campaign”.	An	example	of	 this	 is	how	the	Russian	state	media	and	EU	based	media	framed	a	documentary	program	about	Putin	from	15.	March	2015	 on	 the	 Russian	 state-run	 TV-channel	 Rossiya-1.	 While	 the	 international	press	 largely	 focused	on	 the	news	 that	 ”Vladimir	Putin	describes	secret	meeting	
when	 Russia	 decided	 to	 seize	 Crimea”	 (The	 Guardian	 09.03.15),	 Russian	 state-sponsored	English-language	news	media	utilized	the	word	“reunited”	instead	of	“seized”:	 “Putin	 Reveals	 Details	 of	 Russia-Crimea	 Reunification,	 Maidan	 in	
Documentary”	(SputnikNews	15.03.15).	
	These	stories	are	examples	of	how	differences	in	news	framing	are	vital	for	the	impression	 that	 reaches	 the	 target	 groups.	 The	 medias’	 ability	 to	 frame	international	events	and	influence	populations’	opinions	through	agenda	setting	(Coleman	et	al.	2009:	147;	Entman	et	al.	2009:	177)	supports	the	EU’s	narrative	of	 the	 potential	 damaging	 influence	 of	 “disinformation”	 in	 the	 Russian	 media.	Here	 especially	 adherents	 to	 the	 so-called	 “CNN-effect”	 point	 out	 how	 global	broadcasting	 corporations’	 coverage	 of	 an	 international	 crisis	 can	 prompt	changes	in	foreign	policy	and	shift	the	opinions	of	populations	(Madianou	2009:	
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348;	 Robinson	 2001:	 524).	 Since	 many	 scholars	 have	 criticized	 the	overestimation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 media	 and	 the	 CNN	 effect	 (Robinson	 2001,	Gilboa	 2005),	 I	 will	 not	 enter	 into	 the	 wider	 debate	 on	 the	 media’s	 actual	influence	 on	 the	 developments	 and	 events	 during	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis.	 What	 is	important	 for	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	 EU	 constructs	 the	 media	 as	 having	 an	influence	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan).			
4.1.3 Russian	minorities	as	targets	for	the	“media	war”		As	 a	 part	 of	 the	 conflict	 narrative	 of	 “Revisionist	 Russia”,	 the	media	 has	 been	constructed	as	a	central	part	of	the	Ukraine	conflict	due	to	its	ability	to	influence	how	populations	 perceive	 international	 conflicts.	 Even	 though	media	 attention	and	framing	cannot	always	be	equaled	with	the	opinion	formation	in	society,	the	positive	 framing	of	 the	annexation	of	Crimea	inside	of	Russia	might	have	had	a	say	on	a	poll	made	by	the	 independent	Russian	Levada	Center	 in	 January	2016	showing	 that	 83	 percent	 of	 Russians	 supported	 Russia’s	 annexation	 of	 Crimea	and	only	13	percent	opposed	 it	 (Carnegie	21.03.16).	 	Several	of	 the	 informants	within	this	study	have	been	referring	to	these	polls,	which	show	that	they	have	influenced	 the	 diplomats’	 perception	 of	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 coverage	 by	the	 Russian	 media	 and	 the	 support	 by	 the	 Russian	 population	 to	 president	Putins’	foreign	policy.			In	line	with	this	the	EU	constructs	the	Russian	minorities	living	in	EU	countries	like	 the	 Baltics	 States	 and	 in	 the	 EU’s	 East	 Partnership	 countries	 as	 posing	 a	potential	 threat	 to	 the	 EU’s	 stability.	 Like	 the	 Russians	 inside	 of	 Russia,	 these	minorities	 are	 also	 getting	most	 of	 their	 news	 from	 the	 big	 Russian	 television	channels.	 A	 Gallup	 World	 poll	 from	 2014	 among	 12	 former	 Soviet-states	concluded	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 Russian	 minorities	 in	 post-Soviet	countries	 trusted	 Russian	 media	 more	 than	 they	 trusted	 Western	 media.	Similarly,	the	majority	supported	Crimea	joining	Russia	(Gallup	2014).	This	has	made	skeptics	within	the	EU	fear	that	there	is	a	risk	of	the	minorities	becoming	more	 loyal	 to	 Russia	 than	 to	 the	 EU	 –	 ultimately	 turning	 these	minorities	 into	
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actual	enemies	of	the	EU	integration,	as	Russian	minorities	have	been	in	Ukraine	(Carnegie	21.03.16).	In	line	with	this	perception	of	risks,	the	EU	has	constructed	the	Russian	speaking	populations	in	the	EaP	as	main	targets	of	the	East	StratCom	(East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan).	 But	 since	 also	 EU	 member	 states	 like	 the	 Baltic	countries,	 Germany,	 UK,	 and	 Finland	 also	 have	 big	 Russian	 minorities	 the	Russians	within	 the	EU	are	 similarly	 constructed	as	 target	 groups	 for	both	 the	Russian	“media	campaign”	and	the	East	StratCom.	From	this	point	of	perspective	the	ambition	of	the	East	StratCom	is	to	secure	that	the	Russian	minorities	in	the	countries	 “continue	to	be	 fragmented”	 so	 they	do	not	 become	uncritical	 targets	for	the	Russian	“disinformation	campaign”	(Spokesperson,	EU	delegation	2016).		According	 to	 Larsen	 (2004)	 the	 threat	 to	 European	 security	 is	 “constructed	as	
threats	to	European	integration,	and	thus	the	coherence	within	the	territory	of	the	
EU”	 (Larsen	 2004:	 73f).	 Through	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Russia	 minorities	 as	potential	 threats	 to	 the	 EU’s	 internal	 cohesion,	 the	 East	 StratCom	 is	 also	constructed	as	a	means	of	internal	risk	reduction,	which	enables	the	EU	to	make	strategic	communication	work	as	a	bridge	between	foreign	and	internal	policies.	Since	the	narratives	within	the	so-called	“disinformation	campaigns”	are	mainly	produced	 in	 Moscow,	 the	 Russian	 journalists	 and	 media	 also	 become	 central	target	 groups	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 the	EU’s	East	 StratCom.	And	 since	 the	Russian	 people	 are	 the	 ones	 having	 the	 potential	 to	 delimit	 the	 extend	 of	 the	Russian	 state’s	 “campaigns”	 they	 also	 become	 target	 groups	 for	 the	 East	StratCom:	”It	is	Russians	who	decide	Russia’s	fate.”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).	Because	 the	empirical	material	of	 this	 thesis	consists	of	 interviews	with	diplomats	 working	 in	 Moscow	 the	 target	 groups	 within	 Russia	 will	 be	 the	primary	subject	matter	in	this	study	because	these	groups	are	the	main	concern	in	 the	 diplomats	 articulations..	 In	 the	 following	 I	 analyze	 how	 these	 diplomats	construct	 the	 Russian	 media	 system	 as	 being	 central	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	“disinformation”	 and	 as	 a	 problematic	 context	 for	 implementing	 strategic	communication.	
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4.2 The	 Russian	 media	 system	 as	 promoter	 of	
“disinformation”	Keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 utopias	 underpinning	 the	 East	 StratCom,	 as	 analyzed	 in	chapter	 3,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 diplomats’	 problematization	 of	 Russian	media	 is	 not	merely	 restricted	 to	 conditions	within	 the	 Russian	media	 outlets	themselves	or	among	 journalists.	The	 ideas	and	historical	conditions	 for	media	freedom	and	propaganda	are	tightly	connected	to	the	broader	ideas	defining	the	interconnectedness	 between	 media,	 state,	 market,	 and	 politics	 within	 a	 given	national	context.		Through	their	comparative	media	systems	approach	Hallin	and	Mancini	(2004)	have	 theorized	 how	 the	 role	 of	 media	 and	 journalists	 can	 be	 studied	 as	integrated	with	the	political,	economic	and	cultural	system,	within	a	given	state	(Hallin&Mancini	2004:	13).	These	correlations	which	define	 the	distinctiveness	of	a	given	media	system	can	be	analyzed	through	four	analytical	dimensions:	1)	the	 level	 of	 state	 intervention,	 2)	 the	 media’s	 political	 alignment,	 3)	 the	development	 of	 media	 markets,	 and	 4)	 the	 journalistic	 profession	 (Hallin	 &	Mancini	 2004:	 21).	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 do	 not	 conduct	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	Russian	 media	 system,	 but	 I	 utilize	 the	 understanding	 of	 media	 systems	 as	 a	categorization	 constructed	 by	 diplomats	 in	 accordance	with	 their	 state-centric	worldview,	 and	 as	 part	 of	 their	 problematization	 of	 the	 Russian	 “media	campaign”.			
4.2.1 State	centralization	and	media	control		The	 first	 and	 most	 prominent	 level	 of	 the	 diplomats’	 problematization	 of	 the	Russian	 media	 system	 is	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 central	 power	controlling	 essential	 areas	 of	 the	 Russian	 society	 (diplomat	 1,	 diplomat	 2,	diplomat	 4).	 Such	 perceptions	 are	 in	 line	 with	 Vartanova’s	 (2012)	characterization	of	 the	Russian	media	 system	as	 “neo-autoritarian”	 (Vartanova	2012:	142).	
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Especially	 after	 Putin	 became	 President	 in	 2000,	 Russian	 media	 has	 been	reintegrated	 into	 the	 state	 after	 a	 decade	 of	 liberalizations.	 This	 promoted	 a	centralization	 of	 the	 political	 system	 around	 the	 president,	 including	subordination	 of	 other	 centers	 of	 political	 power	 as	 the	 State	 Duma	 (the	Parliament),	 the	opposition	parties,	 the	media	owners	and	oligarchs	 in	general	(Hallin	&	Mancini	2012:	298).	More	precisely,	this	process	enabled	various	state	agencies	 to	 reestablish	 financial	 or	 de	 facto	managerial	 control	 over	 70	pct.	 of	electronic	media	organizations,	80	pct.	of	 the	regional	press,	and	20	pct.	of	 the	national	press	(Vartanova	2012:	134).		
“Now,	the	Russian	political	system	is	 increasingly	centralistic	–	some	would	compare	 it	
to	absolutism	–	and	that	makes	it	difficult	to	point	out	anyone	outside	the	narrow	circle	
who	can	possess	decisive	influence	(…)”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016)	
	An	important	feature	of	this	process	of	centralization	was,	that	the	state	in	most	cases	did	not	expand	its	direct	ownership	over	the	national	mass	media.	Instead	it	 restructured	 the	 ownership	 patterns	 according	 to	 its	 own	 interests.	 John	 A.	Dunn	 (2014)	 describes	 how	 the	 way	 of	 restructuring	 the	 media	 system	 has	created	 a	 “two-tier	 media	 system”.	 Here	 the	 first	 tier	 comprises	 by	 far	 the	majority	 of	 the	 media,	 including	 nearly	 all	 of	 the	 national	 television	 channels	with	 national	 distribution1,	 bigger	 newspapers	 and	 news	 agencies2,	 and	 most	radio	stations3.	These	outlets	are	generally	promoting	a	world-view	in	line	with	the	 state’s	 narrative.	 The	 second	 tier	 of	 the	 media	 comprises	 outlets	 that	 are	allowed	a	considerable	degree	of	freedom	in	their	coverage	of	political	events	4.	The	media	belonging	to	the	second	tier,	including	most	of	the	Internet,	have	been	permitted	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 freedom.	 It	 especially	 targets	 a	 small	intellectual	liberal	segment	in	the	big	Russian	cities.	But	even	though	this	media	provides	airtime	for	critical	and	controversial	voices,	 it	seems	to	a	large	extend	to	be	aware,	that	it	only	still	exists	on	the	mercy	of	the	state	power	(Dunn	2014:	1431-1449).																																																										1	E.g.	Perviy	Kanal	(Channel	One),	Rossiya	1,	NTV,	TNT	and	Pyatiy	Kanal	(Channel	5),	2		E.g.	Komsomolskaya	Pravda,	Izvestiya,	and		Ria	Novosti	3	E.g.	Russkaya	Sluzhba	Novostei	and	Radio	Rossii	4	The	most	prominent	players	of	within	the	second	tier	are	the	newspapers	Novaya	Gazeta,	Nezavisimaya	gazeta,	Kommersant,	the	radio	Echo	Moskvy	and	to	some	extend	REN	TV	and	TV	Dozhj	–	even	though	the	independence	of	the	five	latter	are	continuously	discussed	
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“I	think	that	they	allow	a	space	for	written	media	in	the	big	cities	for	freedom	of	speech.	
Cause	they	know	that	controlling	the	TV	they	can	reach	the	majority	of	the	population”	(National	diplomat	1).	A	central	feature	of	the	state’s	way	of	controlling	the	media	is	by	the	creation	of	media	 laws,	which	can	be	applied	on	the	media	outsets,	which	encroach	on	the	interests	of	the	state.	As	examples	can	be	given	legislation	providing	the	state’s	media	 watchdog	 Rozkomnadzor	 with	 greater	 powers	 to	 shut	 down	 unwanted	online	content,	and	a	recent	bill	allowing	authorities	to	ban	so-called	“extremist”	online	 content.	 This	 law	 especially	 had	 huge	 influence	 on	 the	 media	 and	increased	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	 regulate	 journalistic	 content	 (AP	 07.10.15).	 The	EU	Delegation	 describes	 that	 this	 “Systematic	 restrictive	and	 repressive	Russian	
legislation	 [is]	 forcing	more	 Russian	 civil	 society	 partners	 to	 become	 fearful	 and	
hesitant	in	their	cooperation	with	EU	(…)”	(EU	Delegation	2015).	In	this	way	the	features	of	the	Russian	media	system	is	problematized	as	hindering	the	EU	in	its	cooperation	with	partners	within	Russia.			The	 neo-authoritarian	 characterization	 is	 according	 to	 the	 diplomats	 enabling	the	state	to	promote	the	EU	as	an	enemy	in	order	to	secure	the	centralization	of	power:		 “Here	 it	 becomes	 very	 important	 either	 to	 be	 able	 to	 create	 scape	 goats,	 blame	
someone	else,	and	avoid	a	feeling	of	dissatisfaction	in	the	public	mood	which	could	be	
turned	against	the	central	power.”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation)	
	In	 this	 way	 the	 diplomats	 generally	 connect	 the	 use	 of	 “propaganda”	 or	“disinformation”	 with	 the	 need	 for	 the	 state	 power	 to	 create	 a	 narrative	 that	generates	internal	support.	In	this	process	the	press	is	disabled	from	functioning	as	 a	 critical	 “watch	 dog”	 and	 is	 instead	 turned	 into	 a	 “tool”	 for	 the	 people	 in	power.		
	
“Of	course	we	know	that	there	are	sort	of	state	influenced	channels	here,	and	we	do	not	
have	the	tools	like	that	at	our	disposal”	(National	diplomat	4)		
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In	the	following	section,	I	elaborate	on	how	the	journalists	in	the	first	tier	media	are	constructed	as	“tools”	for	the	autocratic	state	power.		
4.2.2 Journalists	as	“tools”	for	the	state	Dispite	 the	 high	 degree	 of	 centralism,	 the	 paradoxical	 characteristics	 of	 the	Russian	 media	 system	 is	 that	 it	 actually	 has	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 media	independence,	understood	in	the	way	that	the	state	and	political	parties	do	not	have	direct	ownership	over	many	of	the	news-rooms	(Dunn	2014).	But	since	the	system	is	characterized	by	a	low	level	of	freedom	of	speech,	most	journalists	are	prevented	from	producing	content,	which	seriously	criticizes	the	state	power.		
“(…)	 there	 is	 no	 free	media	 in	Russia.	 You	 can	 find	 obviously	 journalists	 individuals	 (…)	
who	will	 happily	 listen	 to	 you	 and	 probably	will	 agree	 to	 you	 (…)	 But	 they	will	 not	 go	
public	 with	 their	 opinions,	 or	 there	 are	 marginalized	 environments,	 which	 have	 no	
potential	no	influence	on	the	majority	of	the	audience.”	(National	diplomat	3)		The	mechanisms	used	by	 the	state	 to	control	 the	media	are,	among	others,	 the	ability	to	appoint	top	managers	who	are	approved	by	state	authorities,	to	punish	disloyal	 media	 through	 tax	 or	 custom	 legislation	 or	 different	 regulations	 (e.g.	related	to	sanity	or	fire	safety),	or	to	bring	lawsuits	against	media	companies	as	a	part	of	defamation.	Other	means	is	to	deny	certain	media	access	to	certain	kinds	of	 information	 or	 attendance	 in	 state	 agencies’	 press	 conferences	 (Vartanova	2012:	135).	Is	this	way	the	EU	journalists’	special	right	to	collect	information	is	violated	by	the	state	itself,	as	are	the	media	full	ability	to	work	as	a	“watchdog”,	and	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	 state	 to	 promote	 media	 pluralism	 and	 guarantee	freedom	of	the	media	are	not	fulfilled.		A	law	that	has	posed	great	difficulties	to	the	journalists	who	wish	to	contradict	the	line	of	the	state	controlled	media	is	the	infamous	“foreign	agents	law”,	which	label	all	media	actors	that	receive	foreign	funding	as	de	facto	working	according	to	the	interests	of	foreign	agents	(Moscow	Times	19.02.16).		In	 this	 way	 the	 general	 role	 of	 the	 journalistic	 community	 is	 weak	 in	 its	democratic	 sense,	 due	 to	 the	 common	 tendency	 that	 leading	 journalists	 and	
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media	managers	are	being	integrated	into	the	state.	In	this	way	a	leading	part	of	journalists	stop	serving	the	interests	of	the	citizens	and	enter	into	the	process	of	social	 management	 led	 by	 the	 state,	 which	 enable	 disinformation	 through	 the	media	 to	 circulate	 (Vartanova	2012:	 139;	 142).	As	 one	diplomat	 said,	 “Russian	
media	a	clearly	willing	to	play	the	role	as	an	instrument	(National	diplomat	3).	Despite	 the	 legislative	 difficulties	 and	 personal	 risks	 (several	 journalists	 have	mysteriously	been	killed	related	 to	 their	work	during	 the	 last	decade),	 there	 is	still	 a	 tradition	 of	 investigative	 and	 critical	 journalism	 in	Russia.	 But	 following	the	 rising	 commercialization	 and	 de-politicization	 of	 the	 news	 journalism	 and	media	 in	 general,	 the	 journalistic	 professionalism	 (as	 understood	 by	 Hallin	 &	Mancini)	 is	 under	 pressure,	 both	 due	 to	 historical	 and	 contemporary	developments	in	the	Russian	media	system	(Vartanova	2012:	137).	But	 generally	 the	 interviewed	 diplomats	 see	 the	 Russian	 journalists	 as	 very	professional,	 even	 though	 they	 are	 more	 keen	 to	 violate	 the	 Western	 press	norms	prescript:	
	
”Actually	 to	 be	 journalist	 under	 Putin	 is	much	more	 demanding	 (…)	 so	 in	 some	way	
they	are	much	better	 journalists	 (…)	Technically	 they	are	perfect,	and	of	 course	 they	
technically	know	that	it	is	a	rule	that	you	present	both	points	of	view.	They	don’t	don’t	
do	it	not	because	they	don’t	know	it”	(National	diplomat	3).		Especially	the	big	debate	programs	on	the	big	TV	Channels	are	perceived	as	very	far	 from	 the	 Western	 press	 norms,	 and	 are	 more	 characterized	 as	 “gladiator	fights”,	where	e.g.	 the	EU	ambassador	 is	only	 called	 in	 to	act	 the	 target	 for	 the	other	participants’	allegations:			
”It’s	 all	 about	who	yells	 louder.	 It	 is	 a	dog	 fight.	 It	 has	no	 value	of	 information	or	of	
debate	for	the	democracy”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).			
4.2.3 Nationalistic	citizens	and	media	distrust	All	 the	 interviewed	 diplomats	 refer	 to	 the	 opinion	 polls	which	 show	 that	well	over	 the	 80	 pct.	 of	 the	 Russian	 population	 get	 their	 information	 from	 TV	
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channels	(BBC	report).	 In	 this	way	the	Russian	population	 is	mainly	 influenced	by	the	first	tier	media,	even	though	they	have	other	sources	available:	
“They	have	a	great	variety	of	offerings,	they	have	access	to	the	Internet.	They	can	get	
all	the	information	that	they	want.	Nevertheless	there	is	a	high	level	of	disinformation”	(National	diplomat	2)	The	high	degree	of	 “disinformation”	 is	making	 the	Russians	 less	 trustful	 in	 the	media	in	general:	
”I	think	there	are	so	many	versions	of	the	truth	out	here,	that	I	think	it	 is	difficult	for	
audiences	to	know	what	is	and	isn’t	correct	(National	diplomat	4)		This	distrust	in	the	media	have	increased	since	the	beginning	of	the	1990’s	when	the	new	Russian	media	system	was	about	to	reinvent	itself	after	the	collapse	of	the	 Communist	 party	 press	 system	 (Gehlbach	 2010:	 84).	 In	 2012	 Vartanova	wrote	 that	 “the	 discrepancy	 between	 media	 rhetoric	 and	 everyday	 practices	 of	
audiences	produces	growing	distrust	and	disappointment	of	citizens	in	mainstream	
political	media”	(Vartanova	2012:	142).		Even	 though	 the	 Russian	 speaking	 populations	 generally	 believe	 the	 Russian	media	more	than	the	Western	media	as	sources	to	information	about	the	Ukraine	crisis,	the	developments	in	the	media	system	do	not	necessarily	suggest	that	the	trust	have	increased.			
	
Fig	2.	The	evolution	of	distrust	 in	the	media.	Source:	Levada	Center,	Obshchestvennoye	
mneniye	2008	in	Gehlbach	2010	[www.levada.ru/sborniki.html].		
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This	distrust	can	be	explained	by	the	high	degree	of	political	parallelism	in	 the	mid-1990s,	when	the	media	became	a	player	in	the	elite’s	internal	struggles	for	political	 power,	 and	 the	 increased	 state	 centralization	 after	 the	 2000s	(Vartanova	 2012:	 129f;	 133).	 In	 this	 way	 the	 new	 independence	 of	 Russian	media	from	the	state	did	not	lead	to	the	formation	of	a	democratic	public	sphere	after	the	ideals	of	the	European	Union.		Aside	 from	 this	 general	 skepticism	 among	Russians	 towards	media	 in	 general,	the	interviewed	diplomats	point	out	a	growing	patriotism/nationalism	as	a	main	reason	for	why	the	state’s	narrative	(“propaganda”)	becomes	widely	accepted	as	part	of	the	mainstream	media:	
		
”The	 Russians	 are	 really	 nationalist	 people	 (…)	 You	 can	 see	 that	 media	 even	 being	
critical	 with	 Putin	 are	 not	 going	 to	 criticize	 any	 of	 the	 basic	 pillars	 of	 the	 nation”	(National	diplomat	1).	As	a	process	of	 the	political	 centralization,	 the	 state	under	President	Putin	has	been	 very	 successful	 in	 promoting	 nationalism	 as	 a	 force	 to	 connect	 to	homogeneous	 Russian	 population.	 This,	 for	 instance,	 explains	 some	 why	Russians	 might	 support	 e.g.	 the	 “foreign	 agents”-law	 “if	 they	 feel	 that	 [some	
media]	that	was	critical	to	the	government	was	funded	by	the	USA	or	the	European	
Union”	(National	diplomat	1).	In	 this	 way	 the	 societal	 processes	 observed	 by	 the	 diplomats	 within	 Russia	contribute	to	the	conflict	narrative	drawn	up	in	the	beginning	of	this	chapter:		
“This	 historical	 propaganda	 from	 the	 Russian	 side	 should	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 European	
issue,	cause	in	one	hand	it	produces	anti-western	even	neo-nazi	sentiments	inside	Russia.	
And	 it	 produces	 people	 who	 are	 aggressive	 and	 xenophobic	 generally	 towards	 the	
outside	world”	(Diplomat	3).		
4.2.4 The	construction	of	EU	unity	through	‘othering’	During	most	of	the	73	years	of	communist	rule	under	the	Soviet	Union,	the	press	worked	as	a	one-way	communication	channel	for	the	one-party	political	system.	In	the	West,	the	Soviet	media	system,	as	all	other	elements	of	Soviet	society	and	
	 71	
rule,	was	 presented	 as	 the	 antithesis	 to	 the	 independent	media	 norms	 gaining	hegemony	in	‘the	West’		(de	Smaele	1999:	185).		Meanwhile,	 within	 the	 EU,	 media	 systems	 have	 also	 been	 developing	heterogeneously,	 in	 spite	of	 the	strong	discourses	on	 liberal	press	norms	often	proclaimed	as	“universal”.	In	their	work,	Hallin	&	Mancini,	have	identified	three	overall	 distinct	 media	 models	 within	 the	 EU:	 1)	 A	 liberal5,	 2)	 a	 democratic	corporatist6,	and	3)	a	polarized	pluralist	model7,	which	are	roughly	constructing	three	 overall	 media	 systems	 connected	 with	 the	 Anglo-Saxon	 countries,	 the	Scandinavian	and	central	European	countries,	and	the	Mediterranean	countries	respectively	 (Hallin	&	Mancini	2004:	11).	Even	 though	EU	member	 states	on	a	normative	 level	adhere	to	common	Western	press	norms,	 the	characteristics	of	the	 media	 within	 the	 member	 states	 are	 highly	 different.	 Some	 countries,	especially	within	the	polarized	pluralist	model,	are	even	characterized	by	some	of	the	same	features	that	the	EU	is	criticizing	Russia	for	(Vartanova	2012:	141).	Therefore,	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 East	 StratCom	 have	 been	 more	 inspired	 by	 some	countries	 than	others	as	 role	models	 for	other	EU	countries,	 and	 for	Russia.	 In	line	with	this,	the	Spokesperson	on	the	EU	delegation	sees	the	development	goals	and	 foundational	 principles	 promoted	 through	 the	 East	 StratCom	 as	 deriving	from	 the	 liberal	model,	 and	 the	 democratic	 corporatist	 countries	 (with	 France	included):	
”We	can	draw	a	big	circle	which	includes	the	Scandinavian	countries	and	Germany,	
France	and	UK,	and	this	is	the	journalistic	DNA	–	the	journalistic	principles	–	which	
has	 been	 ruling.	 This	 can	 for	 example	 be	 spotted	 by	 the	 educational	 programs	
which	 the	 EU	 has	 financed	 for	 journalists,	 cooperation	 programs	 with	 the	 local																																																									5	Great	Britain	and	Ireland	is	representing	the	liberal	model,	which	is	characterized	by	highly	professionalized	journalists,	a	relative	dominance	of	market	mechanisms	and	commercial	media	and	low	degree	of	political	parallelism	and	state	intervention.	6	The	Nordic	countries,	the	German-speaking	countries,	Belgium,	and	the	Netherlands	constitute	
the	democratic	corporatist	model.	This	model	means	high	reach	of	the	press	market,	relatively	high	degrees	of	political	parallelism,	strong	professionalization,	and	strong	state	intervention	in	the	form	of	strong	public	service	broadcasters	and	subsidies	for	the	press.	7	The	 polarized	 pluralist	 model	 is	 constituted	 by	 the	 Mediterranean	 countries,	 France,	 Greece,	Italy,	 Portugal,	 and	 Spain,	 and	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	 low	 reach	 of	 the	 daily	 press,	 weak	professionalization,	high	political	parallelism	and	state	intervention	which	promotes	clientelistic	relationships	between	the	media	and	the	people	in	power.		
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professional	journalistic	organizations,	for	example	first	when	the	EU	expanded	to	
the	 east,	 and	now	 in	 the	partnership	 countries	 (Ukraine,	Georgia	and	Moldova).”	(Head,	EU	Delegation	2016)		In	 this	way	 the	EU	media	 systems	differ	 greatly,	 and	 some	 countries	have	had	much	more	normative	influence	on	the	EU’s	policies	with	the	media	areas,	than	others.	But	through	the	construction	of	“universal”	press	norms	a	central	within	the	 EU,	 the	 adherence	 to	 these	 are	 used	 to	 include	 all	 EU	member	 states	 and	membership	candidates	 into	 the	same	normative	“system”,	where	discourse	on	media	 plurality	 and	 freedom	 can	 be	 used	 as	 turning	 differences	 to	 a	 force	 for	inclusion:		
“I	think	our	strength	is	the	pluralism,	is	that	we	don’t	have	one	single	narrative,	and	
we	shouldn’t	have	one.	They	[the	Russian’s]	think	it	is	confirmation	of	our	weakness,	
it	 is	 precisely	 the	 contrary.	 Every	member	 state	 has	 different	 structures	 for	 public	
media.	But	I	don’t	think	this	is	a	problem”	(National	diplomat	3).		Despite	being	dominated	by	three	different	overall	media	systems,	many	of	the	interviewed	 diplomats	 refer	 to	 the	 European	media	 as	 something	 distinct	 and	unified,	when	they	describe	how	the	Russian	media	system	is	differing	from	it	-	all	the	while		“othering”	the	Russian	media	system	from	the	“European	model”:		
“Russia	and	Europe	in	one	point	of	history	may	have	been	closer	than	today.	10	years	
ago	everybody	thought	they	[Russia]	strived	for	the	European	model.	It	is	probably	not	
only	the	current	crisis	 in	Ukraine,	but	also	the	kind	of	state	involvement	in	the	media	
etc.,	which	make	it	more	difficult	also	for	Russians	to	speak	freely,	to	discuss	freely	etc.”	(National	Diplomat	2).		Due	 to	 the	Western	 centrism	 in	media	 literature	 and	media	 development,	 the	diplomats	 tended	 to	 measure	 the	 Russian	 media	 against	 the	 Western/EU	normative	 model	 for	 media	 systems.	 In	 this	 way	 they	 construct	 an	 “us-them”	distinction	based	on	the	geo-political	categorization	of	the	Russian	nation	state.	But	when	it	comes	to	the	EU,	the	diplomats	transgress	the	differences	internally	in	the	EU	through	the	articulations	of	the	common	EU	utopias.	
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4.3 Strategic	communication	as	legitimate	foreign	
policy	practice	Since	 “policies	 and	 policy	 proposals	 contain	 implicit	 representations	 of	 what	 is	
considered	to	be	the	‘problem’”	 (Bacchi	2012),	 I	was	able	 to	study	how	the	East	StratCom-strategy	was	 enabled	 through	 the	EU	 actors’	 problematization	of	 the	Russian	“disinformation	campaign”	through	the	media.		In	 this	 part	 of	 the	 thesis,	 I	 will	 show	 how	 diplomats	 construct	 strategic	communication	 as	 a	 legitimate	 foreign	 policy	 response	 towards	 the	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	system.	Even	 though	 all	 the	 interviewed	 diplomats	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 contribute	 to	 the	conflict	 narrative,	 the	 national	 diplomats	 do	 not	 articulate	 their	 specific	 work	with	strategic	communication	as	related	to	a	common	policy	response:		
”I	mean	this	 is	not	something	that	has	 just	happened	over	the	last	year	or	two,	 it	has	
been	a	process	over	a	decade.	I	mean	we	are	just	doing	our	job	that	we	normally	have	
done.”	(National	diplomat	4).		But	 especially	 the	 EU	 has	 presented	 the	 Ukraine-crisis	 as	 fundamental	 for	 the	introduction	of	strategic	communication	as	a	defensive	response	to	the	Russian	“disinformation	campaign”.		
“I	 think	 that	what	made	many	 take	 offence	was	 that	 our	 own	EU	activities,	 policies,	
programs,	 were	 seen	 misrepresented.	 When	 you	 say	 that	 the	 EU	 is	 financing	
concentration	 camps	 in	 Ukraine,	 and	 this	 becomes	 the	 headline	 for	 giving	money	 to	
refugees	who	have	fled	Donetsk	and	Lugansk.“	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).	
	Accordingly,	 perceived	 Russian	 misrepresentation	 of	 the	 EU	 has	 triggered	 a	policy	response	from	the	EU.	 In	this	way	disinformation	is	presented	as	a	 form	for	self-defensive	response:		
“And	the	brutalization	[of	the	Russian	”media	campaign”]	is	also	the	reason	why	the	EU	
countries	decided	that	something	had	to	be	done.	This	is,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	a	reactive	
action”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).	
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	Since	 the	 EU	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 support	 of	 the	member	 states,	 the	member	states	 are	 highlighted	 in	 order	 to	 create	 legitimacy	 for	 the	 EU’s	 response.	Through	 the	East	StratCom,	 the	EU	has	 taken	 the	 lead	 in	order	 to	unify	 the	EU	member	states’	actions	through	the	articulation	of	strategic	communication	as	a	response	 to	 the	 Russian	 “disinformation”.	 Since	 “the	 same	 activity	 can	 be	
regarded	as	a	different	form	of	practice	depending	on	the	mentalities	that	invest	it”	(Dean	 2009:	 26),	 the	 Russian	 media	 and	 experts	 have	 claimed	 that	 the	 East	StratCom	 Team	 was	 created	 to	 produce	 “counter-propaganda”	 (TV	 Rossiya	30.03.16).	 The	 interviewed	 EU	 diplomats,	 are	 aware	 of	 the	 risk	 that	 their	strategic	communication	activities	can	be	perceived	as	the	very	“thing”	the	EU	is	problematizing:		
“I	do	realize	 that	 there	 is	 this	danger	of	becoming	perceived	as	counter	propaganda,	
which	 is	 not	 our	 intention.	 But	 otherwise	 you	 can	 only	 sit	 and	 wait	 and	 see	 how	
Russian	propaganda	operates”	(National	diplomat	3).		As	touched	upon	earlier,	the	term	propaganda	is	connected	with	communication	that	 does	 not	 build	 on	 evidence	 and	 rational	 thought	 (Hurn	 2016:	 1).	 The	interviewed	 diplomats	 have	 widely	 connected	 propaganda	 with	 the	 act	 of	spreading	direct	lies,	and	in	order	to	legitimize	their	ways	of	communicating,	and	distance	themselves	from	the	propaganda	narrative,	all	the	diplomats	stress	that	a	“facts-based	approach”	is	central	for	the	way	they	do	strategic	communication.		
”	What	I	think	is	really	important	both	for	the	EU	disinformation	effort,	and	also	for	
our	 work,	 is	 taking	 a	 facts-based	 approach.	 So	 wherever	 you	 can	 use	 facts	 to	
demonstrate	the	accuracy	of	what	you	are	putting	out,	I	think	that	helps	in	trying	to	
address	the	challenges	that	we	all	see”	(National	diplomat	4)	
	In	 general,	 the	 generally	 legitimize	 this	 facts-based	 approach	 through	 the	rationalities	of	 the	positivist	sciences	(Fuglsang	&	Olsen	2009:	56).	This	can	be	seen	 through	 the	 tendency	 of	 the	 diplomats	 to	 refer	 to	 underlying	 epistemic	norms	 as	 ‘rationality’	 and	 ‘truth’,	 and	 the	 “positivist”	 belief	 that	 “Reality	 will	
confront	bullshit”	(National	diplomat	3):	
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”Strategic	communication	is	to	set	our	record	straight	and	to	put	things	right	(…)	We	
keep	telling	the	right	things.	It	doesn’t	mean	that	next	time	the	guy	is	convinced,	but	
you	have	to	do	it.”	(National	diplomat	2).		In	 order	 to	 distance	 the	 EU’s	 strategic	 communication	 from	 the	 acts	 of	propaganda	 “we	do	not	 necessarily	 have	 to	 sell	 sunshine.	We	must	 inform	about	
what	we	do	honestly	and	properly”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		Within	Russia	media,	 the	relation	between	Russia	and	the	West	has	often	been	presented	 as	 a	 state	 of	 “information	war”	 (RT	 01.10.15;	 TV	Rossiya	 30.03.16).	Within	the	“information	warfare”-discourse,	information	is	seen	as	a	tool	that	is	applied	 strategically	 in	 order	 to	 undermine	 and	 delegitimize	 “the	 opponent”	(Dimitriu	2012:	197).	Within	this	understanding	strategic	communication	can	be	seen	as	an	important	tool,	which	can	support	and	legitimize	military	action,	thus	turning	 strategic	 communication	 to	 “information	 operations”,	 and	 which	ultimately	creates	an	image	of	“communication	as	a	weapon”	(Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	2009:	905).	Similarly	one	of	 the	diplomats	connects	the	occurrence	of	strategic	communication	in	foreign	policy	as	a	supplement	to	military	operations.		
“It	feels	like	it	is	something	that	happened	since	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	That’s	also	when	
my	career	started,	but	throughout	my	career	I	definitely	 feel	 it	has	come	more	out	of	
this	more	military	(context)”	(National	diplomat	4).		None	 of	 the	 diplomats,	 however,	 were	 willing	 to	 accept	 the	 “Warmongering	
vocabulary”	 from	 the	 Russian	 side,	 which	 claims	 that	 the	 EU’s	 strategic	communication	is	a	part	of	an	“information	war”:	
		
“I	 do	 not	 admit	 that	 we	 are	 already	 in	 a	 place	 where	 all	 normal	 professional	
journalistic	behavior	has	ended	(…)	If	we	said	that	it	was	an	information	war,	then	we	
would	already	be	far	past	that	point.	And	if	we	said	it	was	an	information	war,	then	we	
also	say	that	 it	 is	okay	to	 lie,	and	then	 it	 is	okay	to	 fabricate	 lies,	cunning	and	deceit	
because	the	goal	justifies	the	means”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		
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So	 even	 though	 the	 EU	 constructs	 strategic	 communication	 as	 a	 defensive	response	 to	 Russia’s	 “disinformation	 campaign”,	 the	 diplomats	 reject	 the	“information	war”	discourse.	
	
“Well	 look,	this	 is	not	our	narrative,	this	 is	not	our	approach	to	communication.	I	am	
not	engaged	in	information	warfare.	I	am	trying	to	promote	(…)	foreign	policy,	culture,	
and	values	(…)	Where	we	got	interesting	things	to	say,	where	we	got	facts.”	 (National	diplomat	4).		Accordingly,	 EU	 diplomats	 extensively	 draw	 on	 the	 facts-based	 approach	 in	order	 to	 legitimize	 the	 way	 they	 do	 strategic	 communication	 in	 Russia.	 This	strengthens	their	discursive	constructions	between	them	as	legitimate	strategic	communicators,	engaged	in	a	defensive	response	to	”disinformation”.		
4.4 Sum	up:	Visibility	
According	to	Bacchi	“governing	takes	place	through	particular	problematizations”	(Bacchi,	2012:	5).	Following	this,	chapter	4	has	analyzed	how	the	field	of	visibility	is	 constructed	 among	 EU	 actors	 through	 the	 problematization	 of	“disinformation”	in	Russian	media.	This	problematization	is	enabled	through	the	construction	of	 the	conflict	narrative	of	 “revisionist	Russia”,	 through	which	 the	Russian-speaking	minorities	become	constructed	as	both	potential	internal	risks	and	as	target	groups	for	the	East	StratCom.	Furthermore,	the	construction	of	“the	Russian	 neo-authoritarian	 media	 system”	 has	 enabled	 the	 EU	 to	 present	 the	“disinformation”	 in	 the	 Russian	media	 as	 a	 part	 of	 a	 state	 led	 ”disinformation	campaign”,	among	others	targeting	the	EU.	This	has	enabled	the	EU	to	invent	the	East	 StratCom	 and	 construct	 it	 as	 a	 legitimate	 defensive	 policy	 response	 to	 a	hostile	Russian	“campaign”.			Through	 the	 “othering”	 of	 the	 Russian	media	 system,	 and	 the	 broader	 conflict	narrative,	 the	 EU	 diplomats	 construct	 a	 unity	 across	 the	 diverse	 EU	 media	systems	 which	 enables	 them	 to	 create	 an	 “us-them”	 distinction	 between	 the	Russian	 neo-authoritarian	media	 system,	which	 is	 promoting	 “disinformation”,	
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and	the	EU	diplomats	which	seeks	to	diminish	“disinformation”.	By	drawing	on	the	EU’s	“universal”	press	norms	and	articulating	the	importance	of	a	facts-based	approach,	 the	 diplomats	 legitimize	 the	 implementation	 of	 strategic	communication	towards	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media.	Even	though	the	EU	practitioners	engaged	in	the	East	StratCom	articulate	the	strategy	as	being	a	response	 towards	 the	 Russian	 “campaign”,	 they	 simultaneously	 distance	themselves	 from	 the	 discourse	 of	 “information	 war”.	 This	 is	 done	 in	 order	 to	legitimize	 strategic	 communication	 as	 foreign	 policy	 practice	 in	 Russia,	 as	something	different	than	the	work	of	the	“propagandists”.			While	 the	 EU	 level	 actors	 largely	 present	 the	 implementation	 of	 strategic	communication	 as	 a	 defensive	 response	 towards	 the	 Russian	 “campaign”,	 the	member	states’	diplomats	rather	present	strategic	communication	as	a	practice	more	generally	trying	to	operate	in	the	“problematic”	Russian	media	system.	The	following	 chapter	will	 analyze	 how	 the	East	 StratCom	 implementation	 become	aligned	 with	 the	 general	 strategic	 communication	 practice	 performed	 by	 the	member	states	within	the	field	of	techne.			
5 Strategic	 communication	 as	 unifying	
diplomatic	practice		In	 accordance	 with	 the	 governmentality	 framework	 of	 this	 thesis	 the,	 way	specific	 policies	 and	 practices	 are	 performed	 and	 perceived	 as	 legitimate	 or	comprehensible	dependend	on	the	underlying	rationalities	forming	the	actors	in	a	given	regime	of	practices	(Dean	2009).	This	chapter	analyzes	the	field	of	techne	of	The	StratCom	Regime	by	studying	the	actual	tools,	activities	and	vocabularies	forming	 strategic	 communication	 practices	 among	 the	 diplomats	 in	 Russia.	 In	order	to	detect	how	strategic	communication	has	been	constructed	as	a	foreign	policy	 practice	 “on	 top	 of”	 other	 practices,	 I	 first	 detect	 the	 central	 strategic	rationalities,	which	are	underpinning	The	StratCom	Regime.	Next,	 I	analyze	the	existing	 diplomatic	 practices	 in	 The	 StratCom	 Regime,	 how	 they	 are	
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underpinning	 the	 objectives	 of	 East	 StratCom	 and	 how	 they	 are	 implemented	through	specific	 tools	and	activities.	This	enables	me	 to	construct	a	model	 that	reveals	 the	 interconnections	 between	 the	 central	 diplomatic	 practices	 and	strategic	rationalities	within	The	StratCom	Regime	and	how	these	practices	and	aims	are	supporting	the	East	StratCom.	Finally,	this	chapter	studies	how	network	creation	is	a	central	way	to	facilitate	and	legitimize	EU	governance.			
5.1 Strategic	rationalities	in	the	East	StratCom		
A	central	part	of	the	problematization	of	the	“disinformation”	in	Russian	media	has	been	the	formulation	of	the	East	StratCom	Action	Plan	(2015),	since	“policies	
and	policy	proposals	 contain	 implicit	 representations	of	what	 is	 considered	 to	be	
the	 ‘problem’	 (Bacchi	 2012:	 21).	 The	 Action	 Plan	 is	 implemented	 in	 tight	cooperation	 between	 the	 East	 StratCom	 Team	 in	 Brussels	 and	 the	communication	 departments	 of	 the	 EU	 delegations	 and	 member	 states’	embassies	especially	in	Eastern	Partnership	countries	and	Russia.	The	activities	initiated	under	the	East	StratCom	strategy	are	organized	under	three	objectives	promoting	the	following:		
• Media	 support	 &	 cooperation:	 “Strengthening	 of	 the	 overall	 media	
environment	including	support	for	independent	media”		
• Promotion	of	policies	and	values:	“Effective	communication	and	promotion	
of	EU	policies	and	values	towards	the	Eastern	neighbourhood”	
• ‘Myth	 busting’	 &	 political	 statements:	 “Increased	 public	 awareness	 of	
disinformation	 activities	 by	 external	 actors,	 and	 improved	 EU	 capacity	 to	
anticipate	and	respond	to	such	activities”		
(East	StratCom	Action	Plan)	
The	objectives	of	 the	Action	Plan	are	clearly	 reflecting	 the	EU’s	 central	utopias	regarding	independent	press	and	democratic	values.	This	can	be	seen	directly	in	the	Action	Plan’s	aim	to	communicate	“the	universal	values	that	the	EU	promotes,	
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including	a	commitment	to	democracy,	the	rule	of	law,	the	fight	against	corruption,	
minority	 rights	and	 fundamental	 freedoms	of	 expression	and	of	 the	media”	 (East	StratCom	 Action	 Plan).	 But	 especially	 the	 last	 objective	 aiming	 at	 creating	increased	awareness	of	disinformation	activities	is	perceived	as	a	new	initiative	among	the	EU	diplomats.	This	especially	takes	place	through	the	East	StratCom	Team’s	 weakly	 disinformation	 review,	 which	 “collects	 examples	 of	 pro-Kremlin	
disinformation	 all	 around	 Europe	 and	 beyond”	with	 more	 than	 450	 journalists,	civil	society	organizations,	academics,	and	public	authorities	in	over	30	countries	currently	 contributing	 to	 the	 review	 (EU	 vs.	 disinfo,	 EEAS).	 As	 presented	 in	chapter	 3,	 the	 East	 StratCom	 is	 supporting	 the	 general	 policies	 towards	 the	Eastern	 Partnership	 countries.	 At	 the	 same,	 time	 strategic	 communication	 is	presented	as	a	‘new’	policy	response	towards	Russian	“disinformation”,	which	is	supported	by	the	way	the	East	StratCom	Team	is	presented	as	“a	first	step”	and	as	a	“start-up	team”	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).		
5.1.1 Strategic	aims	as	a	governance	rationality		According	 to	Hallahan	et	al.	 (2007),	strategic	communication	can	be	defined	as	
“the	 purposeful	 use	 of	 communication	 by	 an	 organization	 to	 fulfill	 its	 mission”	(Hallahan	 et.	 al	 2007:	 3).	 In	 line	with	 the	 role	 that	 utopias	 play	 for	 the	 act	 of	governance,	similarly	this	‘strategic	rationality’	can	be	seen	as	central	within	the	way	government	promotes	and	guides	conduct:		
“All	 practices	 of	 government	 of	 self	 or	 others	 presuppose	 some	 goal	 or	 end	 to	 be	
achieved”	(Dean	2009:	27).	
	In	this	way	the	act	of	setting	objectives	can	be	seen	as	technique	to	support	the	rationalities	of	governance	itself.		In	 line	 with	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 study,	 Knights	 &	 Morgan	 (1991)	 used	 a	Foucauldian	 genealogical	 analysis	 to	 reveal	 how	 corporate	 strategy	 has	developed	to	a	hegemonic	discourse	concurrent	with	 the	general	emergence	of	
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promoted	 practices	 that	 are	 taking	 form	 as	 rational	 management	 decision-making	 processes	 including	 strategy	 formulation,	 goal	 setting	 and	implementation	 through	 strategic	 objectives	 (as	 e.g.	 expressed	 in	 the	 famous	SWOT	analysis	model	by	Michael	Porter,	1985).	In	line	with	Knights	&	Morgans	study	 (1991)	 I	 analyze	 the	 East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan	 as	 an	 expression	 of	strategic	 rationalities,	 which	 are	 identified	 through	 the	 concrete	 objectives,	definition	of	target	areas	for	implementation,	selection	of	target	groups,	and	the	broader	incorporation	of	the	East	StratCom	into	the	EaP	strategy.		As	a	part	of	promoting	strategic	rationalities	within	The	StratCom	Regime	the	act	of	 setting	 objectives	 can	 be	 compared	 with	 the	 act	 of	 setting	 ‘strategic	 aims’,	which	 describe	 an	 acts	 “that	 is	 systemic,	 focused	 on	 the	 future,	 and	 oriented	
toward	change”	(Colarelli	&	Hughes	2005).	In	line	with	this	I	have	detected	three	main	underlying	strategic	aims	within	the	East	StratCom	Action	Plan,	which	are	underpinning	the	concrete	activities	related	to	the	East	StratCom.	Further,	I	will	show	how	 the	existing	diplomatic	practices	of	 the	diplomats	 in	Russia	are	also	supporting	these	underlying	strategic	aims.	In	 the	 following	 I	 will	 present	 the	 strategic	 aims	 underpinning	 The	 StratCom	Regime	and	present	how	these	are	related	to	the	concrete	objectives	in	the	East	StratCom	 Action	 Plan.	 The	 objectives	 and	 the	 underlying	 strategic	 aims	 they	support	are	presented	in	Figure	1.			
Aid	and	access:		The	aim	of	creating	aid	and	access	is	pursued	through	supporting	and	developing	media	and	media	institutions	in	the	target	countries.	By	doing	this,	the	EU	seeks	to	 establish	 the	 creation	 of	 civil	 society	 platforms,	which	 in	 the	 long	 term	 can	secure	 the	EU	access	 to	populations	and	 segments	 that	were	not	 reachable	 for	the	EU	before.	The	Action	Plan	 for	 example	mentions	how	 the	development	of	civil	 society	 platforms	 and	 networks	 in	 the	 longer	 term	 can	 contribute	 “to	
maximising	 and	 amplifying	 the	 impact	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 communication	
activities	 undertaken	 by	 the	 East	 StratCom	 Team”	 (East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan	2015).		
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Engagement	and	influence:		The	 strategic	 aim	 of	 engagement	 and	 influence	 refers	 to	 the	 diplomatic	 work	seeking	 to	 attract	 populations	 and	 create	 positive	 support	 for	 the	 culture	 and	political	 line	 of	 the	 state	 represented.	 This	 level	 can	 be	 promoted	 through	initiatives	 to	enhance	the	universal	values	of	 the	EU,	as	e.g.	media	 literacy,	and	through	 communication	 that	 should	 explain	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 EU’s	 programs	through	a	positive	narrative	that	“should	be	communicated	in	clear	language,	and	
based	on	real-life	success	stories	that	will	resonate	with	the	target	audience”	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).		
Political	messaging	and	persuasion:	Political	 messaging	 and	 persuasion	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 diplomatic	 task	 of	
“exposing	target	audiences	to	the	EU,	explaining	EU	policies,	promoting	dialogue,	
and	 ensuring	 that	 citizens	are	generally	 informed	about	 the	EU”	 (East	 StratCom	Action	Plan	2015).	The	strategic	aim	underpinning	this	differs	from	the	previous	two	in	that	it	does	not	mainly	communicate	values	and	narratives	to	attract	and	engage	populations,	but	instead	focuses	more	on	traditional	political	messaging	(as	 will	 be	 elaborated	 later	 on).	 This	 is	 typically	 characterized	 by	 one-way	information	of	core	policies	and	concrete	positions	 towards	states,	 institutions,	populations	 etc.	 In	 the	 East	 StratCom,	 “myth	 busting”	 becomes	 a	 part	 of	 the	strategic	aim	of	political	messaging,	since	the	“disinformation”	is	first	presented	followed	 by	 the	 correction,	 which	 enables	 the	 EU	 and	 other	 actors	 to	 present	their	messages/narratives.			Table	 5.	 illustrates	 how	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan	 is	supporting	 the	 different	 strategic	 aims.	 The	 objective	 for	 “media	 support	 &	cooperation”	is	largely	focusing	on	fulfilling	the	strategic	aims	of	aid	&	access	and	
engagement	&	influence,	while	the	objectives	of	“promoting	policies	and	values”	and	“myth	busting	&	political	statements”	mainly	are	working	in	order	to	create	
engagement	&	influence	and	to	secure	and	spread	the	political	messages.		
Table	5.	The	East	StratCom’s	strategic	aims	and	related	objectives	
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	STRATEGIC	AIM	 Aid	&	access	 Engagement	&	influence	 Political	messaging	&	persuasion	EAST	STRATCOM	OBJECTIVE	
Media	support	&	cooperation	 		 Promotion	of	policies	&	values	 		 Myth	busting	&	political	statements			Source:	Table	by	the	author	of	this	thesis		The	 rationalities	 of	 underlying	 strategic	 aims	will	 enable	 the	 analysis	 to	 show	how	different	 existing	 diplomatic	 practices	 among	 the	 diplomats	 in	 Russia	 are	included	into	The	StratCom	Regime.		
5.1.1.1 EU	governance	through	strategic	‘fit’		An	 important	 aspect	 of	 how	 these	 strategic	 rationalities	promote	 the	 ability	 to	enhance	EU	governance	can	be	explained	through	the	strategic	rationality	of	‘fit’	creation.	Through	goal	and	aim-setting,	strategic	communication	can	work	as	an	instrumental	 tool	 to	 create	 correspondence	 and	 ‘fit’	 between	 the	 manifold	communication	activities	by	an	organization	–	in	this	case	the	EU.	Michael	Porter	(1996)	describes	 ‘fit’	 as	 the	 important	art	of	 creating	 correspondence	between	an	organization’s	different	activities	so	they	all	contribute	to	the	same	“mission”.	In	this	way,	 fit	has	to	do	with	the	ways	different	activities	or	tools	 interact	and	reinforce	 one	 another	 (Porter	 1996:	 13f).	 Within	 public	 relations,	 strategic	communication	 can	 similarly	 be	 described	 as	 a	 “bridging	 activity”,	 and	 within	management	 literature	more	 broadly,	 strategic	 communication	 is	 defined	 as	 a	process	of	creating	“linkages	between	discourse	and	interactions,	and	negotiations	
of	multiple	actors	and	the	situated	practices	that	they	draw	upon	in	accomplishing	
that	activity”	 (Jarzabkowski,	 Balogun,	 &	 Seidl,	 2007,	 p.	 8	 in	 Thomas&Stephens	2014:	4).	These	understandings	of	strategic	communication	are	in	line	with	the	hegemonic	corporate	strategy	discourse	that	Knights	&	Morgan	(1991)	detected.	Furthermore,	 this	 is	 in	 line	 with	 “the	 strategic	 turn”,	 which	 “transforms	 all	
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communication	 into	 strategic	 communication”	 (Torp	 2014:	 44).	 This	 discourse	can	also	be	detected	among	the	diplomats	in	Moscow:		
”I	would	say	that	everything	we	do	is	sort	of	strategic	communication,	and	then	within	
that	you	have	different	messaging	and	different	components	 (…)	actually	 thinking	of	
what	 impact	 you’re	 having	 over	 a	 period	 of	 time	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 your	 goals”	(National	diplomat	4).		Most	of	the	diplomats	interviewed	articulate	strategic	communication	as	being	a	practice	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 create	 and	 support	 a	 long-term	 strategy	 plan	 in	order	 to	 reach	 defined	 goals,	 which	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 hegemonic	 strategic	rationalities	presented	above.			Similarly,	 strategic	 communication	becomes	a	way	 to	promote	 the	EU’s	overall	values	(cf.	objective	1	in	East	StratCom	Action	Plan).	In	The	StratCom	Regime	the	communication	 of	 specific	 policies	 and	 events	 are	 strategically	 connected	 in	order	 to	 create	 ‘fit’	 between	 them	 and	 the	 EU’s	 bigger	 values,	 and	 in	 this	way	“strategic	communication	 is	a	part	of	our	overall	 implementation	of	our	policies”	(Spokesperson,	 EU	 Delegation).	 But	 since	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 EU	 itself	 is	contingent	on	the	homogeneity	–	or	at	 least	consent	–	of	the	member	state,	the	strategic	 rationalities	can	also	be	used	 to	strengthen	 the	EU’s	 role	as	a	 ‘unified	supranational	 foreign	policy	actor’	 (see	chapter	3).	This	 is	enabled	 through	the	ability	of	strategic	communication	to	create	‘fit’	between	the	communication	goal	of	national	member	states,	and	that	of	the	EU.	In	this	way	the	diplomats	in	Russia	rethink	the	EU	level	with	the	national	level	through	strategic	communication:		
“We	always	 look	 to	 ‘re-tweet’	when	 possible	 to	 share	 each	 other’s	 content.	 So	we	 do	
speak	about	how	we	can	amplify	messages	and	how	we	best	do	that.	We	are	trying	to	
coordinate,	so	we	can	support	each	other’s	StratCom	messages”	(National	diplomat	4).		In	 this	 way	 the	 strategic	 rationalities	 become	 a	 useful	 ‘tool’	 to	 create	 synergy	between	both	goals	and	practices	of	member	states	and	EU	institutions,	and	this	can	be	 argued	 to	 strengthen	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	EU’s	 actions,	 since	 the	EU	 is	dependent	 on	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 members	 states.	 This	 can	 furthermore	
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contribute	 to	strengthening	 the	EU’s	external	 legitimacy,	and	ability	 to	act	as	a	‘force	for	good’.			Furthermore,	the	strategic	rationalities	can	be	used	as	an	internal	“tool”	in	order	to	 legitimize	 why	 more	 resources	 should	 be	 allocated	 to	 e.g.	 the	 policy	 field	aiming	 at	 diminishing	 Russian	 “disinformation”.	 Following,	 the	 strategic	rationalities	help	making	it	easier	for	decision	makers	to	see	the	bigger	strategic	relevance	through	goal-setting	and	 implementation	planning,	which	are	central	strategic	communication	tools:				
“And	 this	 also	 becomes	 a	 way	 for	 them	 [the	 European	 Parliament]	 to	 see	 some	
structure	 in	 it	 and	 to	 have	 a	 chance	 to	 prioritize”	 (Spokesperson,	 EU	 Delegation	2016).		In	 this	 way,	 the	 strategic	 rationalities	 underpinning	 The	 StratCom	 Regime	become	 central	 for	 the	 legitimization	 of	 the	 regime	 itself,	 among	 all	 the	 other	regimes	of	practices	with	which	it	coexists	within	the	EU.	The	following	section	analyzes	 how	 the	 strategic	 rationalities	 have	 assimilated	 existing	 diplomatic	practices	 into	The	StratCom	Regime.	Here	 I	will	 study	the	diplomatic	practices,	which	are	underpinned	by	the	strategic	rationalities	just	detected.		
5.2 Strategic	communication	as	diplomatic	
practice	According	 to	Dean	(2009),	 regimes	of	practices	must	be	seen	as	constituted	by	
“multiple	elements	(…)	having	diverse	historical	trajectories”	 (Dean	2009:	41).	 In	this	section,	 I	will	detect	how	The	StratCom	Regime	is	constructed	 ‘on	top’	of	a	range	 of	 other	 diplomatic	 practices.	 I	 will	 analyze	 how	 all	 the	 diplomats	 are	drawing	on	and	redefining	these	practices	through	their	engagement	in	strategic	communication.	I	will	use	the	knowledge	about	the	strategic	aims	underpinning	the	 East	 StratCom	 in	 order	 to	 show	 how	 the	 existing	 different	 diplomatic	practices	 in	Russia	are	underpinning	 the	East	StratCom,	and	 in	 this	way	create	
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‘fit’	 between	 the	 practices	 performed	 by	 national	 diplomats	 and	 the	 East	StratCom	Team/EU	Delegation.			The	findings	in	this	section	lead	to	the	construction	of	a	table	that	exposes	how	strategic	 communication	 practice	 is,	 more	 broadly,	 constituted	 by	interconnections	between	overall	strategic	aims,	diplomatic	practices,	and	tools	implemented	 in	Russia.	Furthermore,	 the	 table	will	also	 include	 the	articulated	objectives	 from	 the	 East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan	 in	 order	 to	 suggest	 how	 the	general	 underlying	 strategic	 aims,	 and	 the	 diplomatic	 practices,	 tools	 and	activities,	are	supporting	implementation	of	the	East	StratCom	in	Russia.		
5.2.1 Public	diplomacy		The	 interviewed	 diplomats	 in	 Moscow	 articulate	 ‘public	 diplomacy’	 as	 a	diplomatic	 practice	 that	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 work	 with	 strategic	communication.	 These	 diplomats	 consider	 strategic	 communication	 as	 either	being	 a	 part	 of	 their	 public	 diplomacy	 work	 or	 as	 being	 a	 practice	 including	public	diplomacy:		
“I	don’t	think	public	diplomacy	is	a	separate	thing	from	strategic	communication,	they	
kind	of	overlap	(…)	Public	diplomacy	is	one	tool	at	our	disposal.	But	you	know	it	falls	
within	 what	 we	 are	 trying	 to	 do	 with	 strategic	 communication	 overall”	 (National	diplomat	4).		
“Public	diplomacy	is	not	only	strategic	communication,	because	a	picture	or	an	image	
of	a	country	is	more	than	the	strategic	communication”	(National	diplomat	2).		
“I	believe	that	if	one	is	to	make	a	distinction,	then	strategic	communication	is	a	subset	
of	public	diplomacy,	it	is	a	condensate,	and	it	is	a	more	targeted	attempt	to	take	stock	
of	a	few	phenomena”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).	
	As	 illustrated,	 diplomats	 to	 a	 large	 extend	 include	 tools	 and	 activities	 also	entailed	 in	 public	 diplomacy	 practices	 when	 they	 describe	 their	 work	 with	strategic	communication.		
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	Public	 diplomacy	 has	 many	 aspects	 in	 common	 with	 the	 broader	 concept	 of	public	 relations,	 which	 in	 its	 broadest	 meaning	 refers	 to	 “the	 professional	
maintenance	of	a	favorable	public	image	by	a	company	or	other	organization	or	a	
famous	 person”	 (Dictionary	 definition,	 Van	 Dyke	 &	 Verčič	 2009:	 905).	 Within	international	relations,	public	diplomacy	can	correspondingly	be	described	as	a	foreign	policy	approach	that	seeks	to	influence	public	opinion,	especially	among	populations	in	foreign	countries,	in	order	to	advance	the	success	of	foreign	policy	towards	that	country	(Sheafer	&	Gabay	2009:	464).	This	is	e.g.	evident	in	one	of	the	objectives	articulated	 in	 the	EU	Delegation’s	communication	plan	 for	2016:	
“Try	to	regain	support	for	a	favourable	image	of	EU	among	the	Russian	public”	(EU	Delegation	2015).		This	entails	that	the	diplomats	to	a	larger	extend	have	to	change	their	role	from	traditionally	 working	 on	 a	 state-to-state	 level	 as	 lobbyists	 and	 political	messengers,	towards	taking	an	active	part	in	trying	to	shape	the	public	debates,	e.g.	 in	Russia	 (Jönsson	&	Hall	 2003:	 203).	 Public	 diplomacy	 can	 also	 entail	 the	EU’s	role	as	a	network	creator	between	nongovernmental	actors,	such	as	NGO’s,	universities,	businesses	etc.		Figure	 1.	 Illustrates	 how	 public	 diplomacy	 practices	 focus	 on	 the	 relations	between	government	bodies	and	foreign	populations,	or	the	relations	between	a	nation’s	own	population	and	foreign	populations.											
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Figure	1.	The	field	of	public	diplomacy		
		
Source:	Suto	(2011)	based	upon	McDowell’s	(2008)	public	diplomacy	model			As	 a	 subfield	within	public	diplomacy,	 ‘cultural	diplomacy’	has	 emerged	as	 the	diplomatic	 practice	 attempting	 to	 promote	 a	 positive	 attitude	 towards	 one’s	nation	through	the	promotion	of	cultural	 features	such	as	 language,	art,	sports,	traditions,	etc.	(Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	2009:	907).		A	 central	 feature	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 reliance	 on	 what	 Joseph	 Nye	 has	conceptualized	as	 ‘soft	power’.	Soft	power	works	 to	gain	 influence	not	 through	physical	force	and	coercion,	but	through	the	ability	of	a	state	to	attract	and	shape	the	preferences	of	others	in	order	to	enhance	one’s	own	foreign	policy	objectives	(Nye	2004,	2008).	The	strategic	communication	aspects	within	public	diplomacy	include,	among	others,	”direct	or	mass-mediated	communication	activities”	which	aim	at	“directly	or	indirectly	reducing	negative	clichés	and	prejudices,	generating	
sympathy	 and	 understanding	 for	 a	 nation’s	 ideals,	 goals,	 (foreign)	 policies,	 its	
institutions,	culture	and	model	of	society”	(Löffelholz	et.	al:	2014:	440).			
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Following,	strategic	communication	must	be	seen	a	practice	similarly	engaged	in	influencing	 populations	 through	 engaging	 forms	 of	 communication,	 facilitating	people-to-people	contact,	communicating	a	positive	image	of	a	country	etc.		
5.2.1.1 Tools	and	activities		A	 large	 part	 of	 the	 diplomats’	 strategic	 communication	work	 in	 Russia	 can	 be	categorized	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 public	 diplomacy,	 conferring	 the	 diplomats’	quotes	in	the	beginning	of	this	section.		In	 line	 with	 this,	 the	 strategic	 communication	 can	 include	 work	 related	 to	activities	promoting	cultural	exchange,	e.g.	the	embassies’	partaking	in	arranging	art	 exhibitions,	 concerts,	 education	 exchange	 etc.	 as	 part	 of	 the	 intercultural	relations.	 Here,	 most	 of	 the	 big	 countries	 have	 cultural	 centers	 in	 addition	 to	their	 embassies,	which	undertake	 the	main	 tasks	of	building	 cultural	 relations,	e.g.	The	British	Council,	 the	German	Goethe	Institute,	or	the	Institut	Francais.	A	part	of	public	diplomacy	work	is	also	the	general	information	work,	targeting	the	broad	parts	of	the	Russian	population	in	order	to	facilitate	public	interchange	or	overall	 promotion	 of	 the	 diplomats’	 home	 countries.	 This	 can	 take	 place	 by	means	 of	 traditional	 spread	 of	 information	 material	 (leaflets,	 posters,	publications),	conferences	on	certain	topics,	public	speaking	by	the	ambassador,	spokesperson,	 or	 other	 diplomats,	 or	 through	 political	 diplomatic	communication	about	the	policies	as	laws	of	the	country.			All	the	embassies	of	the	diplomats	I	interviewed	as	well	as	the	EU	Delegation	use	their	 homepages	 as	 important	 channels	 for	 sharing	 communication	 towards	target	 groups.	 However,	 the	 explosion	 of	 online	 communication	 on	 social	platforms	has	 revolutionized	 their	 ability	 to	 communicate	 strategically	directly	to	populations:	
“It	has	just	opened	up	the	diplomatic	world	much	wider,	and	have	broadened	the	range	
of	 audiences.	 The	 people	 who	 didn’t	 get	 invited	 to	 receptions	 can	 now	 still	 find	 out	
what	we	are	doing	out	here.”	(National	diplomat	4)	
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In	this	way	the	social	media	becomes	a	central	part	of	the	diplomats’	work	on	a	daily	basis.	All	the	embassies	communicate	regularly	on	their	homepages	and	on	Twitter,	 and	 especially	 their	 profiles	 on	 Facebook,	 Vkontakte	 (the	 Russian	version	 of	 Facebook),	 YouTube,	 and	 Instagram	 are	 considered	 as	 particularly	valuable	 ways	 to	 reach	 “normal	 Russians”	 and	 to	 strengthen	 the	 intercultural	bonds:		
“We	need	these	bridges	and	these	ties	between	people.	Even	in	more	difficult	times	it	is	
important	that	you	continue.	And	you	have	to	continue	both	tracks.	If	you	double	only	
the	 official	 communication,	 I	 mean,	 you	 are	 lacking	 the	 human	 touch”	 (National	diplomat	2).	As	the	last	part	indicates,	public	diplomacy	is	not	just	about	strengthening	one’s	own	 ‘brand’,	 it	 is	 also	 about	 creating	 access	 to	 target	 groups,	 through	 the	
engagement	 of	 target	 groups	 in	 cultural	 exchange	 activities	 and	 online	communication.	But	cultural	relations	are	mainly	seen	as	a	national	issue,	which	means	that	the	strength	of	the	EU	as	a	unified	actor	is	perceived	as	weak	within	this	practice.	As	one	diplomat	said,	“The	Russians	don’t	really	understand	the	EU”	(National	diplomat	2).	In	this	way	the	ability	to	create	‘fit’	between	the	EU	level	and	the	member	state	level	is	weaker	within	the	public	diplomacy:	
”We	 all	 try	 to	 promote	 our	 narrative,	 which	 include	 of	 course	 public	 diplomacy,	 cultural	 issues,	
history	issues	(…)”	(National	diplomat	3).	Accordingly,	public	diplomacy	tools	become	central	parts	of	promoting	bilateral	relations,	 and	 the	 member	 states	 are	 highly	 focusing	 on	 their	 own	 unique	relations	with	Russia	among	cultural	actors,	businesses,	science,	etc.	In	this	way	the	 public	 diplomacy	 is	 contributing	 to	 fulfill	 the	 objective	 of	 “promotion	 of	values	 and	 policies”	 in	 Russia	 but	 with	 preponderance	 of	 the	 bilateral	 level.	Similarly,	public	diplomacy	 tools	also	become	central	 for	 the	EU	 institutions	 in	order	 to	 improve	 the	 image	of	EU	as	a	 supranational	 foreign	policy	actor.	This	brand	 becomes	 important	 for	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	 strategically	 in	 the	future:	
“Credibility	 –	 brand	 identity	 –	 becomes	 hugely	 important!	 We	 will	 see	 much	 more	
brand	 theft.	 And	 that’s	 why	 we	 need	 to	 carefully	 maintain	 our	 image	 as	 a	 credible,	
honest	 interlocutor.	When	you	 tune	 into	our	 frequency,	or	 look	at	our	products,	 then	
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you	need	to	be	sure	that	we	are	the	ones	talking.	Already	now,	troll	fabrics	are	engaged	
with	producing	pure	lies	behind	the	cover	of	virtual	identities	which	do	not	exist	at	all”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		Concluding,	 public	 diplomacy	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 central	 part	 of	 the	 diplomats’	work	with	strategic	communication.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	diplomats	will	stop	calling	these	activities	public	or	cultural	diplomacy.	Instead,	it	 implies	that	the	 diplomats	 are	 articulating	 and	 constructing	 strategic	 communication	 as	 a	practice	 “besides”	 or	 “on	 top	 of”	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 practice	 that	 can	 be	drawing	on	the	same	tools,	activities	and	strategic	aims	as	public	diplomacy.	In	this	way	 the	 practices	 are	 generally	 presented	 as	 highly	 entangled.	 The	 public	diplomacy	work	of	embassies	is	generally	favoring	engagement	and	influence	on	a	bilateral	 level,	while	 the	EU	 focuses	on	 the	overall	 EU	 “brand”.	But	 since	 the	promotion	 of	 the	 values	 and	 policies	 are	 generally	 drawing	 on	 the	 common	“universal	 values”,	 also	 national	 public	 diplomacy	 activities	 can	 be	 argued	 to	support	 the	 promotion	 of	 EU	 values	 and	 policies	 on	 a	 bigger	 level.	 Thus,	 the	diplomatic	practice	of	public	diplomacy	can	be	argued	especially	to	be	concerned	with	the	East	StratCom	objective	2	regarding	“Promotion	of	values	and	policies”,	whose	primary	strategic	aim	 is	 to	create	“engagement	and	 influence”	(cf.	Table	5).	These	finding	are	summed	up	in	Table	6.		
Table	6.	Public	diplomacy	in	the	East	StratCom				DIPLOMATIC	PRACTICE:	 PUBLIC	DIPLOMACY	Tools	and	activities:	 Cultural	exchange,	general	information	work,	online	communication,	engaging	intermediaries	Strategic	aim:	 Primary:	Engagement	&	influence	Secondary:	Aid	&	access	and	political	messaging	&	persuasion	East	StratCom	objective:	 Promotion	of	values	and	policies		Source:	Table	by	the	author	of	this	thesis		
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5.2.2 Media	diplomacy		As	 a	 part	 of	 their	 engagement	 in	 strategic	 communication,	 all	 the	 diplomats	stressed	the	importance	of	their	work	with	the	media	and	journalists	in	Russia:		
“What	I	see	critically	important	is	to	stay	in	touch	with	individual	journalists	(…)	from	
main	dailies,	weeklies,	information	agencies,	radio	stations.”	(National	diplomat	3).		
“Relations	with	key	media	representatives	will	be	nursed	and	maintained.	To	achieve	
this,	the	Delegation	builds	on	previous	years	of	work	and	contacts	in	order	to	maintain	
the	 position	 of	 a	 relevant	 and	 reliable	 partner	 to	 media	 and	 public	 officials	 and	
academia.”	(EU	Delegation	2015).		 	Theoretically	 ‘media	 diplomacy’	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 subfield	 of	 public	 diplomacy.	Where	 public	 diplomacy	 targets	 the	 public	 in	 general	 through	 a	wide	 range	 of	tools	 and	 channels,	 media	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 specific	 practice	 of	 utilizing	 news	media	channels	to	influence	domestic	and	foreign	audiences	with	access	to	either	the	Internet	or	global	news	media	(Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	2009:	907).	The	struggle	to	gain	media	access	has	become	a	central	aspect	of	today’s	foreign	policy,	due	to	the	 belief	 that	 sympathetic	 media	 coverage	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 political	influence.	The	central	aim	for	media	diplomacy	is	then	to	influence	the	framing8	of	political	issues	(Sheafer	&	Gabay	2009:	449).	Here	media	diplomacy	becomes	an	 efficient	 approach	 to	 try	 to	 enhance	 the	 use	 of	 politically	 favorable	 frames	above	discrediting	ones.		
5.2.2.1 Tools	and	activities		As	 part	 of	 the	 East	 StratCom	 the	 objective	 for	media	 support	&	 cooperation	 is	especially	concerned	with	the	aspect	of	creating	media	support	through	building	networks	 and	 providing	 economic	 aid	 e.g.	 through	 capacity	 building	 for	journalists	 (East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan).	 But	 due	 to	 the	 previously	 described																																																									8	Framing	is	the	act	of	“selecting	and	highlighting	some	facets	of	events	or	issues,	and	making	
connections	among	them	so	as	to	promote	a	particular	interpretation,	evaluation,	and/or	solution”	(Sheafer	&	Gabay	2009:	449).	
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constraints	 within	 the	 Russian	 media	 system,	 the	 objectives	 regarding	 media	support	and	development	is	very	restricted	in	its	implementation	in	Russia.	The	diplomats	working	in	Russia	see	their	abilities	to	provide	financial	and	structural	aid	as	limited	due	to	the	structures	within	the	centralized	Russian	media	system.	This	 restriction	 also	 enable	 the	 EU	 to	 strengthen	 its	 central	 position	 in	 The	StratCom	Regime	due	to	the	benefits	for	individual	member	states	to	work	under	the	EU	 “umbrella”	when	 it	 comes	 to	more	politically	 tense	 issues.	This	enables	the	 EU	 to	 obtain	 a	 more	 central	 role	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 trying	 to	 “reconfigure	
events	and	develop	alternatives”	(EU	Delegation	2015).	This	stronger	role	of	 the	EU	 within	 this	 dimension	 also	 become	 underpinned	 by	 the	 strong	 utopian	character	of	the	media	values,	which	makes	EU	countries	more	likely	to	present	themselves	as	united	within	the	structural	dimension	of	media	diplomacy.	In	line	with	this,	one	of	the	diplomats	explains	how	the	strong	values	strengthen	the	EU	cooperation:		
“It	 is	only	when	we	agree	with	our	EU	allies,	on	for	example	the	 issues	on	freedom	of	
the	press,	that	we	represent	the	EU”	(National	diplomat	3).		In	spite	of	the	limitations	for	doing	media	support,	the	member	states	and	the	EU	still	 have	 some	 initiatives	 which	 are	 especially	 concerned	 with	 giving	scholarships	 for	 journalists,	 inviting	 journalists	 for	 seminars	 or	 study	 visits	abroad,	or	buying	content	in	supplements	for	papers	etc.	The	EU	has	supported	the	 creation	 of	 an	 Internet	 radio-station	 “Terra	 Libra”	 aiming	 at	 developing	 a	regional	news	agency	that	“accumulates	and	promotes	voices	of	Russian	regions”	(EU	Delegation	2015).		As	already	mentioned,	all	 the	diplomats	stress	contact	creation	with	 journalists	as	an	important	task.	This	includes	hosting	seminars	or	informal	gatherings	for	press	 contacts,	or	having	 lunches	and	meetings	with	Russian	and	 international	journalists.	 Hence,	 one	 of	 the	 EU	 Delegation’s	 Communication	 objectives	 for	2016	 is	 to	 seek	 to	 promote	 a	 credible	 and	 accurate	 reflection	 of	 main	 EU	positions,	 by	 “engagement	 of	 key	 media	 representatives/opinions	
makers/decisions-shapers	 &	 -makers	 on	 appropriate	 platforms	 in	 electronic	 and	
	 93	
broadsheet	media”	(EU	Delegation	2015).	In	this	way	the	media	contacts	are	seen	as	central	“investments”	for	building	networks	for	later	use:	
	
“If	you	build	that	kind	of	relationship	with	the	journalists	or	in	a	higher	level	with	the	
director	of	the	media	–	with	a	respect-approach	–	most	of	the	times	it	works”	(National	diplomat	1).		Network	 creation	 becomes	 important	 for	 diplomats	 to	 secure	 that	 they	 have	media	channels	to	use	to	disseminate	their	messages	through	(as	I	will	elaborate	on	in	the	next	part).		
	
“We	 have	 to	 be	 realistic	 about	 which	 journalists	 we	 can	 actually	 trust	 and	 build	 a	
relationship	with	 (…)	 you	 have	 to	 have	 a	 relationship	with	 the	 journalist	 before	 you	
can	 even	 do	 things	 like	 interviews	 and	 briefings	 and	 things	 like	 that”	 (National	diplomat	4).	
	As	 the	 last	 quote	 points	 out	 supporting	 media	 and	 building	 contacts	 with	journalists	is	covering	the	strategic	aim	of	securing	access,	since	this	is	the	work	that	 nourish	 the	 relations	 that	 gives	 the	 diplomats	 access	 to	 the	 broader	communication	 channels	within	 the	 Russian	 society.	 As	 one	 diplomat	 said,	 “at	
some	time	maybe	the	situation	will	change	and	it	is	important	to	have	partners	and	
players”	(National	diplomat	3).		A	 central	 part	 of	 the	 diplomats’	 strategic	 communication	 in	 Russia	 is	 thus	concerned	 with	 building	 relations	 with	media	 actors,	 especially	 to	 pursue	 the	strategic	goal	of	obtaining	access	to	media	channels.	The	East	StratCom	objective	about	media	support	is	hard	to	pursue	in	Russia	due	to	the	many	laws	restricting	foreign	funding	and	stigmatizing	the	media	and	organizations	cooperating	with	Western	 donors.	 But	 in	 spite	 of	 this,	 the	 diplomats	 do	 continue	 to	 have	 some	initiatives	supporting	the	objective.					
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Table	7.	Media	diplomacy	in	the	East	StratCom			DIPLOMATIC	PRACTICE:	 MEDIA	DIPLOMACY	Tools	and	activities:	 Media	support	&	journalist	exchange,	contact	creation,	briefings	&	content	Strategic	aim:	 Primary:	Aid	&	access		Secondary:	Engagement	&	influence	East	StratCom	objective:	 Media	support	and	cooperation		Source:	Table	by	the	author	of	this	thesis			
5.2.3 Political	diplomatic	communication		As	already	mentioned	by	one	of	the	diplomats	above,	there	is	a	diplomatic	‘track’	next	 to	 public	 diplomacy,	 which	 I	 focusing	 on	 more	 official	 of	 political	communication.	Thus,	practice	of	political	diplomatic	communication	is	closer	to	the	 diplomatic	 practice	 of	 ‘traditional	 diplomacy’,	 which	 usually	 is	 concerned	with	 communication	 between	 two	 governments	 at	 an	 official	 level	 (as	represented	 in	 figure.	 1).	Here,	 political	 diplomatic	 communication	 is	 similarly	concerned	with	the	traditional	act	of	delivering	political	messages	from	one	state	to	 another.	 But	 this	 practice	 also	 includes	 todays’	 broad	 variety	 of	communication	platforms,	which	means	that	political	diplomatic	communication	can	 target	 traditional	 diplomatic	 forums,	 but	 also	 online	 platforms,	 the	media,	etc.	Opposite	to	the	diplomatic	practices	under	public	diplomacy,	which	is	mostly	concerned	 with	 the	 use	 of	 ‘soft	 power’,	 creating	 the	 ability	 to	 shape	 the	preferences	 of	 others	 (Nye	 2004),	 political	 diplomatic	 communication	 can	include	 communication	 on	 ‘hard	 power’	 policies,	which	 relates	 to	 economic	 or	military	 measures.	 In	 this	 way	 “Hard	 power	 can	 rest	 on	 the	 inducements	
(“carrots”)	or	threats	(“sticks”)”	(Nye	2004:	12).		Just	 like	 the	 work	 with	 strategic	 communication	 in	 Russia,	 the	 political	messaging	on	the	economic	sanctions	related	to	the	Ukraine	crisis	constitutes	a	
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substantial	part	of	the	EU’s	communication.	This	is	also	one	of	the	areas,	where	the	 EU	 level	 is	 strong,	 and	 an	 area	 which	 is	 highly	 defining	 for	 EU-Russia	relations:	
“[A]t	the	end	of	the	of	the	day	it	is	always	about	the	sanctions”	(National	diplomat	1).		
”I	 think	 that	 across	 all	 areas	 -	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 more	 in	 the	 need	 in	 terms	 of	
sanctions	and	on	the	Minsk	2	agreement.	I	think	that	was	something	where	we	used	
messaging,	or	we	just	used	the	EU’s	messaging.”	(National	diplomat	4).		
5.2.3.1 Tools	and	activities		A	 part	 of	 the	 third	 objective	 of	 the	 East	 StratCom	 is	 the	 ambition	 to	 create	
“Increased	public	awareness	of	disinformation	activities	by	external	actors”	and	to	be	 able	 to	 “respond	 to	 such	 activities”	 (East	 StratCom	 Action	 Plan).	 A	 central	element	of	the	ability	to	respond	is	political	statements,	which	are	distributed	on	the	homepages	and	social	media	platforms	by	the	EU	member	states	and	the	EU	institutions.	These	statements	are	performed	by	people	 in	 top	positions	within	the	 EU,	 such	 as	 the	 High	 Representative	of	 the	 Union	 for	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	Security	Policy,	 the	President	of	 the	European	Parliament,	 the	President	of	 the	European	 Commission,	 or	 by	 national	 ministers	 in	 the	 member	 states	 or	ambassadors	 for	 the	 EU	 or	 the	 member	 states	 in	 Russia.	 The	 EU	 would	 not	communicate	statements	by	single	national	member	states	(single	the	it	to	be	a	union	 for	 all	 member	 states),	 but	 the	 member	 states	 often	 post	 the	 EU	statements,	and	use	them	strategically	in	their	own	communication.	In	this	way	political	 statements	 from	 the	 EU	 have	 a	 great	 potential	 for	 fit	 creation	 in	 the	strategic	communication:		
”A	recent	example	has	been	the	EU	statement	on	the	threat	against	Kasyanov,	who	is	
a	 member	 of	 the	 opposition.	 Again	 we	 ‘re-tweeted’	 the	 EU	 and	 put	 out	 our	 own	
messages.	 So	 its	 not	 competition,	 it	 is	 how	 we	 amplify	 each	 others	 messages.”	(National	diplomat	4).		
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As	 this	 excavation	 of	 the	 strategic	 communication,	 as	 a	 policy	 response	 to	perceived	disinformation,	reveals,	strategic	communication	is	generally	seen	as	a	“patch-work”	 of	 other	 diplomatic	 practices	 already	 performed	 within	 other	frameworks	by	the	diplomats,	which	get	linked	through	different	strategic	aims.	But	 as	 mentioned	 before,	 something	 that	 all	 the	 diplomats	 perceived	 as	something	new,	and	generally	the	first	thing	they	mentioned	in	connection	with	the	East	StratCom	Team,	was	the	aspect	of	“myth-busting”.	This	term	covers	their	work	 of	 “analyzing	 trends,	 explaining	narratives	 and	addressing	disinformation”	(East	StratCom	Q&A).	This	work	 is	primarily	based	 in	 the	East	StratCom	Team	and	 is	 communicated	 through	 the	 weakly	 Disinformation	 Review,	 which	presents	an	overview	of	the	“pro-Kremlin”	(Russian	state)	stories	that	provided	factually	wrong	information	or	frames	within	the	past	week.	This	is	supported	by	continuous	posts	on	the	Twitter	profile	‘EU	Mythbusters’.	In	connection	with	the	
“Falsification	of	the	Disinformation”,	the	EU	or	its	partners	provide	a	“Disproof”	to	support	the	falsification	of	the	stories	(e.g.	Disinfo	Review	1.3.16).	In	this	way	the	Disinformation	 Reviews	 also	 provide	 a	 platform	 for	 the	 EU	 and	 like-minded	actors	to	correct	information	according	to	their	beliefs,	here	among	information	supporting	 the	objective	3	 in	 the	East	StratCom:	 “Increased	public	awareness	of	
disinformation	 activities	 by	 external	 actors,	 and	 improved	 EU	 capacity	 to	
anticipate	and	respond	to	such	activities”.	 In	this	way,	the	myth	busting	can	also	be	seen	as	an	enabler	for	political	messaging:			
“Personally	I	think	it	is	good	to	have	the	disinformation,	because	it	helps	you	to	get	your	
messages	 right,	 where	 to	 put	 your	 emphasis	 (…)	 It	 is	 good	 to	 have	 these	 kinds	 of	
examples,	because	it	is	funny.	The	more	interesting	challenge	is	how	to	get	our	messages	
through,	not	how	to	dismantle	the	thing.”	(National	diplomat	2).		Other	 tools	 for	 political	 messaging	 also	 encompass	 public	 speaking,	 press	briefings	and	conferences,	press	releases,	public	announcements,	publication	of	graphics	and	statistics,	and	giving	 interviews.	Even	 though	 these	 tools	can	also	be	used	as	part	of	public	diplomacy	practice,	the	characteristic	of	their	use	within	political	diplomatic	communication	is	the	focus	on	delivering	political	messages	(one-way).	 While	 public	 diplomacy	 and	 media	 diplomacy	 generally	 focus	 on	creating	the	right	platforms	and	access	to	spread	the	messages,	public	diplomacy	
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and	cultural	diplomacy	focus	on	securing	that	these	messages	are	perceived	the	right	way	among	 the	 target	 groups.	The	 strategic	aim	 of	political	 statements	 is	first	 of	 all	 to	 get	 the	message	 “out”	 in	 hope	 that	 they	 can	 persuade	 the	 target	groups	 by	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 argument.	 The	 success	 of	 the	 two	 previous	strategic	aims	thus	secure	that	the	diplomats	can	spread	their	messages,	and	that	these	messages	are	getting	framed	in	the	ways	the	diplomats	indented,	and	that	they	are	perceived	in	the	right	ways	(positively/with	trust)	among	target	groups.		
Table	8.	Political	diplomatic	communication	in	the	East	StratCom			DIPLOMATIC	PRACTICE	 POLITICAL	DIPLOMATIC	COMMUNICATION	Tools	and	activities	 Official	statements,	interviews	&	public	speaking,	“re-tweeting”	and	message	sharing,	disinformation	review		Strategic	aim	 Primary:	Political	messaging	&	persuasion	Secondary:	Engagement	&	influence	East	StratCom	objective	 Myth	busting	and	political	statements		Source:	Table	by	the	author	of	this	thesis		
5.2.4 Sum	up:	Strategic	communication	as	unifying	diplomatic	practice		It	 has	 become	 clear	 that	 strategic	 communication	 is	 perceived	 as	 involving	different	 diplomatic	 practices,	 especially	 public	 diplomacy,	 with	 its	 more	specified	 approaches	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 media	 diplomacy.	 But	 also	political	diplomatic	communication	is	an	important	ingredient	of	the	diplomats’	strategic	 communication	 work.	 Thus,	 the	 previous	 analysis	 showed	 how	strategic	 communication	 practices	 are	 constructed	 “upon”	 other	 diplomatic	practices,	but	with	specific	strategic	aims	guiding	how	the	“mission”	is	supposed	to	be	advanced	 (Hallahan	et	 al.	 2007:	4).	 Informed	by	 these	 findings,	 I	 suggest	that	 strategic	 communication	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 a	 unifying	 diplomatic	practice.		
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With	inspiration	from	the	“International	Relations	positioning	spectrum”	by	the	British	 Council	 (see	 appendix	 1),	 I	 have	 constructed	 a	 schematic	 overview	showing	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 three	 objectives	 within	 the	 East	 StratCom,	their	underlying	strategic	aims,	and	the	diplomatic	practices,	tools	and	activities	supporting	 the	 implementation.	 Figure	 2.	 provides	 a	 simplified	 overview	 –	 a	condensate	 –	 over	 the	 techne	 dimension	 of	 The	 StratCom	 Regime,	 since	 it	highlights	 “the	 techniques,	 mechanisms,	 vocabularies,	 and	 technologies”	 (Dean	2009:	31,	42)	applied	towards	the	problematization.	It	is	important	to	stress	that	the	different	categorizations	should	be	seen	as	analytical	clarifications	enabling	this	 thesis	 to	 reveal	 the	 different	 rationalities	 and	 practices	 in	 play	 in	 The	StratCom	 Regime	 and	 their	 interrelatedness.	 In	 the	 diplomats’	 everyday	 work	with	 strategic	 communication,	 the	 stylized	 diplomatic	 practices	 and	 strategic	aims	become	much	more	fluent	and	entangled.			
“In	a	country	as	Russia,	the	transition	between	public	diplomacy,	ordinary	diplomacy,	
ordinary	 diplomatic	work	 and	 strategic	 communication	 is	 fluid.	 It	 is	 a	 continuum	 in	
which	 one	moves,	where	 it	will	 be	 difficult	 to	 identify	where	 one	 thing	 ends	 and	 the	
other	begins.”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation)		Similarly,	Figure	2.	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	work	of	a	single	diplomat,	but	can	be	used	as	an	analytical	tool	for	further	analyses	of	the	interrelatedness	between	diplomatic	 practices,	 tool	 and	 activities,	 and	 the	 guiding	 underlying	 strategic	aims.	
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Figure	2.	Strategic	communication	as	a	unifying	diplomatic	practice	
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	 Media	support	&	cooperation		 Promotion	of	values	&	policies		 Myth	busting	&	political	statements	
		Source:	Table	by	the	author	of	this	thesis	
	
	In	 the	 previous	 section,	 I	 have	 studied	 how	 strategic	 communication	 has	 been	initiated	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	 response	 to	 “disinformation”	 in	 Russian	 media	through	the	East	StratCom.	And	we	have	seen	how	the	East	StratCom	has	been	introduced	into	–	and	constructed	upon	–	a	broader	field	of	diplomatic	practices.	In	 the	 following	 I	 will	 present	 some	 of	 the	 academic	 literature	 on	 the	 field	 of	strategic	 communication	 in	 order	 to	 support	 the	 conclusion,	 that	 strategic	communication	can	be	labeled	a	‘unifying	diplomat	practice’.			
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5.3 Strategic	communication	as	a	unifying	
paradigm	As	 presented	 above,	 strategic	 communication	 is	 a	 concept,	 which	 can	 be	attributed	 to	 activities	 within	 many	 diplomatic	 practices.	 In	 the	 academic	literature	 strategic	 communication	 is	 similarly	 regarded	 as	 an	 “overarching	
concept	combining	public	diplomacy,	public	affairs,	international	broadcasting	and	
information	operations	as	done	by	the	political–military	sector”	 (Löffelholz	 et	 al.	2014:444).	The	emergence	of	 strategic	 communication	as	 a	 “unifying	paradigm	
for	 studying	 purposeful	 communications	 by	 organizations”	 has	 in	 this	 way	managed	 to	 unite	 previously	 different	 “forms	 of	 strategy	 and	 communication	
practice,	 since	 they	 in	 reality	had	many	of	 the	 same	concepts	 in	common,	among	
other	 audience	 analysis,	 goal	 setting,	 message	 strategy,	 channel	 choice,	 and	
program	assessment”	(Hallahan	et	al.	2007:	16,	5).	This	is	in	line	with	the	findings	of	 the	 previous	 section	 that	 showed	 how	 the	 East	 StratCom	 and	 strategic	diplomatic	communication	practices	in	Russia	are	comprised	by	several	different	diplomatic	practices	and	tools.	In	 chapter	 4,	 I	 detected	 how	 that	 strategic	 communication	 became	 especially	outspoken	among	EU	diplomats	–	especially	at	the	EU	level	–	after	the	outbreak	of	the	Ukraine	crisis.	But	the	EEAS	has	a	general	strategic	communications	team,	which	 was	 formed	 with	 the	 EEAS	 in	 2011,	 before	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis.	 This	 of	course	indicates	that	strategic	communication,	as	a	foreign	policy	practice,	is	not	specifically	 related	 to	 the	 Russia	 policies,	 even	 though	 it	 has	 overall	 been	articulated	 as	 a	 new	 foreign	 policy	 response	 to	 Russia.	 The	 term	 strategic	communication	 has	 long	 been	 used	 within	 academic	 literature,	 but	 it	 is	 only	within	the	last	decade	that	the	term	has	emerged	as	a	specific	field	of	academic	study	(Thomas	&	Stephens	2015,	Hallahan	et	al.	2007,	Torp	2014).	Accordingly,	the	 practices	 of	 strategic	 communication	 in	 themselves	 are	 not	 new,	 but	 the	extended	use	of	 the	overarching	or	unifying	 term	strategic	 communication	has	only	developed	recently.			
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5.3.1 The	strategic	turn	in	foreign	policy	practice		In	 chapter	 4,	 I	 presented	 how	 the	 initiation	 of	 strategic	 communication	responses	 was	 related	 to	 the	 narrative	 of	 Russia	 as	 a	 ‘revisionist	 state’.	 This	observation	 is	 in	 line	 with	 those	 of	 Van	 Dyke	 &	 Verčič	 (2009).	 They	 have	detected	 the	 occurrence	 of	 strategic	 communication	 practice	 within	international	relations	as	being	 largely	formed	by	the	broad	conflict	narratives,	which	have	been	defining	 international	politics	within	 the	 last	 and	 the	 current	century.	 They	 argue	 that	 the	 World	 Wars	 played	 a	 central	 role	 for	 the	developments	of	different	communication	strategies	–	such	as	propaganda	–	 in	order	 to	 attack	 the	 credibility	 of	 one’s	 enemies	 and	 conversely	 enhance	 the	nations’	 own	 international	 image	 and	 legitimize	 national	 military	 or	 political	engagement	 in	 the	 different	 international	 alliances	 (Van	 Dyke	 &	 Verčič	 2009:	914f).	Similarly,	the	intensification	of	a	bipolar	conflict	perception	and	the	risk	of	nuclear	 destruction	 during	 the	 Cold	 War	 encouraged	 state	 leaders	 to	 invent	“strategic	 communication	 management	 policies”	 that	 could	 combine	 different	communication	 activities	 like	 public	 relations,	 public	 diplomacy,	 negotiation,	persuasion,	 and	 coercion	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 dialogue	 and	 deter	 nuclear	war	(Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	2009:	915).	In	this	context	strategic	communication	related	to	 foreign	 policy	 and	 was	 fundamentally	 built	 up	 around	 a	 grand	 conflict	narrative,	which	 could	 guide	 and	 legitimize	 states’	 foreign	 policies.	 During	 the	Cold	War,	 ‘the	West’	 correspondingly	 promoted	 the	 foreign	 policies	 related	 to	the	 grand	 narrative	 of	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 its	 promotion	 of	international	communism.	After	 the	 9/11	 terrorist	 attacks	 on	 the	 U.S.,	 the	 ‘war	 on	 terror’	 became	 a	hegemonic	 international	 conflict	 narrative,	 which	 became	 a	 catalyst	 for	 the	creation	 of	 new	 ways	 of	 conducting	 national	 security	 and	 foreign	 policies	(Dimitriu	2012).	Similarly,	the	argument	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	construction	of	the	 new	 conflict	 narrative,	 which	 has	 gained	momentum	within	 the	 EU	 in	 the	wake	of	the	Ukraine	crisis,	has	enabled	strategic	communication	to	be	presented	as	a	legitimate	foreign	policy	response	(as	studied	in	chapter	4).	While	Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	has	presented	how	earlier	 conflict	 narratives	have	paved	 the	way	 for	
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the	 development	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 strategy	 and	 communication	 within	foreign	 policy	 practices,	 this	 thesis	 thus	 takes	 their	 study	 further	 by	 analyzing	how	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 conflict	 narrative	 about	 Russia	 as	 a	 ’revisionist	 state’	 has	enabled	 the	 development	 of	 strategic	 communication	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	response	to	“disinformation”.	Further,	this	thesis	argues	that	this	was	the	outset	for	the	broader	constitution	of	The	StratCom	Regime.			Finally,	 strategic	 communication	 within	 both	 management	 literature	 and	international	relations	cannot	be	seen	as	a	radical	change	in	practices,	and	in	this	way	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 “the	degree	of	change	in	diplomatic	communication	is	
today	 often	 exaggerated”	 (Jönnson	 208).	 But	 the	 way	 new	 conflict	 narratives	combine	existing	practices	through	strategic	rationalities	must	here	be	argued	to	constitute	 the	 fundament	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 strategic	 communication	 as	legitimate	 foreign	 policy	 response	 –	 in	 our	 present	 historical	 context	 towards	Russian	“disinformation”.			
5.4 EU	governance	through	network	facilitation	
As	introduced	in	chapter	3,	the	spread	of	 information	and	knowledge	is	central	for	any	processes	of	‘conduct	of	conduct’.	This	aspect	of	governmentality	is	likely	to	 take	 place	 among	 a	 network	 of	 actors,	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 such	governance	 networks	 is	 central	 for	 the	 way	 EU	 governmentality	 plays	 out	(Joseph	2012:	186).	In	the	following,	I	will	analyze	how	the	practice	of	creating	networks	becomes	central	 for	 the	EU’s	ability	 to	govern	 through	The	StratCom	Regime.	Through	the	role	as	policy	arena,	 the	EU	acts	 like	a	network	facilitator	which	makes	other	actors	cooperate	about	specific	issues	and	strategies:		
“Networks	 should	provide	a	platform	 for	 relevant	 stakeholders	 to	 exchange	products	
and	 ideas,	 to	 amplify	 communication	 messages,	 and	 to	 coordinate	 their	 activities.”	(East	StratCom	Action	Plan).		
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As	 this	 indicate	 the	 engagement	 of	 networks	 is	 vital	 for	 the	 actors	 ability	 to	create	‘fit’.		As	mentioned	in	chapter	2,	The	StratCom	Regime	is	a	sub-regime	to	the	broader	Regime	of	Practices	against	Russia	“Disinformation”.	As	the	East	StratCom	Action	Plan	explicate,	the	creation	of	networks	with	actors	in	the	broader	regime	is	also	important	 for	 the	 EU.	 Similarly,	 the	 network	 creation	 constitutes	 central	 tools	and	activities	within	the	diplomatic	practices	detected	earlier	in	this	chapter.	But	since	 the	 analysis	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 The	 StratCom	Regime,	 the	 network	 creating	with	like-minded	and	not	like-minded	actors	in	the	broader	regimes	will	not	be	elaborated.	Instead,	Appendix	2	provides	a	rough	overview	of	some	of	the	actors	in	the	broader	regime.			
5.4.1 The	EU	as	network	facilitator	among	member	states		The	 thesis	 have	 already	 studied	 strategic	 communication	 towards	 Russian	“disinformation”	 as	 a	 multilayered	 process	 comprised	 by	many	 strategies	 and	practices	within	the	East	StratCom	Team,	the	EU	Delegation,	and	the	individual	member	 states.	 In	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 level	 of	 fit	 among	 these	 practices	 and	strategies,	 the	practice	of	network	creation	becomes	an	 important	 tool.	As	one	diplomat	 put	 it:	 “[T]he	 EU	 do	 things	 according	 to	 their	 strategy.	 We	 deliver	
according	 to	 our	 strategy.	 And	 there	 will	 be	 some	 overlap	 and	 some	 points	 of	
synergy,	where	we	can	support	each	others’	messages”	(National	diplomat	4).		The	process	of	 increasing	synergies	 is	widely	supported	through	networks	and	cooperation,	and	here,	the	EU	level	plays	a	central	role	for	the	development	and	articulation	of	strategic	communication	in	Russia:	
“We	are	the	first	movers,	and	we	definitely	move	first”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		
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The	 decision	 and	 initiation	 of	 the	 East	 StratCom	has	 given	 the	 EU	 this	 “leader	role”	within	The	StratCom	Regime.	One	of	the	diplomats	from	the	Brussels-based	East	 StratCom	 Team	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 strategy	 implementation	 in	 Russia	 in	close	 cooperation	 with	 especially	 the	 spokesperson/Head	 of	 the	 Press	 and	Information	 Department	 at	 the	 EU	 Delegation	 in	 Moscow.	 Through	 the	facilitation	 of	 meetings	 and	 seminars,	 they	 engage	 the	 diplomats	 in	 charge	 of	strategic	 communication	 at	 the	 national	 embassies	 in	 the	 development	 of	strategic	 communication	 initiatives	 and	 the	 ‘fit’	 creation	 between	 the	member	states	and	the	EU	level.	This	especially	takes	place	through	the	exchange	of	best	practices	and	discussions	of	the	recent	developments	within	the	Russian	media	system	(EU	Delegation	2015).			A	secondary	“leadership	level”	is	constituted	by	the	big	member	states,	which	the	diplomats	 interviewed	 for	 this	 thesis	 represent.	 Since	 it	 is	 mostly	 the	 big	member	 states	 that	 have	 resources	 to	 actually	 have	 an	 employee	 dedicated	 to	strategic	 communication,	 these	 member	 states	 also	 get	 big	 influence	 on	 how	strategic	communication	is	defined	and	developed	within	the	EU.	This	influence	is	 especially	 exerted	 through	 their	 role	 as	 “best	 practice	models”.	 This	 can	 be	illustrated	 through	 a	 prior	 description	 of	 a	 meeting	 at	 the	 EU	 Delegation	 in	February	2016:		
”And	 then	 we	 will	 also	 invite	 some	 of	 our	 most	 active	 colleagues	 to	 share	 their	
experiences.	And	 the	 context	of	 it	 all	 is	 that	a	number	of	 tese	 colleagues	 [from	other	
member	states]	have	said,	 ‘we	have	been	 told	by	our	capitol	 that	we	are	about	 to	do	
something,	 and	 we	 	 are	 not	 entirely	 sure	 how	 to	 tackle	 it’”	 (Spokesperson,	 EU	Delegation	2016)		In	this	regard	the	power	relations	that	enable	the	bigger	member	states’	to	exert	more	 influence	 on	 the	 strategic	 communication	 practices	 in	 the	 EU	 is	 not	constructed	on	the	basis	on	their	material	capabilities	per	se,	but,	in	addition	to	that,	the	fact	that	they	have	the	knowledge	and	experience.	This	is	supported	by	the	diplomats	interviewed.	For	example	one	diplomat	explains	how	he	co-creates	online	 strategic	 communication	 in	 cooperation	with	 his	 peer	 colleagues	 at	 the	other	big	member	states’	embassies	and	the	EU	Delegation:		
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”I	am	having	almost	direct	 contact	 to	 the	EU	and	 to	 the	other	bigger	 states	who	are	
very	active	also	in	social	media	(…)	I	know	what	is	on	their	presences	and	I	know	where	
to	retweet”	(National	diplomat	2)		Accordingly,	 the	knowledge	about	strategic	communication	 is	 to	a	 large	degree	developed	 through	 the	 experience	 of	 big	 member	 states,	 which	 in	 this	 aspect	gain	more	influence	than	smaller	member	states.	But	the	EU	takes	a	central	role	in	The	 StratCom	Regime	by	 constituting	 a	 policy	 arena	 for	 the	member	 states,	and	by	taking	the	lead,	especially	through	the	East	StratCom	objectives	and	the	specific	 knowledge	 on	 strategic	 communication	 accumulated	 through	 the	 East	StratCom	Team,	who	become	constructed	as	‘experts’	within	the	regime.	In	this	way	 the	 EU	 is	 simultaneously	 acting	 in	 accordance	with	 its	 two	 foreign	 policy	‘roles’	outlined	in	chapter	3:	The	supranational	and	the	intergovernmental.			The	 EU’s	 ability	 to	 define	 and	 execute	 strategic	 communication	 initiatives	 in	Russia	 (through	 the	 Disinformation	 Review,	 own	 social	 media	 profiles,	 own	ambassador	 etc.)	must	 be	 seen	 as	 something	 strengthening	 the	 EU’s	 role	 as	 a	foreign	policy	actor	in	its	own.	But	since	the	East	StratCom	is	highly	dependent	on	the	support	from	the	member	states,	the	EU’s	role	as	a	policy	arena	has	to	be	included	in	order	to	secure	legitimacy	among	the	member	states:	
	
”We	must	keep	 in	mind	that	 the	EU,	after	all,	 is	a	club	of	member	states.	 It	 is	not	a	
federation	which	tells	the	subjects	to	do	this	and	that.	[…]	The	member	states,	on	the	
other	hand,	may	expect	that	when	they	have	decided	on	xxx,	then	we	actually	do	it”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		The	 governmentality	 framework	 enables	 this	 thesis	 to	 study	 how	 the	 EU	performs	 ‘indirect’	 or	 ‘hidden’	 governance,	 by,	 for	 example,	 encouraging	 the	member	states	to	adopt	certain	practices	and	rationalities	–	in	this	case	strategic	rationalities	and	 the	 conflict	narrative	about	Russia	as	a	 ‘revisionist’	 state.	The	promotion	of	strategic	communication	can	thereby	be	argued	to	work	as	a	form	of	‘conduct	of	conduct’,	where	the	network	facilitation	enables	the	EU	to	obtain	a	central	role	for	defining	the	form	of	knowledge,	rationalities,	and	practices	which	
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are	 dominant	 for	 the	 regime.	 Through	 this	 common	 knowledge	 and	 certain	practice	 frameworks,	 the	member	 states	 ‘freely’	 choose	 to	 implement	 strategic	communication	 tools	 within	 their	 work	 –	 or,	 equally	 important,	 to	 adopt	 the	terminologies	 and	 target	 groups	 promoted	 through	 The	 StratCom	Regime.	 For	exampled	 the	 weekly	 disinformation	 review	 circulated	 by	 the	 East	 StratCom	Team	 is	 frequently	 read	 by	 national	 diplomats,	 who	 all	 see	 it	 as	 a	 “really	interesting”	 basis	 for	 understanding	 the	 Russian	 media	 system	 (National	diplomat	 1).	 Even	 though	 the	 strategic	 communication	 activities	 by	 member	states	might	not	be	initiated	as	a	direct	part	of	the	East	StratCom	-	they	almost	never	are	–	 the	EU	 is	nevertheless	still	able	 to	 form	the	central	basis	on	which	diplomats	‘talk’	about	strategic	communication	and	disinformation.		Doing	 so,	 the	 EU	 govers	 through	 its	 influence	 on	 the	 “the	 forms	 of	 knowledge,	
techniques	and	other	means	 employed”	 (Dean	 2009:	 18)	 and	 through	 it	 central	position	with	The	StratCom	Regime,	which	enables	it	to	play	a	dominant	role	for	defining	the	target	groups	within	Russia,	the	actors	involved	in	the	networks,	the	strategic	end	goals,	and	the	practices	applied.	As	 mentioned,	 the	 fields	 where	 the	 diplomats	 express	 the	 largest	 degree	 of	alignment	 between	 the	 national	 and	 the	 EU	 level	 is	 on	 the	 Ukraine	 policy,	Russia’s	 implementation	 of	 the	 Minsk	 2	 agreement,	 and	 the	 EU’s	 sanctions	against	 Russia.	 Even	 though	most	 of	 the	member	 states’	 communication	 in	 or	related	 to	 Russia	 is	 related	 to	 national	 issues,	 and,	 to	 a	 large	 degree,	 national	cultural	 issues,	 the	 EU	 becomes	 a	 central	 channel	 for	 the	 countries’	 strategic	communication	on	 the	biggest	conflict	 issue	related	 to	Ukraine.	 In	 this	way	 the	EU	 becomes	 a	 strategic	 channel	 to	 communicate	 through,	 when	 EU	 member	states	 criticize	 Russia,	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 that	 Russia	 cannot	 play	 the	member	states	out	against	each	other:	
	
“I	think	why	EU	counts	in	this	respects	is,	that	if	it	was	only	the	Czechs	who	raises	the	
issue	of	freedom	of	press	in	Russia,	they	would	be	ignored,	dismissed	or	even	repressed	
economically.	 If	 ambassador	 Ušackas	 [the	 EU	 ambassador]	 says	 it,	 it	 is	 impossible,	
because	then	Russia	realizese	that	 its	also	the	German,	Danish	Dutch,	French,	British.	
Then	we	are	together,	and	it	is	not	too	easy	for	Russians	to	play	their	favorite	game	(…)	
	 107	
-	 to	 give	 something	 to	 the	 Italians,	 and	 punish	 Poles	 and	 isolate	 the	 Hungarians.”	(National	Diplomat	3).		As	 this	 indicates	 the	 ability	 of	 the	EU	 to	 influence	 the	member	 states	 –	 and	 to	exercise	governance	–	through	the	East	StratCom	is	realized	through	its	role	as	a	knowledge	promoter	and	network	 facilitator,	because	of	 its	privileged	position	to	set	the	agenda	and	not	least	promote	strategic	communication	as	a	“new”	but	important	policy	practice	towards	Russia.			
5.5 Sum	up:	Techne	
In	 this	chapter	 I	have	analyzed	some	of	 the	central	elements	within	 the	 field	of	
techne	 in	 order	 to	 reveal	 the	 rationalities,	 practices	 and	 techniques	 that	constitute	 The	 StratCom	 Regime.	 Through	 its	 ability	 to	 position	 itself	 as	 a	dominant	 actor	 within	 the	 regime,	 the	 EU	 is	 undertaking	 a	 role	 as	 network	facilitator.	 Since	 the	 EU	 cannot	 dictate	what	 the	member	 states	 should	 do,	 the	governance	 in	 the	 network	works	 through	 ‘conduct	 of	 conduct’	 where	 the	 EU	promotes	 strategic	 communication	 as	 an	 emerging	 foreign	 policy	 practice	towards	 “disinformation”.	 Through	 the	 networks	 the	 EU	 influence	 the	 reality	perceptions	and	knowledge	bases	of	the	member	states	by	information	and	best	practice	sharing	and	facilitation	of	cooperation	within	the	regime.		Since	the	implementation	of	the	East	StratCom	is	not	contingent	on	the	member	states’	 participation,	 the	 EU	 becomes	 the	 main	 promoter	 of	 strategic	communication	 as	 being	 a	 “new”	 foreign	 policy	 response	 to	 Russian	“disinformation”.	 But	 through	 the	 strategic	 rationalities	 underpinning	 The	StratCom	 Regime,	 the	 national	 diplomats	 are	 encouraged	 and	 qualified	 to	contribute	indirectly	to	the	EU’s	East	StratCom,	without	giving	lower	priority	to	the	tasks	expected	by	the	member	states.	This	is	enabled	through	the	creation	of	‘fit’,	 which	 furthermore	 strengthens	 the	 EU’s	 ability	 to	 act	 as	 a	 unified	supranational	foreign	policy	actor.			
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The	 analysis	 showed	 that	 strategic	 communication,	 as	 a	 diplomatic	 practice,	 is	not	 a	 single	 practice	 “imported”	 into	 the	 Russian	 context	 as	 part	 of	 the	 policy	solution.	Strategic	communication	can	rather	be	defined	as	a	 ‘unifying	practice’	since	it	is	drawing	upon	several	other	practices,	such	as	public	diplomacy,	media	diplomacy	 and	political	 diplomatic	 communication.	 Through	 the	 strategic	 aims	that	are	underpinning	 the	East	StratCom,	 the	existing	practices	of	diplomats	 in	Russia	 are	 subjected	 into	 strategic	 communication.	 In	 this	 way	 the	 analysis	reveals	that	strategic	communication	is	not	a	‘new’	practice	but	rather	a	unifying	practice.	Supported	by	findings	in	existing	literature,	the	analysis	shows	that	the	emergence	 of	 the	 conflict	 narrative	 about	 Russia	 as	 a	 ‘revisionist’	 state	 has	enabled	 the	 emergence	 of	 The	 StratCom	 Regime	 and	 the	 extension	 of	 EU	governance,	which	is	enabled	through	the	regime.	Based	on	this,	I	argue	that	the	EU	governance	is	not	contingent	on	the	actual	success	of	the	East	StratCom	and	the	actual	strategic	communication	results.	Rather,	the	governance	potential	lies	in	the	way	the	underlying	rationalities	enable	them	to	unify	practices	and	actors	into	a	common	network,	through	which	the	EU	can	exercise	conduct	of	conduct.		
6 The	strategically	communicating	
diplomat		Through	the	analysis	of	the	first	three	governmentality	dimensions	in	chapter,	3,	chapter	 4	 and	 chapter	 5	 it	 has	 become	 clear	 that	 the	 diplomats	working	with	strategic	 communication	 in	Moscow	 have	 been	 central	 for	 the	 construction	 of	strategic	communication	as	a	practice	against	“disinformation”.				In	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	 investigate	 how	 the	 diplomat	 role	 in	 particular	 becomes	central	 for	 the	 EU’s	 ability	 to	 govern	 through	 The	 StratCom	 Regime.	 This	dimension	 studies	 the	 formation	 of	 certain	 identities	 above	 others,	 “through	
which	 governing	 operates	 and	 which	 specific	 practices	 and	 programmes	 of	
government	try	to	form”	(Dean	2009:	43).	This	is	enabled	through	the	processes	of	 ‘conduct	 of	 conduct’,	 which	 make	 the	 diplomats	 internalize	 certain	 truths,	
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interests,	 and	 wishes	 above	 other	 (Torfing	 &	 Sørensen	 2005:	 115ff).	 I	 study	governance	through	the	diplomats	processes	of	self-government	(Dean	2009).		The	 chapter	 will	 first	 briefly	 outline	 three	 predominant	 diplomat	 identities	suggested	 by	 Cornut	 (2005)	 being	 the	 role	 as	 knowledge-producer,	 the	 role	 as	
representative	and	the	role	as	bureaucrat.	However,	I	find	these	existing	diplomat	identities	 limited	when	 it	 comes	 to	 understand	 the	 diplomats’	 articulations	 of	their	role	in	relation	to	the	StratCom	Regime.	Following,	I	analyze	and	identify	a	new	 diplomat	 identity	 that	 I	 name	 the	 role	 of	 the	 strategically	 communicating	
diplomat.		
6.1 Diplomatic	multi-roles	
In	 his	 study	 of	 diplomats	 in	 Egypt,	 Cornut	 (2015)	 has	 detected	 three	predominant	 roles,	 which	 the	 diplomats	 working	 at	 embassies	 manage	simultaneously.	The	first	role	is	the	role	as	knowledge-producers.	While	engaging	in	 diplomatic	 practices	 diplomats	 inevitably	 engage	 in	 knowledge-construction	through	the	description	and	 interpreting	of	 information	about	 topics	related	to	current	 international	 affairs.	 At	 the	 national	 representations	 the	 knowledge	production	is	mostly	targeting	the	national	MFA’s,	and	in	this	way	the	diplomats	are	 the	 home	 country’s	 main	 source	 to	 information	 about	 other	 countries	(Cornut	 2015:	 388).	 However,	 the	 EU	 member	 states	 are	 all	 interested	 in	knowledge	 about	 each	 others’	 view	 on	 current	 affairs	 -	 for	 example	 on	 new	trends	within	strategic	communication	-	and	in	this	process	an	important	part	is	also	 to	 engage	 in	 common	 knowledge	 production	 (Bicchi	 2013:	 254),	which	 is	happening	 through	 common	 newsletters,	 analyses,	 seminars,	 best-practice	sharing	etc.	The	 second	 role	 is	 as	 representative	 of	 a	 government.	 This	 means	 that	 the	diplomats	 in	 the	end	are	responsible	 for	 the	execution	of	 the	priorities	of	 their	governments,	and	in	this	way	the	diplomats	have	a	mandate	to	speak	on	behalf	of	their	 state,	 and	 the	population	 they	 represent	 (Cornut	2015:	389).	 In	 line	with	the	preponderance	of	 the	national	 level	 in	 the	EU’s	 foreign	policy,	 the	national	
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role	 is	very	 strong	 in	 the	diplomats’	 identities	–	also	when	 in	 comes	 to	 finding	common	ground	through	strategic	communication	in	Russia:	
“It	is	good	to	have	the	European	side,	but	my	headquarter	is	still	demanding	from	me	
to	 do	 information	 on	 this	 and	 this,	 specifically	 on	 something	 with	 relation	 to	 (my	
country)”	(National	diplomat	2)		But	 studies	 have	 also	 shown	 that	 the	 discourse	 on	 ‘the	 EU	 as	 a	 unified	supranational	 foreign	 policy-actor’	 is	 generally	 strong	 among	 diplomats	 in	 EU	countries.	 A	 recent	 study	 building	 on	 138	 questionnaires	 shows	 that	 many	diplomats	understand	EU	foreign	policy	as	“a	collective	political	project	with	the	
objective	 to	 craft	 a	 common	 European	 policy”.	 Especially	 this	 “supranational	attitude”	 is	 strengthened,	 if	 the	 diplomats	 have	 direct	 work	 experience	 from	Brussels	(Chelotti	2014:	190).	I	have	similarly	detected	this	‘EU-identity’	among	my	informants,	who	all	express	support	and	positive	attitudes	towards	the	East	StratCom.	As	one	diplomat	expresses	the	commitment	to	the	East	StratCom:		
“I	am	a	part	of	the	StratCom,	cause	I	belong	to	the	European	Union,	and	the	StratCom	
is	a	part	of	our	embassy,	of	course	(…)”	(National	diplomat	1).			Actually	this	diplomat	was	the	one	expressing	biggest	cautiousness	towards	the	East	StratCom,	especially	 the	aspects	of	media	developments,	which	she	 feared	could	easily	be	perceived	as	“paternalism”.	But	the	fact	that	she	is	nevertheless	expressing	 clear	 involvement	 in	 the	 strategy	 nonetheless,	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	symbol	 of	 the	 EU’s	 ability	 to	 make	 the	 diplomats	 feel	 that	 they	 want	 to	 be	included.	 In	 this	 way	 the	 national	 diplomats	 also	 play	 a	 central	 role	 for	 the	development	of	EU	foreign	policy	actorness.	But	even	though	the	discourses	and	perceptions	 of	 among	 practitioners	 show	 that	 the	 EU	 is	 constructed	 as	 an	important	 foreign	 policy	 actor,	 another	 recent	 study	 of	 diplomats’	 practices	relating	to	EU	foreign	policy	showed	that	diplomats	see	the	policies	of	the	EEAS	as	an	additional	 resource,	but	not	something	 that	can	substitute	 the	policies	of	the	national	ministries	of	 foreign	affairs	 (MFA’s)	 (Lequesne	2015).	Similarly	all	the	 diplomats	 in	 this	 study	 stress	 the	 national	 level	 as	 being	 primary	 to	 their	professional	role.		
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While	 representing	 their	 countries	 abroad	 all	 diplomats	 are	 still	 a	 part	 of	 the	bureaucracy	in	their	national	MFA,	and	thus	they	take	on	the	role	as	bureaucrat	(Cornut	2015:	389).	As	part	of	 the	member	 states’	 integration	 into	 the	EU	and	the	 development	 of	 EU’s	 institutions,	 the	 administrative	 and	 legislative	standards	 within	 the	 Union	 have	 been	 increasingly	 adapted	 to	 common	standards	(EU	2014:	23).	Through	the	engagement	in	EU	policy	processes	and	by	working	after	the	same	diplomatic	‘rules’,	the	diplomats	also	to	some	extent	take	part	 in	 the	EU’s	 bureaucracy.	An	 example	 of	 these	 emerging	 common	working	procedures	 in	 foreign	 policy	 can	 be	 the	 COREU	 network,	 through	 which	 EU	institutions	and	member	states	can	share	confidential	foreign	policy	information	(Bicchi	 2011).	 Through	 these	 systems	 and	 bureaucratic	 regimes	 the	 diplomats	produce	and	reproduce	diplomatic	practice,	through	which	they	solve	their	tasks	and	 meet	 expectations	 from	 national	 MFA’s,	 the	 EU,	 populations	 etc.	(Čmakalová&Rolenc	2012:	265).		These	three	diplomatic	roles	presented	above	all	have	an	impact	on	how	the	EU	diplomats	 construct	 and	 legitimize	 their	 practice,	 which	 form	 the	 way	governance	 takes	 place.	 In	 the	 following	 I	 will	 analyze	 how	 strategic	communication	has	contributed	 to	an	emerging	diplomat	role,	which	promotes	new	possibilities	for	EU	governance.		
6.2 The	strategically	communicating	diplomat	
Processes	of	forming	certain	identities	are	closely	connected	to	the	processes	of	problematization	as	I	studied	in	chapter	4	(Bacchi	2012).	Through	the	analyses	this	thesis	has	shown	how	the	diplomats,	as	a	part	of	the	problematization	of	the	Russian	media	system,	have	been	drawing	up	discursive	distinctions	in	order	to	legitimize	 how	 their	 own	 strategic	 communication	 actions	 can	 be	 seen	 as	legitimate	while	propaganda	activity	 is	 illegitimate.	As	studied	 in	chapter	4	 the	diplomats	 ‘othering’	of	the	Russian	media	system	becomes	a	way	to	strengthen	the	 diplomats	 EU	 identity	 (Vartanova	 2014:	 100).	 As	 a	 part	 of	 the	 problem	articulations	the	diplomats	draw	on	the	underlying	distinctions	between	‘us’	and	
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‘them’,	which	are	guided	by	 the	epistemic	norms	regarding	 independent	media	and	 propaganda.	 Here	 the	 distinctions	 are	 drawn	 between	 the	 ‘independent	press’	 and	 the	 ‘propaganda	 press’,	 and	 similarly	 between	 the	 diplomats	 as	‘strategic	communicators’	versus	the	Russian	officials	working	as	‘propagandists’	seeking	to	control	the	media:		
“Nu	 er	 det	 politiske	 system	 jo	 I	 tiltagende	 grad	 centralistisk,	 nogen	 vil	 kalde	 det	
enevældigt,	og	derfor	bliver	det	vanskeligt	at	pege	på	nogle	mennesker,	som	kan	have	
afgørende	indflydelse	uden	for	den	snævre	kreds”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation).		Through	this	problematization	of	the	Russian	media	system	and	the	initiation	of	strategic	communication	as	a	legitimate	policy	response,	the	diplomats	similarly	shape	themselves	into	the	role	as	strategic	communicators.	As	presented	above,	the	diplomats	hold	many	different	roles,	and	they	are	engaged	in	many	different	practices	 (as	 analyzed	 in	 chapter	 5).	 As	 part	 of	 the	 process	 of	 legitimizing	strategic	 communication	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	 practice	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	strategic	 communication	 as	 a	 unifying	 paradigm,	 the	 diplomats	 have	 similarly	been	encouraged	to	adapt	into	a	new	corresponding	role:		
“How	 individuals	view	themselves	as	diplomats	 is	 closely	associated	 to	 the	 tasks	 they	
are	 expected	 to	perform,	 how	 these	 expectations	 relate	 to	 their	 interpretation	of	 the	
role,	and	 the	organizational	and	cultural	 features	of	 the	contexts	 they	are	embedded	
in”	(Chelotti	2014:	193).	
	Based	on	Chelotti’s	“recipe”	of	the	formation	of	diplomat’s	roles	I	will	proceed	to	the	analysis	of	how	the	governance	through	strategic	communication	has	formed	the	role	of	the	‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’.		The	first	aspect	of	how	the	diplomats	see	their	roles	is	concerned	with	the	tasks	that	 the	diplomat	 is	 expected	 to	 perform.	This	 thesis	 has	 shown	how	 strategic	communication	has	been	promoted	by	the	EU	through	the	East	StratCom.	Since	the	informant	for	this	thesis	are	all	heads	of	the	communication	departments	of	their	respective	embassies	the	role	as	 ‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’	 is	more	 likely	 to	 emerge	 among	 them	 that	 in	 other	 embassy	 departments.	 This	
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makes	them	more	exposed	to	this	role,	while	many	of	their	colleagues	might	be	more	connected	to	the	bureaucratic	or	representative	role	etc.	But	the	strategic	rationales	 seem	 to	 be	 spreading	 into	 more	 traditional	 diplomatic	 positions	 as	described	 above,	 exemplified	 by	 the	 tendency	 that	 many	 ambassadors	 and	spokespersons	are	now	being	active	on	twitter,	blogs	etc.	Furthermore,	many	of	the	diplomats’	national	MFA’s	have	upgraded	strategic	communication	teams	at	home.	 In	 this	 way	 the	 role	 of	 the	 ‘strategically	 communicating	 diplomat’	 is	promoted	 from	many	 sides.	 Similarly	 the	 diplomats	 express	 that	 they	 in	 their	capacity	 as	 strategic	 communicators	 become	 included	 in	 central	 decision	processes	of	their	embassies,	and	in	this	way	this	role	moves	them	closer	to	the	political	 management,	 which	 can	 be	 argued	 to	 underpin	 how	 strategic	communication	 facilitates	 e.g.	 the	 integration	of	political	messaging	 into	public	diplomacy	work.	Similarly	this	changes	the	role	for	the	diplomats,	since	strategic	communication	becomes	a	way	for	them	to	obtain	more	influential	and	‘visible’	positions	within	their	organizations.		
”So	we	don’t	communicate	as	an	afterthought	(…)	Communication	is	not	a	thing	you	do	
at	the	last	minute	at	the	end.	We	are	now	brought	into	the	discussion	a	lot	earlier	and	
through	the	development	of	things.”		(National	diplomat	4)		According	to	Cornut	the	diplomats	also	have	their	own	interests	in	pursuing	the	roles	 close	 to	management,	 since	 this	 gives	 them	more	 influence	 and	 a	 higher	standing	among	their	mangements	(Cornut	2015:	396)		The	 ‘strategically	 communicating	 diplomats’	 are	 also	 expected	 to	 change	themselves	 ‘‘from	 being	 reporters	 and	 lobbyists	 on	 reactive	 issues	 to	 shapers	 of	
public	debates	around	the	world’’	(Jönsson	&	Hall	2003:	203).	Thus,	the	diplomat	role	within	The	StratCom	Regime	is	to	be	actively	engaged	in	the	procession	of	opinion	formation	not	 just	among	national	populations,	but	also	among	foreign	publics.	 Especially	 online	 communication	 on	 e.g.	 social	 media	 become	 a	 new	arena	where	the	‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’	is	expected	to	act:			
“For	 us	 this	 means	 that	 we	 also	 have	 to	 be	 present,	 where	 the	 new	 consumption	
patterns	are”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delengation	2016).	
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	And	 in	 this	way	 the	 diplomats	 see	 themselves	 a	 being	 directly	 communicating	with	 the	 ‘users’.	 This	 expresses	 a	 central	 part	 of	 the	 diplomats’	 own	“interpretation	 of	 the	 role”	 (Chelotti	 2014).	 Here	 the	 ‘strategically	communicating	diplomats’	become	integrated	into	the	self-image	of	‘the	modern	diplomat’:		
“I	think	that	is	a	part	of	being	a	modern	diplomat,	who	understands	the	modern	world	
and	 modern	 communication	 technology	 and	 audiences.	 It	 has	 just	 opened	 up	 the	
diplomatic	 world	 much	 wider,	 and	 braided	 the	 range	 of	 audiences.”	 (National	diplomat	4).		Like	 the	 other	 dimensions	 of	 the	 regime	 of	 practices,	 this	 diplomat	 articulates	how	 the	 role	 of	 the	 ‘modern	 diplomat’	 is	 supporting	 norms	 such	 as	
“transparency,	openness,	and	understanding	of	what	work	we	are	doing”	(National	diplomat	4).	Since	these	are	utopian	norms	within	the	EU,	this	self-image	can	be	argued	 to	 strengthen	 the	 emerging	 role.	 Similarly	 the	 strategically	communicating	 role	 can	 be	 integrated	 into	 the	 role	 of	 the	 traditional	representative	diplomat	role:	“We	are	here	to	bring	bridges”	 (National	diplomat	1),	which	similarly	underscores	the	legitimacy	of	the	emerging	role.			The	diplomats’	interpretations	about	their	future	work	are	closely	linked	to	their	“interpretations	 of	 their	 context”	 (Chelotti	 2014).	 Here	 the	 strategically	communicating	role	is	again	tightly	linked	to	the	developments	within	the	global	communication	 networks,	 which	 become	 important	 for	 the	 user-oriented	‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’:		
“So	now	 it	 doesn’t	matter	 if	 you	 can	write	 the	most	 elegant	 press	 release.	Nobody	 is	
interested.	You	need	to	be	able	to	write	your	140	characters	on	twitter,	but	I	can	hear	
that’s	 changing	 too:	 You	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	 take	 photographs,	 videos,	 in	 real	 time	 –	
there	is	no	point	in	doing	it	late”	(National	diplomat	4).		In	 this	 way	 the	 role	 of	 the	 ‘strategically	 communicating	 diplomat’	 is	 always	seeking	 to	 analyze	 the	 “new	 trends”,	 which	 again	 underscores	 that	 the	 role	
	 115	
encourages	 a	 further	 move	 away	 from	 traditional	 diplomatic	 channels	 to	 the	public	diplomacy	channels.	While	still	 stressing	 the	 importance	of	 independent	journalists	the	developments	within	communication	also	make	the	‘strategically	communicating	 diplomats’	 integrate	 closer	 with	 the	 field	 of	 journalism,	 which	they	traditionally	have	seen	themselves	as	strictly	divided	from:		
”We	 are	 producing	 now.	 And	 what	 is	 happening	 is	 –	 and	 I	 think	 this	 will	 be	 more	
accentuated	the	coming	years	(…)	that	we	start	to	produce	fully	pre-packed	products,	
which	you	as	a	consumer	on	Vkontakte	or	Facebook	and	Twitter	kan	choose	to	read”	(Spokesperson,	EU	Delegation	2016).		While	the	traditional	diplomat	would	work	as	the	source	for	the	journalists,	the	‘strategically	 communicating	 diplomat’	 can	 still	 be	 the	 source	 that	 gives	interviews	or	press	briefings,	but	it	can	also	be	a	newsmaker	in	itself,	by	posting	directly	 on	 online	 platforms,	 where	 also	 more	 and	more	 journalists	 search	 in	order	 to	 find	 news	 (Verweij	 2012).	 In	 this	 way	 the	 strategic	 communicating	diplomat	 is	 interacting	 fundamentally	 different	 with	 the	 journalists	 and	 the	public	than	more	traditional	diplomatic	roles	as	e.g.	the	knowledge	producer,	the	state	 representative,	 or	 the	 bureaucrat.	 In	 this	 way	 the	 ‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’	acts	across	traditional	boundaries,	and	both	takes	part	in	management	 processes	 and	 political	 communication	 while	 also	 becoming	 a	content	producer	and	newsmaker.	
	Due	to	this	“agile”	role	the	 ‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’	can	similarly	be	engaged	in	the	creation	of	fit	between	many	different	levels,	both	within	the	national	 diplomatic	 sphere,	 between	 the	 diplomatic	 sphere	 and	 the	 public	sphere,	and	between	the	national	level	and	the	EU	level:		
“So	we	are	working	in	a	sort	of	multiple	layers	(…)	Some	interests	will	overlap	with	
several	other	EU	countries	or	the	EU.	So	you	look	at	the	policy	issue	and	then	look	at	
the	context	around	it	(…)	We	are	trying	to	coordinate,	so	we	can	support	each	others	
stratcom	messages”	(National	diplomat	4).		
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So	 even	 though	 the	 diplomats	 are	 generally	 much	 closer	 linked	 to	 the	 nation	state	 they	 represent,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 ‘strategically	 communicating	diplomat’	 is	 more	 encouraged	 to	 integrate	 different	 levels	 and	 strategies	simultaneously.	 According	 to	 the	 hegemonic	 strategic	 rationales,	 which	 were	detected	 as	 underpinning	 the	 StratCom	 Regime	 against	 Russian	"Disinformation",	 this	 can	 similarly	 be	 argued	 to	 underscore	 the	 level	 of	 fit	creating	 between	 the	 national	 level	 and	 the	 EU	 -	 as	 long	 as	 it	 strengthens	 the	ability	 to	 reach	 the	 users.	 Larsen	 (2004)	 have	 studied	 how	 “the	 overall	
problematics	of	international	governance	in	the	EU”	can	be	seen	as	“an	expression	
of	 struggles	 between	 states	 and	 institutional	 actors	 adhering	 to	 different	
discourses”	 (Larsen	 in	 Tonra	&	 Christiansen	 2004:	 68f).	 In	 line	with	 the	 above	presentation,	the	promotion	of	the	‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’	can	be	argued	 to	 improve	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 EU	 level	 into	 the	 national	 diplomatic	communication	and	create	bigger	alignment	between	the	different	discourses	in	play	–	which	might	have	a	positive	influence	on	EU	governance.		The	 challenges	 of	 governance	 on	 the	 EU	 level	 are	 big,	 since	 “the	 social	 and	
political	 actors	 are	 not	 naturally	 inclined	 to	 interact	 in	 and	 through	governance	
networks.	 Thus	 international	 organizations	 and	 institutions	 (as	 well	 as	 states)	
constantly	 have	 to	 form	 subjectivities	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 aims,	 and	 to	
legitimize	their	own	existence”	(Torfing&Sørensen	2006:	39f).	In	line	with	this,	this	thesis	suggests	that	the	formation	of	the	‘strategically	communicating	diplomat’	is	promoted	as	part	of	strengthening	the	abilities	of	actors	 to	engage	 in	 the	EU	governance	network.	 In	 this	way	the	 formation	of	 this	role	–	or	subjectivities	–	become	a	part	of	legitimizing	strategic	communication	action,	but	also	a	part	of	legitimizing	EU	governance	in	itself.		
	
6.3 Sum	up:	The	formation	of	identities	
Through	 the	 study	 of	 the	 governmentality	 dimension	of	 identity	 formation	 this	chapter	 has	 detected	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 new	 role	 of	 the	 strategically	
communicating	 diplomat.	 Contrary	 to	 more	 traditional	 diplomatic	 roles	 the	
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strategically	 communicating	 diplomat	 is	 constructed	 as	 being	 able	 to	 work	across	many	fields,	both	close	to	central	management	and	policy	formulation	and	internal	 developments,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 highly	 oriented	 towards	 the	external	target	groups/users.	This	user-oriented	focus	supports	the	constructed	self-image	 of	 being	 a	 promoter	 of	 democratic	 utopias	 e.g.	 transparency	 and	public	 engagement.	 Central	 for	 the	 field	 of	 study	 in	 this	 thesis,	 an	 interesting	aspect	is	how	this	is	enabling	a	redefinition	of	the	traditional	relations	between	diplomats,	 journalists,	 and	 the	 public.	While	 journalists	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 have	been	 central	 intermediaries	 between	 the	 diplomats	 and	 the	 populations,	 the	diplomats’	 increased	 adaption	 to	 online	 communication	 has	 enabled	 them	 to	develop	 identities	 as	 being	 newsmakers	 themselves	 through	 the	 direct	communication	with	populations	especially	on	social	media	platforms.		In	this	way	the	role	of	the	strategically	communicating	diplomat	is	articulated	to	overlap	 with	 the	 broader	 expectations	 to	 the	 “modern	 diplomat”	 (National	diplomat	 4),	 who	 is	 constantly	 working	 in	 order	 to	 adapt	 the	 diplomatic	institutions	and	practices	to	the	ever	changing	technologies	and	conditions	in	the	contemporary	 “outside	world”.	 Thus,	 this	 role	 is	more	 externally	 focused	 than	more	traditional	diplomatic	roles.	Due	to	the	closer	integration	into	management	the	 strategically	 communicating	 diplomat	 tends	 to	 give	 precedence	 to	 political	diplomatic	communication,	which	increases	the	tendency	that	political	messages	is	 given	 higher	 priority	 by	 the	 diplomats	 than	 other	 kinds	 of	 content.	 This,	 in	combination	 with	 the	 strategic	 rationales	 forming	 the	 strategically	communicating	diplomat,	makes	this	role	more	capable	of	seeking	to	bridge	the	gaps	 between	 national	 and	 EU	 identities	 and	 combine	 these	 according	 to	common	 strategic	 aims.	 In	 this	 way	 strategic	 communication	 becomes	 a	diplomatic	 practice	 that	 enables	 ‘fit’	 between	 the	 national	 communication	 and	the	EU’s	communication.	But	since	the	national	level	still	has	preponderance,	the	strategically	 communicating	 diplomat	 is	 depending	 on	 national	 political	alignment	with	the	EU	level.						
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7 The	institutionalization	of	strategic	
diplomatic	communication	in	EU	
foreign	policy	–	consequences	and	
prospects		In	this	chapter	 I	will	present	some	reflections	on	how	strategic	communication	can	 be	 seen	 a	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 process	 of	 institutionalizing	 strategic	communication	 into	 the	 EU’s	 foreign	 policy,	 and	 what	 consequences	 and	opportunities	this	can	have	for	diplomatic	work.		Since	 I	 have	 studied	how	 strategic	 communication	 is	working	within	 the	 ever-changing	structures	within	institutions	and	networks	I	align	with	Frederiksson	&	Pallas	 (2014)	 who	 define	 strategic	 communication	 as	 being	 a	 part	 of	“constituting	 these	 structures”	 (Fredriksson	 &	 Pallas	 2014:	 153).	 In	 line	 with	Dean,	 a	 regime	 of	 practices	 is	 not	 a	 closed	 structure	 separated	 from	 other	regimes	 (Dean	2009:	 28).	 	 Through	 this	 understanding	 I	 can	 thus	 suggest	 that	the	 structures	 constituting	 The	 StratCom	 Regime	 are	 likely	 to	 becomce	influential	 on	 the	 broader	 structures	 constituting	 the	 EU	 in	 general.	 Following	this	the	constitution	and	emergende	of	The	StratCom	Regime	can	also	be	seen	as	a	part	of	integrating	strategic	communication	in	the	EU	itself.	This	might	lead	to	the	creation	of	other	StratCom	Teams	in	the	future,	tasked	with	targeting	other	interest	areas	for	the	EU,	for	example	a	Southern	Partnership.			Even	though	the	strategic	rationalities	underpinning	The	StratCom	Regime	seek	to	 present	 strategic	 communication	 as	 merely	 “purposeful”	 means	 of	communicating	 (Hallahan	 et.	 al	 2007:	 3),	 the	 experiences	 with	 strategic	communication	in	the	Eastern	Partnership	context	(studied	through	the	Russian	case)	 have	 shown	 that	 strategic	 communication	 is	 not	 always	 perceived	 as	 a	“neutral”	 act:	 It	 can	 be	 associated	 with	 such	 different	 concepts	 as	 “public	diplomacy”,	“counter-propaganda”	and	“information	warfare”.	Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	(2009)	 have	 studied	 how	 strategic	 communication	 practices	 can	 cause	legitimacy	 crisis	 in	 the	 way	 that	 they	 present	 themselves	 as	 soft	 power	
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programs,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 often	 used	 to	 “attract	others	 to	 cooperate	on	hard	
power	 (e.g.,	 political,	 economic,	 and	 military	 sanctions	 or	 force)	 to	 persuade	 or	
compel	others	to	adopt	goals”	 (Van	Dyke	&	Verčič	 2009:	 904).	 Similarly,	 I	 have	studied	 how	 the	 strategic	 communication	 related	 to	 hard	 power	 politics	 are	easily	framed	as	illegitimate.	In	the	thesis	we	have	also	been	aware	how	the	East	StratCom	 has	 been	 presented	 as	 illegitimate	 from,	 even	 though	 the	 EU	 actors	have	 presented	 its	 as	 legitimate.	 Since	 strategic	 communication	 works	 as	 a	unified	 practice	 this	 opens	 up	 for	 tighter	 integration	 between	 hard	 power	policies	 and	 the	 diplomatic	 practices	 of	 for	 example	 cultural	 and	 public	diplomacy,	which	are	 traditionally	connected	with	soft	power.	 In	 line	with	Van	Dyke	&	Verčič’s	observations,	I	suggest	that	strategic	communication	might	risk	blurring	 the	 lines	 between	 the	 diplomatic	 practices,	 which	 might	 lead	 to	legitimacy	problems	for	diplomats	and	diplomatic	institutions.	
Furthermore,	 critics	 have	 argued	 that	 strategic	 communication	 “privileges	 a	management	discourse”	(Hallahan	et.	al	2007:	11).	 In	the	case	of	The	StratCom	Regime	my	analysis	has	indicated	that	the	management	orientation	has	led	to	an	increase	 in	 the	 political	 diplomatic	 communication,	 since	 the	 embassies	 upper	management	 is	 after	 all	 national	 politicians,	 who	 are	 communicating	 in	accordance	with	the	contemporary	political	agenda.	This	can	further	lead	to	the	dilution	of	the	traditional	soft	power	diplomacy	practices.	
Lastly	 this	 encourages	me	 to	 raise	 the	 question:	What	 does	 the	 integration	 of	strategic	 communication	 into	 EU’s	 foreign	 policy	 practices	 then	 induce	 for	 the	
art	of	diplomacy?	
One	 of	 the	 diplomats	 interviewed	 for	 this	 thesis	 raised	 the	 point	 that	 for	 him	public	 diplomacy	 needs	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 broader	 concept	 than	 strategic	communication,	 since	 the	 core	 of	 the	 diplomatic	 work	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	cooperation	between	countries	remains	even	in	times	of	political	tensions:	
“Even	 if	we	 have	 difficulties	 that	we	 didn’t	manage	 to	 overcome	 at	 the	moment,	 the	
relations	between	the	two	countries	and	the	people	are	still	 there.	There	are	cultural	
exchanges	 (…)	 the	 framework	 of	 economy,	 business,	 which	 are	 there	 and	 which	 we	
should	 preserve.	 Especially	 in	 difficult	 times,	 because	 you	 have	 to	 have	 a	 channel	 of	
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communication”	(National	diplomat	2)	Through	the	emergence	of	the	strategic	rationalities	within	diplomatic	practices	of	The	StratCom	Regime,	the	diplomats	are	encouraged	to	legitimize	their	work	through	 creating	 ‘fit’	 with	 the	 overall	 EU	 political	 level	 and	 common	 political	statements	and	messages.	As	mentioned	above,	this	leads	to	a	closer	integration	of	political	goals	into	for	example	the	public	diplomacy-field.	In	accordance	with	this,	I	argue,	that	the	strategic	rationales	tend	to	encourage	the	alignment	of	the	diplomatic	practices	focusing	on	soft	power	and	intercultural	relations	with	the	more	political	management-oriented	communication	practices.	Such	integration	increases	 the	 likeliness	 that	 these	 “channels	 of	 communication”	 become	politicized	 and	 integrated	 in	 the	 dominating	 conflict	 narratives	 (e.g.	 that	 of	‘revisionist’	Russia).	While	public	and	cultural	diplomacy	previously	were	able	to	work	as	a	diplomatic	track	that	could	ensure	some	kind	of	intercultural	relations	even	 in	 times	 where	 the	 official	 channels	 are	 affected	 by	 increased	 political	tensions	or	even	state	of	war,	the	integration	with	strategic	communication	puts	this	 to	a	 risk.	From	 this	perspective	 the	pervasiveness	of	 strategic	 rationalities	might	 in	 worst	 case	 cause	 damaging	 effects	 on	 the	 diplomats	 ability	 to	 work	beside	the	political	level.			
It	 is	 out	 of	 the	 realm	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 actually	 suggest	 how	 dominating	 this	tendency	has	become	within	broader	regimes	of	EU	diplomatic	practices,	but	this	thesis	has	revealed	 that	 the	EU	 is	clearly	promoting	 these	rationalities	 through	for	example	The	StratCom	Regime.	Furthermore,	 I	 cannot	provide	a	conclusion	on	whether	the	EU’s	governance	through	strategic	communication	risks	to	have	damaging	 effects	 for	 the	 diplomats’	 abilities	 to	 work	 beside	 the	 political	structures	 and	 keep	 the	 other	 “channels”	 open	 in	 times	 of	 increased	 political	tensions	between	 the	EU	and	Russia.	 In	order	 to	get	 a	 closer	understanding	of	the	actual	 influence	of	 strategic	 communication	on	 the	 traditional	 intercultural	frameworks	within	diplomatic	practice,	more	study	is	needed.	Furthermore,	this	thesis	 highly	 encourages	 future	 studies	 to	 take	 up	 how	 the	 broader	institutionalization	 of	 strategic	 communication	 practice	 into	 the	 institutional	structures	of	the	EEAS	affects	the	EU’s	ability	to	bridge	the	EU’s	“gaps”	between	it	identity	as	supranational	and	intergovernmental.	
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8 Conclusion:	Governing	through	
strategic	communication		 	
How	does	the	EU	govern	through	strategic	communication	with	the	aim	to	diminish	the	
effects	of	perceived	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media?			By	 constructing	 of	 The	 StratCom	Regime,	 I	 have	 analyzed	 the	 “relatively	stable	
field	 of	 correlation	of	 visibilities,	mentalities,	 technologies	 and	agencies”	 through	which	EU	governance	takes	place	(Dean	2009:	37).			My	 findings	 from	 the	 analyzes	 of	 the	 four	 governmentality	 dimensions	 of	 The	StratCom	 Regime	 have	 shown	 that	 EU	 governance	 is	 enabled	 through	 the	problematization	 of	 the	 Russian	 media	 (the	 field	 of	 visibility),	 which	 is	legitimized	through	the	utopias	of	press	norms	and	independent	media	(the	field	of	 episteme).	 The	 form	 of	 conduct	 is	 empowered	 through	 the	 EU	 policy	practitioners	and	national	diplomats	endorsement	of	the	EUs	East	StratCom	as	a	legitimate	policy	response	towards	Russian	“disinformation”.			The	 EU	 promotes	 the	 necessity	 of	 member	 states	 to	 engage	 in	 strategic	communication	 practices	 in	 Russia	 through	 promoting	 a	 conflict	 narrative	 of	Russia	 as	 a	 ‘revisionist’	 state.	 Through	 this	 narrative	 Russian	 minorities	 in	member	 states	 and	 partnership	 countries	 are	 constructed	 as	 a	 potential	 risk,	which	 strengthens	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 necessity	 of	 a	 united	 foreign	 policy	response	 towards	 “disinformation”	 among	 the	EU	member	 states.	 Through	 the	conflict	 narrative,	 the	 EU	 actors	 are	 furthermore	 enabled	 to	 link	 the	 general	“disinformation”	 in	 media	 to	 the	 problematization	 of	 Russian	 “disinformation	campaigns”	led	by	the	Russian	state.	This	has	enabled	the	EU	to	initiate	the	East	StratCom,	 which	 indirectly	 targets	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 Russian	 state,	 but	 works	through	 the	 Eastern	 Parnership	 Programme,	 the	 Disinformation-Review,	
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network-formation	 within	 The	 StratCom	 Regime	 and	 the	 broader	 regime	 of	practices,	 and	 through	 a	 broad	 array	 of	 strategic	 communication	 tools	 and	activities	in	Russia	(the	field	of	techne).			Due	to	its	central	position	within	The	StratCom	Regime	the	EU	level	is	enabled	to	organize	 the	 strategic	 communication	 actions	 of	 member	 states	 through	 the	network	in	Russia.	The	foundation	of	the	East	StratCom	Team	has	made	the	EU	level	 construct	 strategic	 communication	 practices	 and	 rationalities	 as	 a	 new	policy	approach.	But	as	my	analysis	shows,	strategic	communication	must	rather	be	 characterized	 as	 a	 unifying	 policy	 practice,	 which	 has	 subjected	 existing	diplomatic	 practices	 as	 public	 diplomacy,	 media	 diplomacy,	 and	 political	diplomatic	 communication.	 This	 has	 been	 enabled	 through	 prevailing	 strategic	rationalities,	 which	 encourage	 the	 national	 diplomats	 to	 seek	 ‘fit’	 creation	between	 the	national	 and	 the	EU’s	 strategic	 communication.	 Through	 strategic	aims,	the	diplomatic	practices	performed	by	the	diplomats	are	aligned	with	the	objectives	of	the	East	StratCom.	In	this	way	the	national	diplomats	are	enabled	to	contribute	 indirectly	 to	 the	East	 StratCom	while	 they	 are	working	 to	 fulfill	 the	expectation	 from	 their	 national	 states.	 This	 form	 of	 governance	 is	 to	 a	 large	extent	 carried	 out	 through	 conduct	 of	 conduct	 within	 The	 StratCom	 Regime,	where	 the	 diplomats	 are	 encouraged	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 role	 as	 ‘strategically	communicating	diplomats’	(formation	of	identities).			Through	the	 internalization	of	 the	strategic	rationalities,	 the	diplomats	become	inclined	to	align	with	the	EU	level	as	often	as	possible.	Since	the	bilateral	level	is	still	strongest	among	the	diplomats	in	Russia,	this	is	only	possible	when	national	and	 EU-interests	 overlap.	 However,	 on	 the	 long	 run,	 the	 conduct	 towards	strategic	 diplomatic	 communication	 can	 contribute	 to	 strengthen	 the	 EU’s	identity	as	a	unified	supranational	foreign	policy	actor.	
	The	 governance	 processes	 enabled	 through	 The	 StratCom	 Regime	 can	 be	summed	up	according	to	the	sub-question.		
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Subquestion	1:	How	do	utopian	assumptions	and	a	problematization	of	“disinformation”	in	the	Russian	media	construct	a	field	for	legitimate	EU	governance?		The	field	for	EU	govenance	is	constructed	through:	
- Legitimation	of	strategic	diplomatic	communication	through	epistemic	
utopias	of	independent	media	and	press	norms.	
- Construction	of	the	conflict	narrative	of	Russia	as	a	‘revisionist’	state.	
- Construction	of	“disinformation”	in	Russian	media	as	part	of	Russia’s	
“disinformation	campaign”.	
- Legitimation	of	strategic	communication	practice	through	a	facts-based	
approach	and	‘othering’	of	the	Russian	media	system.	
	Subquestion	2:	How	is	strategic	communication	practice	implemented	among	diplomats	in	Russia,	and	how	does	it	enable	governance	through	The	StratCom	Regime?	
	Governance	through	The	StratCom	Regime	is	enabled	through:	
- Institutionalization	of	strategic	communication	as	a	unifying	foreign	policy	
practice.	
- The	promotion	of	strategic	rationalities.	
- Promotion	of	‘fit’	creation	between	national	and	EU-level	strategic	
communication.		
- Formation	of	strategically	communicating	diplomats.		
	Since	governmentality	processes	“do	not	work	in	universal	mechanistic	ways	but	
must	 be	 analyzed	 in	 their	 complex	 societal	 and	 cultural	 contexts”	 (Kurki	 2011:	36f)	 the	 rationalities	 and	practices	which	have	been	 included	 in	The	 StratCom	Regime	 can	only	be	understood	within	 the	 empirical	 context	of	 this	 study.	But	since	this	thesis	has	revealed	that	many	of	the	utopias,	the	strategic	rationalities,	the	diplomatic	practices,	and	also	the	greater	conflict	narrative,	are	drawing	on	hegemonic	discourses	within	the	EU,	I	suggest	that	the	dynamics	detected	with	The	StratCom	Regime	might	be	applicable	on	similar	sub-regimes	within	the	EU.	However,	I	leave	it	to	further	studies	to	investigate	this	supposition.	
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10 Appendix		
10.1 Appendix	1.	Dimensions	of	The	StratCom	Regime	
	
	
The	StratCom	Regime	Field	of	episteme	 -The	EU	as	a	supranational	unified	
foreign	policy	actor	vs.	the	EU	as	an	
arena	for	member	states		
-	Democratic	public	sphere	
-	Neoliberal	utopias	
-	Independent	media	&	press	norms	
-	Propaganda	&	disinformation	Field	of	visibility	 -	Conflict	narrative	on”	Russia’s	
revisionist	aspirations”	
-	Problematization	of	the	Russian	media	
system	Field	of	techne	 -	Legitimate	discourse	on	strategic	
communication		
-	Rationality:	Strategic	aims	
-	Diplomatic	practices:	- Public	Diplomacy	- Media	Diplomacy	- Traditional	diplomatic	
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communication	- Network	creation	Creation	of	identities	 -	Strategic	communicating	diplomats		Table:	Dimensions	of	The	StratCom	Regime	
10.2 Appendix	2.	Actors	in	the	broader	regime	
of	practices	
	The	 following	provide	an	overview	over	different	kinds	of	 actors,	which	are	 in	some	way	engaged	in	the	broader	regime	of	practices	–	The	Regime	of	Strategic	Diplomatic	Communication	towards	Russian	"Disinformation".		This	 should	 only	 be	 seen	 as	 some	 selected	 examples	 to	 provide	 a	 rough	illustrative	 overview,	 and	 in	 this	 way	 central	 actors	 might	 not	 be	 included.	Furthermore	 the	 “borders”	 of	 the	 regime	 of	 practices	 are	 fluent,	 with	 some	actors	 playing	 a	 more	 central	 role	 (or	 being	 included/excluded)	 in	 some	problematizations	and	practices	while	not	 in	other.	The	actors	below	are	all	 in	some	 extend	 related	 to	 “disinformation”	 in	 the	 Russian	 media,	 but	 does	 not	indicate	how	like-minded/not	likeminded	the	actors	are.	
	
	
Like-minded	actors:	
	 - Multilateral	 actors:	 European	 Union,	 OSCE,	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 NATO	
(stratcom	team),	UNESCO	- Governmental	actors:	the	Embassy	of	the	United	States,	embassies	of	other	
Western	states,	EU	friendly	governments	in	Eastern	Partnership	states	- Liberal	political	non-systemic	opposition	in	Russia	
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- Regulative	 actors	 (other	 than	 states):	 Internet	 service	 providers,	 social	
network	hosts		- Knowledge	 producing	 actors:	 University	 research	 departments,	 think	
tanks,	e.g.	Carnegie	Center	Moscow	- Organizations	 for	 democracy,	 freedom	 of	 speech,	 and	 free	 press:	
European	Endowment	for	Democracy,	Reporters	without	borders,	Amnesty	
International,	International	Media	Support	- Myth-busting	networks	and	internet	watch-dogs:	e.g.	Rublacklist.net	- News	 media	 and	 journalist	 associations:	 Mass	 Media	 Defence	 Centre,	
Russian	 Union	 of	 Journalists,	 International	 and	 European	 Federation	 of	
Journalists,	Deutsche	Welle,	BBC,	Radio	Free	Europe/Radio	Liberty,	Russian	
“second-tier”	media	- Bloggers,	“tweeters”,	“instagrammers”	and	other	opinion	makers/sharers	on	social	media		
	
Not	like-minded	actors:		 - The	 Russian	 state,	 Rozkomnadzor,	 government	 supporting	 parties,	‘systemic	opposition’	- Russian	pro-Kreml	media	owners,	editors,	journalist,	bloggers,	and	public	opinion	makers	- Pro-Kremlin	think	tanks	and	research	departments	- Russian	“first-tier”	media	- Patriotic/anti-Western	groups	 inside	of	Russia,	 the	EU,	and	EU	neighbor	states	- Promoters	of	catholic	right-wing/orthodoxy	- EU-skeptical	groups	outside	and	inside	the	EU	Etc.	
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10.3 Appendix	3.	Table	of	public	diplomacy	
	
		
The	Public	Diplomacy	Continuum,	Global	Affairs	Canada	2005,	(Online),	Available:	http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2005/evaluation/horizontal_review-examen_horizontal.aspx?lang=eng#ng3_2											
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10.4 Appendix	4.	Formidlingsartikel	
	
Valg	af	medie:	Information	
Genre:	Kronik	
Antal	tegn:	7.500	
	
Begrundelse:		Målet	med	min	 formidlingsartikel	har	været	at	præsentere	nogle	af	aspekterne	ved	EU’s	”styring”	gennem	strategisk	kommunikation	på	en	måde,	der	kan	være	nærværende	og	let	tilgængelige	for	den	gængse	avislæser.			Jeg	 har	 valgt	 at	 formidle	 stoffet	 som	 en	 kronik,	 da	 denne	 debatterende	formidlingsform	 tillader	 mig	 at	 præsentere	 nogle	 mere	 grundlæggende	refleksioner	omkring	sammenhængskraften	i	EU	og	de	strategiske	logikker,	som	er	 fremherskende	 i	de	 styrende	samfundslag	 i	EU.	Tilsvarende	muliggør	denne	genre,	at	 jeg	 igennem	artiklen	kan	rejse	nogle	bredere	spørgsmål,	 som	læseren	selv	 kan	 tænke	 videre	 over.	 Jeg	 har	 i	 kronikken	 taget	 afsæt	 i	 specialets	konklusioner	vedrørende	de	fremherskende	strategiske	styringsrationaler	inden	for	diplomatiet,	samt	den	rolle	 internationale	konfliktnarrativer	spiller	 for	EU’s	muligheder	 for	 at	 skabe	 intern	 samling.	 Kronikken	 rækker	 ud	 over	 specialets	fokus,	i	det	jeg	i	kronikken	træder	ud	af	den	”neutrale”	forskerrolle	og	tillægger	mig	 en	 mere	 normativ	 diskuterende	 og	 problematiserende	 taleposition.	Derudover	 inddrager	 kronikken	 særlige	 perspektiver/informationer,	 som	 jeg	vurderer	har	relevans	for	den	danske	læser.		Jeg	har	valgt	dagbladet	Information	som	medie,	da	avisens	målgruppe	er	blandt	den	mere	 veluddannede	del	 af	 den	danske	befolkning,	 som	 typisk	 interesserer	
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sig	for	internationalt	stof	med	storpolitisk	udsyn.	Samtidig	er	Information	kendt	for	 at	 være	 en	 mere	 kritisk	 venstrefløjsavis,	 som	 sætter	 en	 dyd	 i	 at	 stille	spørgsmål	til	det	etablerede	og	det,	vi	normalt	tager	for	givet.	Derfor	falder	min	kritiske	undersøgelse	af	EU’s	brug	af	internationale	fjendebilleder	og	strategiske	styringsredskaber	i	fin	tråd	med	avisens	profil.		
10.4.1 KRONIK		
	
Er	Rusland	EU’s	strategiske	
redningsplanke?	
	
En	 nyttig	 fjende.	 I	 takt	 med	 at	 det	 interne	 sammenhold	 i	 EU	 smuldrer,	 har	Unionens	diplomatiske	korps	 sat	de	 strategiske	kommunikatører	 i	 frontlinjen	 i	Øst.	 Men	 er	 målet	 den	 russiske	 ”løgne-kampagne”,	 eller	 er	 det	 snarere	 EU-borgerne	selv?		
	
Gry	Waagner	Falkenstrøm	
	”EU	finansierer	kz-lejre,	og	der	er	i	øvrigt	også	krematorier!	Og	jeg	sad	og	så	det	på	
live	tv,	og	der	tænkte	jeg:	Hold	da	op	altså”.	Sådan	fortæller	EU-diplomaten	Søren	Liborius	om	en	af	de	mange	”løgnehistorier”,	han	 jævnligt	ser	 i	 landsdækkende	russisk	tv.	Historien	her	omhandler	en	af	EU’s	 flygtningeprogrammer	 i	Ukraine	og	 er	 et	 eksempel	 på	 de	 falske	 russiske	 nyheder,	 som	 han	 i	 stigende	 grad	 har	iagttaget,	 siden	 Ukraine-konfliktens	 udbrud.	 Tilsvarende	 historier,	 som	 havner	på	 to	 do-listen	 hos	 EU’s	 kommunikations-strateger	 i	 Rusland,	 omfatter	 alt	 fra	korsfæstede	børn,	til	nedskudte	fly	og	interview,	der	aldrig	har	fundet	sted.		Som	et	modtræk	til	historier	som	disse	har	EU	fra	september	sidste	år	søsat	et	East	 StratCom	 Team,	 der	 samarbejder	med	 de	 udsendte	 diplomater	 fra	 EU	 og	medlemslandene	 om	 at	 udvikle	 strategisk	 kommunikation	 rettet	 mod	 både	Unionens	nuværende	og	måske	kommende	borgere	i	Øst.	Det	erklærede	formål	
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er	 at	 styrke	 de	 uafhængige	 medier	 og	 indsatsen	 mod	 de	 falske	 informationer	samt	 generelt	 at	 underbygge	 EU’s	 naboskabspolitikker	 i	 Øst.	 Men	 er	 den	strategiske	kommunikation	udelukkende	et	redskab	i	kampen	mod	den	såkaldte	russiske	medieoffensiv,	 eller	 benytter	 EU	 sig	 af	 en	 kærkommen	 lejlighed	 til	 at	styrke	det	indre	sammenhold?			
Den	strategiske	diplomat	er	EU’s	nye	helt	
	For	 EU	 er	 der	 klare	 fordele	 ved	 at	 styrke	 udviklingen	 af	 ”moderne”	 strategisk	kommunikerende	 diplomater.	 EU’s	 identitet	 –	 også	 i	 udenrigspolitikken	 -	 er	grundlæggende	skizofren.	På	den	ene	side	udgør	EU	en	selvstændig	overnational	aktør,	som	kan	markere	sig	over	for	Rusland,	men	på	samme	tid	er	den	reduceret	til	en	forhandlings-	og	samarbejdsarena	for	de	mange	medlemsstater.		Vi	kender	strategisk	kommunikation	fra	indenrigspolitikken.	Her	har	den	ofte	en	negativ	 samklang	 med	 spindoktorers	 fejen-under-gulvtæppet	 eller	 diverse	partiers	 charmekampagner	 på	 bybusserne.	 Men	 ser	 vi	 på	 management	litteraturens	definitioner,	er	der	større	grund	til	EU’s	begejstring	for	konceptet.	Her	 defineres	 strategisk	 kommunikation	 som	 et	 redskab	 til	 at	 opsætte	strategiske	mål	og	skabe	et	’fit’	mellem	aktiviteter,	visioner	og	målsætninger.	I	en	udenrigspolitisk	 virkelighed,	 hvor	 EU	 er	 afhængig	 af	 medlemslandenes	opbakning,	 er	 det	 vel	 netop	 sådan	 en	 værktøjskasse,	 der	 kan	 sikre	 EU’s	overlevelse	 i	 en	 tid,	 hvor	medlemsstaterne	 i	 stigende	 grad	 vender	 sig	mod	 sig	selv.	 Ny	 forskning	 om	 EU’s	 strategiske	 kommunikation	 i	 Rusland	 har	 netop	påvist,	at	den	strategiske	kommunikation	i	stigende	grad	bruges	til	at	bygge	bro	mellem	EU	og	det	nationale	diplomatiske	arbejde.	Det	er	en	af	forklaringerne	på,	at	den	strategiske	kommunikation	er	kommet	højt	på	EU-dagsordenen	 i	blandt	andet	 Rusland,	 hvor	 EU	 aktivt	 promoverer	 den	 som	 et	 vigtigt	 diplomatisk	redskab.	 Det	 får	 diplomaterne	 fra	 EU	 og	 medlemsstaterne	 til	 i	 højere	 grad	 at	samtænke	deres	politiske	statements,	udvikle	”best	practices”,	’like’	hinanden	på	de	sociale	medier	og	ugentligt	dele	”disinformations-analyser”	i	stor	stil.			
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Ved	 at	 placere	 sig	 centralt	 i	 den	 strategiske	 udvikling	 kan	 EU	 være	med	 til	 at	udvikle	 diplomater,	 som	 kan	 bruge	 deres	 strategiske	 sans	 til	 at	 skabe	overensstemmelse	 og	 ”fit”	 mellem	 de	 nationale	 udenrigsagendaer	 og	 EU’s	budskaber	 og	 visioner.	 	 På	 den	 måde	 kan	 strategisk	 kommunikation	 blive	 et	nyttigt	 skjult	 redskab	 til	 at	 skabe	 samling	 i	 EU	 i	 en	 tid,	 hvor	 de	 nationale	regeringer	ikke	bliver	populære	på	at	fremme	den	fælles	europæiske	dagsorden	internt.	På	det	mere	synlige	plan	kan	EU’s	East	StratCom	mod	Rusland	bidrage	til	at	 vise	 borgerne,	 at	 Unionen	 beskytter	 dem	mod	 en	 løgnagtig	 nabo,	 og	 at	 EU-pengene	derved	ikke	blot	forsvinder	dybt	i	EU-bureaukratiets	egne	lommer.		
Rift	om	udenrigspolitikken	
	De	strategiske	rationaler,	der	dominerer	indenrigspolitikken,	har	også	for	længst	fået	 blik	 for	 potentialerne	 i	 at	 samtænke	 udenrigspolitikken	 i	 de	 interne	anliggender.	Hvis	vi	skal	tage	Danmark	som	eksempel,	så	er	udviklingsbistanden	på	det	seneste	blevet	til	”indenrigsbistand”	til	flygtninge	i	Danmark,	og	kampen	mod	 Islamisk	 Stat	 i	 Syrien	 er	 tilsvarende	 blevet	 ’framet’	 som	 et	 indenrigs	sikkerhedsspørgsmål.	 På	 den	 måde	 er	 der	 mange	 strategiske	 hensyn,	 den	moderne	 diplomat	 skal	 tage,	 hvis	 både	 de	 indenrigspolitiske	 agendaer	 og	 EU’s	udenrigspolitiske	 visioner	 skal	 kommunikeres	 igennem	 udenrigspolitikken.	 Da	EU	ofte	må	følge	medlemsstaternes	taktstokke,	ender	de	nationale	agendaer	med	at	vægte	højest.	Vil	EU	derfor	sikre,	at	så	mange	af	EU-landene	engagerer	sig	i	et	fælles	 udenrigspolitisk	 anliggende,	 som	 for	 eksempel	 den	 øgede	 retoriske	konfliktoptrapning	fra	russisk	side,	så	handler	det	om	at	gøre	de	eksterne	trusler	interne.	Derfor	 gøres	den	 russiske	 ”løgne-kampagne”	 relevant	 for	EU-borgerne	ved	at	den	ofte	bliver	koblet	 sammen	de	 russiske	mediers	mulighed	 for	 at	øge	kløften	 mellem	 de	 etniske	 befolkninger	 og	 russiske	 minoriteter	 i	medlemslandene.	Det	sker	ved	at	italesætte,	hvordan	præsident	Putin	gennem	de	russiske	 medier	 har	 et	 direkte	 talerør	 til	 at	 udbrede	 propaganda,	 der	 gør	 de	russiske	minoriteter	 i	EU	loyale	over	for	Rusland.	Lige	som	det	skete	i	Ukraine,	kan	den	loyalitet	blive	destabiliserende	for	de	enkelte	medlemslande,	men	også	for	EU	som	helhed.			
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Vi	samles	om	truslen	og	lader	værdierne	sejle		Når	 EU	 landenes	 diplomater	 i	 Moskva	 skal	 kommunikere	 til	 den	 russiske	offentlighed,	 er	 indholdet	 ofte	 af	 bilateral	 karakter.	 Et	 område,	 hvor	diplomaterne	med	fordel	kan	samtænke	de	nationale	fortællinger	med	EU’s,	er	i	forhold	til	de	grundlæggende	værdier	om	demokrati,	ytrings-	og	pressefrihed	og	retssamfund.	 Det	 er	 værdier,	 som	 skaber	 et	 ’fit’	 imellem	 EU	 og	 de	 enkelte	medlemslande.	Men	i	en	tid	hvor	mange	af	de	nationale	regeringer	i	EU	i	stigende	grad	 går	 på	 kompromis	med	 de	 fælles	 værdier	 (eller	 hvor	 det	 virker	 for	 dyrt	aktivt	at	promovere	dem)	kan	selv	værdi-fortællingen	komme	til	at	klinge	hult.			For	hvordan	skal	diplomaterne	kunne	promovere	EU’s	”universelle	værdier”	om	åbenhed	og	menneskerettigheder	samtidig	med,	at	en	lang	række	medlemslande	sætter	 grænsekontroller	 op	 mod	 flygtninge,	 hvor	 polakkerne	 øger	statskontrollen	med	medierne,	danskerne	 indfører	”smykkelove”	og	briterne	er	på	vej	til	at	melde	sig	helt	ud	af	EU-fællesskabet?		Hvis	 ikke	 vores	 fælles	 værdier	 kan	 bruges	 til	 at	 skabe	 sammenhæng	 i	 den	diplomatiske	fortælling	over	for	Rusland,	hvad	skal	så?	Og	hvis	EU	landene	ikke	skal	samles	om	de	fælles	værdier	i	en	tid,	hvor	sammenhængskraften	smuldrer,	hvad	skal	så	holde	os	sammen?		Hvor	de	fælles	værdier	i	EU	svækkes,	træder	konfliktfortællingen	om	den	fælles	trussel	 til	 i	 stedet	 for	at	 skabe	sammenhold	mod	 terroristerne,	 flygtningene	og	Rusland.	Så	nok	kan	Rusland	ses	som	en	nyttig	fjende	for	EU,	når	det	kommer	til	at	 styrke	 den	 fælles	 fortælling	 i	 en	 opbrudstid.	 Men	 frygtnarrativet	 åbner	samtidigt	 op	 for	 nye	måder	 for	medlemslandene	 at	 legimitere,	 at	 flere	 går	 på	kompromis	 med	 de	 fælles	 værdier.	 En	 pessimistisk	 anlagt	 læser	 vil	 nok	 selv	tænke	videre	over,	hvad	konsekvenserne	vil	være,	hvis	de	ydre	trusler	i	stigende	grad	bliver	den	strategisk	samlende	kraft	i	EU	–	i	stedet	for	værdierne.		
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